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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the interaction of market-based development policy with
democratic decentralization in ecological frontiers in western India inhabited by the vast
majority of the country‘s poor. The study explores how the leaders of elected local bodies
called panchayats who are driven by the imperatives of broad-based distribution deliver
upwardly distributive capital-intensive development in resource-poor communities during
a period of state-neoliberalization. On the basis of eighteen months of ethnographic
fieldwork in eastern Gujarat, the study explores how the implication of panchayats- the
world‘s largest system of democratic politics- in large-scale politics shapes the
distribution of material resources in resource-dependent communities. In the context of
the state‘s devolution of governance to non-state actors, the project investigates the role
of political society actors including panchayat leaders, vote-brokers and political
competitors in shaping the distribution and governance of market-led development and its
impact on well-being. In doing so, the dissertation uses a mixed-method design
combining a range of qualitative and quantitative techniques including archival research,
household surveys, in-depth interviews, political ethnography, multi-site participant
observation, and national, state and district-level data.
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1. Market-Driven Development in the Drylands: Policy, Institutions, Politics
How do market-based development and democratic decentralization interact to
shape well-being in resource-poor communities? How do elected local leaders
implementing capital-intensive development in labor-rich societies do so, given their
imperatives of broad-based distribution and the indivisible nature of new material
resources delivered to communities through market-led development policy? How are
new markets in institutional credit and high-value commodity production organized in
natural resource-dependent communities? This dissertation lies at the nexus of these
questions and explores market-driven development implemented by elected local bodies
called panchayats in semi-arid eastern Gujarat, western India, inhabited
disproportionately by households in poverty.
This dissertation is a study of ‗Hariyali‘ (Greenery), the Indian state‘s largest
watershed development program implemented by panchayats enacted by the Indian state
through the Panchayati Raj Institutions Act in 1994. This study is situated in the
geopolitical context of the state‘s devolution of development to non-state actors since the
2000s, contemporary development policy paradigm‘s emphasis on linking the poor with
markets to improve their well-being, and the expansion of the financial sector‘s role in
development policy implementation. I inquire into the relationship between market-based
development policy and democratic politics in India‘s drylands inhabited by the vast
majority of its poor; the impact of panchayats- the world‘s largest apparatus of
democratic politics on the distribution of market-driven development technologies; and
the way in which market-driven development‘s specific activities- micro-credit and high1

value commodity production are organized in remote communities through modes of
self-governance involving actors in political society- that sphere which arises from civil
society and comprises all actors, organizations, parties and movements concerned with
capturing state power (Cohen & Arato, 1992) including elected representatives, informal
leaders, development agents, political competitors and vote brokers.
Watershed development extends commercial inputs for high-value commodity
production, deepens institutional credit and expands irrigation in semi-arid regions in
India (see Li, 1999; and Nevins & Peluso, 2008 for Southeast Asian cases). Situated
within the larger capital-intensification of small-scale agriculture worldwide since the
1990s, the largest watershed development intervention in India implemented in smallscale communities has shifted from ecological regeneration to irrigation intensification
for cash-crop production in the 2000s, raising questions about the impact of this strategy
on ecological security, food security for food-insecure households and inequality in the
drylands.
The Panchayati Raj Institutions Act devolves power and resources for community
development and local governance to elected local bodies called panchayats. Watershed
development‘s implementation was shifted from NGOs to panchayats in 2003, putting the
intervention squarely in the domain of electoral politics. Regional parties in India gained
significant power with respect to national parties in the 1980s (Jaffrelot, 1998; Rudolph
& Rudolph, 2002), and the enactment of Panchayati Raj (Elected Local Bodies‘ Rule)
represents national parties‘ attempt to reassert control over democratic politics by
channeling development directly to panchayat leaders.
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This study investigates the way in which democratic politics shapes the
distribution of market-based development‘s indivisible technologies in resource-poor
communities, and how development interventions in semi-arid areas inhabited by the vast
majority of India‘s poor voters are shaped by political competition between parties and
panchayats‘ implication in higher scales of electoral politics. In the context of the rise of
liberal democracy worldwide and deepening theoretical concern with the impact of
democracy on distributional justice, the dissertation explores how development policy
implementation by elected leaders shapes household well-being, and the extent to which
market-driven development comprising credit delivery and high-value commodity
production is a strategy of poverty-alleviation in resource-dependent communities.
Watershed development exemplifies the state‘s devolution of governance to nonstate actors including contractual employees, NGOs and panchayat leaders called
sarpanches and ward members elected from each electoral ward in a panchayat.
Watershed development‘s centerpiece is the delivery of commercial micro-credit to
households to purchase inputs for commodity production. This dissertation examines how
the distribution of power in state institutions of democratic decentralization and marketdriven development policy, in market institutions, social institutions and political
institutions shape different development subjects‘ ability to control and exploit the
economic mobility offered by capital.
The dissertation investigates how neoliberal development and democratic politics
unfold in geographic contexts by means of a study in Gujarat, the poster-state of marketbased reforms in India, where the central state‘s neoliberalization is bolstered by the promarket orientation of the regional state to materialize what may be the most capital3

intensive form of watershed development in India. Gujarat has one of the highest
economic growth rates in India and is ruled by the Hindu nationalist BJP, one of India‘s
and the world‘s largest political parties. Known as the laboratory of Hindu nationalism,
Gujarat epitomizes a dream tale of the success of BJP‘s political ideology of antiminority nationalism, on the basis of which the party has ruled in the state continuously
since 1995. Despite overall success in the state, Hindu nationalism has had limited
success among subaltern voters in Gujarat comprising lower castes and tribes due to its
tacit acceptance of caste-based discrimination, and due to deepening inequality in Gujarat
under the BJP‘s rule. Gujarat‘s semi-arid districts inhabited by lower-castes and tribes are
unstable sites of support for the BJP.
I investigate how watershed development is shaped by India‘s largest national
parties, the Congress and BJP‘s attempts to woo poor voters in the drylands, and how
development is shaped by political competition between the Congress which rules the
central state and implements watershed development, and the BJP which delivers state
government development schemes. Fieldwork for this dissertation was conducted in
Dahod district, eastern Gujarat, the epicenter of the worst episode of collective violence
against Muslims in postcolonial India in which the BJP-led government in Gujarat is
widely considered complicit (HRW, 2002). This eroded support for the BJP in Dahod and
turned it into a battleground district for both the Congress and BJP to win an election and
score larger political points. Panchayats are implicated in political parties‘ electoral
contests because sarpanches are vote-brokers for parties. A study in Dahod enables
understanding how panchayats‘ significance deepens political competition in the locality
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to control the panchayat, and the role of clinetelist politics in shaping panchayats‘
distributional decisions.
On the basis of 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork combining a range of
qualitative and quantitative techniques, I explore how market-driven development policy,
grassroots democratization and market structures interact with social norms to shape
agrarian change in eastern Gujarat. In the context of neoliberal governmentality or the
state‘s delegation of governance to non-state actors, the dissertation focuses on the ways
in which electoral politics, transaction costs, and the politico-social processes of forging
markets shape the organization of market-driven development and the distribution of its
gains.
The Interaction of Formal Institutions with Informal Rules
Policy is shaped by the spatial context in which it is implemented. Market-driven
development and democratic decentralization interact with social norms in small-scale
societies to shape the governance of development. The drylands are commonly
considered egalitarian because of relatively low land inequality (e.g. Shah, Banerji,
Vijayshankar, & Ambasta, 1998). However, there are political forces at work in access to,
control over and transformation of landscapes (Blaikie & Brookfield, 1987; Peet &
Watts, 1996; Robbins, 2004). Property rights to land, water, forests and grasslands which
shape household well-being, are the outcomes of political struggles and interests, and
property rights enable actors to control the stream of benefits from these resources. Social
organization in semi-arid India is on the basis of the lineage which traces its descent from
a common male ancestor. ‗Settler lineages‘ that founded a village control high-quality
land which enables them to invest in well-deepening. Wells are inherited with land and
5

are deepened jointly by kin, therefore kinship, lineage and identity shape control over
land and water in rainfed areas.
Power is also shaped by patterns of social structure such as caste-tribe relations
which accord disproportionate power to cultivator-castes relative to tribes and
‗untouchable‘ castes. Tribes are called Adivasis (literally, indigenous people) and castes
that are considered ‗untouchable‘ by upper caste Hindus are called Dalit (literally, the
broken and oppressed). Identity is a source of power, and Kolis- a cultivator-caste in
Gujarat, Adivasis and Dalits do not intermarry. Kolis do not eat with Dalits and Adivasis;
accept food cooked by them or water served by them. Kolis have better-quality land than
Adivasis and Dalits, higher well-ownership, higher access to institutional credit through
cooperative banks and greater representation in government employment. Rules of
interaction between Kolis on the one hand and Adivasis and Dalits on the other accord
more power to Kolis, and these rules are seldom violated because violation may result in
banishment from the village or humiliation.
Social recognition, identity and the capacity for agency are closely related
(Kabeer, 2002). Social actors have differential abilities to realize their interests due to
differences in their resource endowments (Agarwal, 1997), and experience constraints on
their agency which may be imposed by more powerful actors on less powerful ones.
Power shapes social actors‘ bargaining advantage in their interactions with others to
secure watershed development‘s material technologies.
Small-scale societies maintain social order through informal rules of governance
which are enforced in the locality without relying on the higher authority of the state
(Taylor, 1982). Informal governance structures interact with panchayats to order
6

communal life. In eastern Gujarat, informal governance mechanisms include the dispute
mediation process or ‗council of elders‘ called the panch, and the institution of
headmanship called patlai which preceded Panchayati Raj. Interpersonal disputes within
the lineage are resolved by lineage leaders who are usually wealthier men that own
perennial wells, which means that lineage leaders are non-migrants and receptacles of
collective memory.
Serious disputes over land, wells, livestock, implements, marriage and violence
are resolved through the panch (literally, ‗group of five‘) comprising all lineages‘ leaders.
The panch involves two or more lineage leaders who mediate on disputants‘ behalf, listen
to each disputant‘s account, establish wrongdoing and determine a fine. Disputants avoid
going to the police or courts because the police demand bribes and court cases involve
traveling to the district court which has several years‘ backlog and a case might drag for
many years without resolution (Krishna, 2002). Therefore informal institutions (informal
in the sense that they are not codified into laws, although they are in fact very formal in
the way they function) play a critical role in resolving disputes and sanctioning offenders.
Lineage leaders impose graduated sanctions on wrongdoers, first imposing a fine, then
prohibiting the use of shared wells and motors, and finally turning the offender to the
police. Because of their power of sanctioning, lineage leaders exert control over
community affairs, the panchayat and development; and control over the panch accords
social actors considerable power.
The institution of patlai or headmanship was initiated in 1960 when the state of
Gujarat was carved out of Bombay state after the success of the Maha Gujarat (Greater
Gujarat) movement in demanding a separate state for Gujarati-speaking people. The
7

Mamlatdar or district tax collection officer conducted interviews with candidates from
each village to appoint a suitable candidate as headman to collect tax and govern village
life. Interviews were held periodically to appoint a new candidate. Patels maintained
communal peace and reported serious offences to the police. The patel received an annual
payment (paagdi) and non-taxable land in exchange for his services. Because of their
familiarity with the law and local administrators, senior patels are still called upon by
sarpanches to resolve serious disputes over forests, murder and violence, and may even
have more authority in the internal matters of a village than the sarpanch. Patels both
supplement the panchayat‘s authority and are a countervailing institution to the
panchayat, and the office of the patel accords extensive power in the locality. This
dissertation explores how market-driven development policy and democratic
decentralization interact with informal institutions of governance that carve out
jurisdiction over justice and fairness in the locality and are a significant counterpoint to
panchayats.
In the next section, I outline the theoretical framework that informs the
dissertation and situate watershed development‘s upward distribution of development
within economic reforms in India and transformations in global dryland development
policy.
Theoretical Approaches
Understanding development as a process of planned social and economic change
(Hobart 1993); I conceptualize watershed development as a strategy of institutional
change to bring into being market-based production in the drylands. Institutions are
humanly devised constraints that structure social interactions because they specify the
8

rewards and punishments of specific actions (North 1990). Institutions include both
codified laws and informal norms, codes of conduct and conventions. Policies are a
special case of institutions that allocate resources to achieve certain state goals,
incentivize certain behavior on development subjects‘ part, and achieve larger objectives
of social and economic progress.
Some accounts of institutional emergence and change such as North‘s (1981) and
Barzel‘s (1989) suggest that social actors design institutions to meet collective needs of
gains from exchange, cooperation or coordination. These accounts suggest that actors
select those institutions that provide collective gains over those that do not, and
institutions move in the direction of constant improvement as less efficient institutions
are weeded out in favor of more efficient ones. However, such a conception does not
account for the gap between individual motivations to secure the greatest gain from an
institution and institutions‘ collectively beneficial outcomes.
Accounts such as Knight‘s (1992), Libecap‘s (1989), North‘s (1990) and
Agrawal‘s (1999) recognize that while institutions may achieve valuable outcomes such
as gains from exchange, coordination and cooperation, they need not distribute these
gains equally. Moreover, these gains are not the primary motivations that drive the
creation of institutions, but the distributional conflicts inherent in shared social activities
are the drivers of institutions. The shared nature of the benefits of an institution means
that actors try to create an institution that gives them a distributional advantage from a
joint endeavor, and powerful actors may be able to impose their institutional preferences
on less powerful ones.

9

Accounts such as Knight‘s (1992), Libecap‘s (1989), North‘s (1990) and
Agrawal‘s (1999) are more plausible conceptions of institutions because they place they
identify distributional conflicts as the driving mechanism of institutional change.
Knight‘s (1992) account is particularly compelling because it makes the simplest
assumption: that social actors do the best they can given what others are going to do, and
therefore asymmetries of power are critical in influencing the nature of institutions and
processes of institutional change.
I use this formulation to understand watershed development as the product of the
ascendance of a market-driven paradigm in macroeconomic and development policymaking, leading to the neoliberalization of development policy for the drylands inhabited
by the vast majority of India‘s poor. The Indian state‘s adoption of a neoliberal policy
paradigm since the 2000s is exemplified by a shift in the state‘s rhetoric of citizenship
from the poor to the middle class, from emphasizing the development of human
capabilities to underlining individual self-reliance, from agriculture to business as the
backbone of economic growth (Rao, 2007), deeper tax concessions for businesses (Kohli,
2006), the adoption of a liberal democratic order based on the principle of market
expansion and nurturing Indian corporations‘ growth (see Singh, 2007), an outwardoriented economic approach of integration in the global economy (Frankel, 2005), the
weakening of environmental regulations (Menon & Kohli, 2008), the weakening of labor
laws, the commodification of natural resources (GOI, 2005) and withdrawal from
strengthening human capabilities such as by cutting down on food security for those
subsisting close to and below the poverty line (Hindu, 2007).

10

I draw upon Ostrom‘s (1990) conception of nested institutions wherein lowerlevel institutions are shaped by rules set by higher-level institutions to understand
watershed development as nested within pro-market economic reforms by the Indian state
since the 2000s. Watershed development constitutes a technology of neoliberal social and
economic change in the drylands, which has transformed from the 1990s to the 2000s
from subsistence food security to cash-crop production, from state improvement of public
land to investing in private cultivated land, from delivering micro-credit for meeting
subsistence needs to delivering it for commodity production for external (both domestic
and international) markets, from environmental regeneration to natural resource
extraction for cash-crop production, from soil and moisture conservation for collective
needs to dam-building for water-intensive cash-crops, and from employment-generation
in labor-rich and high-unemployment regions to capital-intensification.
Watershed development was rechristened ‗Hariyali‘ (Greenery) in 2003, shifting
from environmental regeneration to natural resource extraction through dam-building for
irrigation, and from improving the commons on which the poor rely disproportionately
for subsistence to investing in cultivated land owned by well-off households. Watershed
development embodies capital-intensification of development policy, privatization of
technologies of soil and moisture conservation, and upward distribution of policy
instruments to owners of flat land, wells and irrigation motors who can lift dam-water
and channel it to their fields.
Watershed development dovetails into the transformation of Indian agricultural
policy in the late 1990s from food self-reliance to profit generation, state withdrawal
from investment in agriculture, a shift from food-crop based research to cash-crop
11

centered research, and within food-crops, a shift from research on affordable staples to
high-value crops for urban markets, and farmers‘ integration with increasingly volatile
global markets. Watershed development‘s transformation is also situated within policy
shifts in global policy organizations such as the International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI) and the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
(CGIAR), and financial institutions like the World Bank which have advocated marketbased development as a vehicle for poverty-reduction in semi-arid areas since the late
1990s (e.g. Braun, 2005; GOI, 2006a, 2008; IBRD, 2008; e.g. IFPRI, 1999; Rosegrant,
Cai, Cline, & Nakagawa, 2002).
Watershed development is labeled ‗the second green revolution‘, (GOI, 2006a),
echoing the first green revolution which channeled commercial high-yielding seeds,
pesticides and fertilizer to irrigated districts to increase agricultural productivity. While
the new seed technology was assumed to be scale-neutral or deliver the same increase in
output per unit of input, the technology required access to irrigation and credit to
purchase the new commercial inputs, putting wealthy farmers at an advantage in cashcrop production. Watershed development signifies the expansion of the green revolution
to frontiers of commercial agriculture accompanied by knowledge of the technology‘s
inequality-deepening effects, and raises questions about how the technology is distributed
in the resource-poor drylands inhabited by cash-strapped households, what its
consequences are, and how people respond to it, which are the themes of this dissertation.
Development is a tool of bringing about agrarian and economic change (see
Evans, 2004; Ferguson, 1990; Gupta, 1998; Peters, 1994; Subramanian, 2009), and
watershed development is a strategy of technological, financial and institutional change
12

that integrates the drylands with new circuits of capital, credit and commodities in the
21st century for market-driven growth in dryland agriculture. In the next section I
describe the shift in watershed development from labor-intensive to capital-intensive
technologies from the 1990s to the 2000s, and link these changes to changes in
macroeconomic policies and the neoliberalization of the state.
Watershed Development’s Policy Trajectory from the 1990s to the 2000s
Watershed development was crafted in the early 1990s by combining
interventions focused on natural resource management and poverty alleviation in semiarid areas under one umbrella, including the Desert Development Program, the Drought
Prone Area Program and the Integrated Wasteland Development Program. The drylands
have low and erratic rainfall spread unevenly over space and time and their growing
season is just 90-150 days compared to 170-210 days for irrigated districts (Shah et al.,
1998). These regions are inhabited largely by small farmers owning one to two hectares
of land (one hectare equals 2.47 acres), marginal farmers owning less than one hectare of
land and landless households.
The drylands are food-insecure and the vast majority of people undertake
migration to meet food needs, and rely on communal resources for food and fodder. In
eastern Gujarat, 76 per cent households are unable to meet their food requirements for
more than six months a year and many do not produce enough food for more than two to
three months (Mosse et al., 2002). Most households migrate as wage laborers after the
rainfed cultivation season- from 65 per cent in eastern Gujarat (Mosse et al., 2002) to 52
per cent in central India (Deshingkar & Start, 2003). Households depend extensively on
natural resources on public lands to meet food, fuelwood and fodder needs (Jodha 1995).
13

Natural resources comprise 17 to 23 per cent of poor households‘ income in the drylands
and 69-84 per cent depend on them for grazing (Jodha, 2000). Public lands and
commons provide fruits, tubers, berries, leaves and grass for fodder, fuelwood and housebuilding and implement-building materials.
In the 1990s, watershed development consisted of labor-intensive technologies to
regenerate public lands including village ponds, forests and grazing lands which attained
the dual objectives of ecological security and employment-creation. These technologies
included contour-bunding (building earthen embankments on sloping grazing lands to
reduce soil erosion and conserve water), contour-trenching (digging moisture-conserving
trenches in public lands to prevent soil runoff), gully-plugging (plugging soil-depleting
water channels with stones and vegetation), and field-bunding (raising earthen
embankments around fields to conserve rainwater). Activities on public lands had a
strong redistributive effect because less well-off households participated in them to a
greater extent than well-off ones. Additionally, wage employment enabled purchasing
foodgrains and ensured food security.
In the late 1990s, the Indian state‘s largest watershed development intervention
funded by the Council for the Advancement of People‘s Action and Rural Technology
(CAPART), an autonomous body under the aegis of the central state‘s Ministry of Rural
Development shifted from ecological restoration to irrigation expansion and from laborintensive techniques targeted on public lands to the improvement of private cultivated
land. The shift in watershed development, which has been the single-largest development
intervention for the drylands inhabited by the largest proportion of India‘s households
subsisting below the poverty line, signifies broader trends in the post-liberalization state,
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including the state‘s withdrawal from public goods‘ provision, the privatization of
development policy wherein policy instruments channel collective resources to private
beneficiaries, the upward redistribution of development policy from poorer to better-off
families, the shift from state emphasis on human capabilities to fostering entrepreneurial
proclivities, and switch in state orientation from being a buffer between the market and
vulnerable social groups to linking vulnerable groups deeply with markets.
In watershed development, this policy shift is constituted by a move from waterprovision for drinking needs and livestock to augmenting irrigation for cash-crop
production. For instance, in a circular to district officers, the Department of Panchayats,
Rural Housing, and Rural Development of the Government of Gujarat emphasized
terminating tank-deepening which generates water for subsistence needs and massive
wage-employment to generating irrigation potential for cash-crops instead:
‗Physical works in public lands such as digging a new tank, strengthening the
embankments of a tank, or deepening an existing tank may not be attempted….
instead, stone dams, check dams and earthen-cum-check dams… should be built‘
(GOG, 2005a).
Harnath Jagawat, Dahod‘s largest development NGO Sadguru‘s director and a
member of Gujarat‘s state-level Watershed Development Training Committee and
Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, confirms the capital-intensification of watershed
development in Gujarat:
Soil and moisture conservation (comprising labor-intensive activities), is
fundamental to any watershed. That has to be the highest priority. In Gujarat
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that‘s missing. In Gujarat bureaucrats have said ‗You can‘t build field bunds,
deepen tanks, or undertake earthen works.‘
Watershed development‘s capital-intensification in the late 1990s was
accompanied by the intervention‘s administration being transferred from CAPART to the
Ministry of Rural Development‘s Department of Land Resources, bringing the policy
firmly within state control. The Department of Land Resources now channels funds
directly to the District Rural Development Agency- the highest development agency in a
district, the lowest administrative level in India, which channels funds to NGOs.
Kashiben Kanasiya, a watershed development specialist in the NGO Anandi remarks:
CAPART and the DRDA work very differently. CAPART used to focus on
earthen bunds. The DRDA has done away with earthen bunds…. with whichever
works generate more employment, are labor-intensive and involve earthwork.
Now the unwritten rule for NGOs implementing DRDA-administered watershed
development is to build check dams. Every time the DRDA releases an
installment of monies, it tells us ‗Build a check dam or check wall.‘
Dams are emblematic of the ‗upward distribution‘ (Sundar, 2011) of dryland
development policy favour of capital. Eighty per cent of a dam‘s funds are channeled to
cement manufacturers and retail stores; contractors who rent out concrete mixers and
water tanks; and tractor-owners that transport materials from stores to dam sites. Laborers
receive only twenty per cent of the outlay on a dam. In effect as well, dams channel water
resources to owners of deep wells with irrigation motors that can lift dam-water with
pipes and channel it to their fields. Production categories link social groups, property
rights and physical space (Pigg, 1992), and watershed development‘s policy texts (GOI,
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2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a) articulate the ‗farmer‘ (khedut) (GOG, 1998)- the irrigator,
owner of flat land, and holder of perennial wells as the representative dryland inhabitant,
shifting citizenship from subordinate groups to owners of property.
While policy-making and implementation are typically assumed to be collective
because development policy is delivered to a community as a whole, insights from
distributional accounts of institutions suggest that development policies are better thought
of as contested and partial. In this project, I examine how distributional rules embedded
in watershed development policy interact with social norms in the drylands to shape the
outcomes of market-based development.
Before proceeding, I distinguish between institutions and organizations.
Institutions are sets of rules that structure interactions among social actors, while
organizations are groups of actors governed by particular rules. However, some entities
can be conceptualized as both institutions and organizations, such as the enterprise, the
bank or the panchayat, which is a practice I will follow in this study. The next section
describes the formal structures of watershed development‘s implementation.
Implementation Structure
Watershed development is implemented by the Department of Land Resources of
the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India. Seventy five per cent of the
intervention‘s funding comes from the central government and 25 per cent from the state
government. Both the central government and state government channel funds to the
District Rural Development Agency. The District Development Officer, the highest level
civil servant in a district from the Indian Administrative Service, the mythologized steel
frame of India, oversees the intervention‘s timely execution and quality of
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implementation. The District Rural Development Agency is in charge of the day-to-day
administration of watershed development. The District Rural Development Agency‘s
Director and Deputy Director, bureaucrats from the state government‘s civil service
which is subordinate to the central government‘s civil service, report to the District
Development Officer on progress in implementation.
The District Rural Development Agency selects villages to implement watershed
development, and with emphasis on state-civil society partnership in development,
appoints a ‗lead NGO‘ to recruit and train district- and block-level staff. The District
Rural Development Agency‘s officers meet with contractually recruited staff every
month, report progress on achieving targets to the Department of Land Resources, and
implement new activities on the basis of policymakers‘ feedback. To be eligible to
become a lead NGO, an NGO must have implemented more than 30 watershed projects
and have an annual turnover of more than 2,000,000 rupees. This gives large-scale
technocratic NGOs an advantage in becoming lead NGOs.
With the decline in the state‘s role as an employment provider since the 1990s,
there has been a sharp reduction in long-term employment and a marked rise in
contractualization within the state, with many governmental functions being carried out
not by government employees in salaried positions but by contractual hires. The lead
NGO recruits contractual staff and acts as a legal buffer between contract staff and the
District Rural Development Agency, protecting the agency against contractual
employees‘ potential demands to be made permanent government employees (GOG,
2005b). The lead NGO rather than the District Rural Development Agency issues
newspaper advertisements to recruit staff; evaluates candidates‘ performance in written
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examinations, conducts interviews jointly with the District Rural Development Agency
and issues letters of appointment.
The lead NGO is assisted by a district-level Multi-Disciplinary Team comprising
a district-level micro-credit expert, an irrigation expert, a community mobilization expert
and an agricultural expert, who are also contractually hired. The ‗soft‘ and messy tasks of
participatory rural appraisals which involve interacting directly with communities and the
lowest-level staff in the watershed development apparatus are delegated to the lead NGO
and district-level experts. The District Rural Development Agency also disburses funds to
the Block Development Office at the block, the administrative level between the district
and village comprising a cluster of 20-30 villages, which in turn disburses funds to
communities.
At the block, watershed development is implemented by a block-level watershed
development team. This team comprises an agriculture extension specialist or livestock
specialist, an irrigation engineer and a social development expert. The watershed
development team is supervised by a ‗nodal officer‘. Dahod has seven watershed
development teams, one for each block, with a total of 28 staff. Watershed development
is a five-year intervention and is extended to a new cohort of villages every year. The
watershed development team implements the intervention in villages at different stages of
implementation at any given time. The watershed development team conducts
participatory rural appraisals; gives technical expertise on irrigation, cash crops and
micro-credit to village level farmer groups, micro-credit groups, water-user groups and
the village watershed development committee; and delivers funds for activities through
the village watershed development committee.
19

The state is limited in its ability to rule based on limits on its ability to know, and
builds partnerships with local leaders to enact development (Sivaramakrishnan, 1996). At
the village level, watershed development is implemented by a village watershed
development committee which is headed by the sarpanch who is elected by the entire
electorate of a panchayat. The village watershed committee comprises the sarpanch, a
ward member representative and one representative each from the village level farmers‘
groups, ‗self-help‘ groups who access micro-credit, and ‗user-group‘ who use natural
resources, reflecting development actors‘ deployment of groups as new sites of
improvement. Additionally, the committee includes a representative from the block-level
watershed development team and the nodal officer. However, in practice, decisionmaking powers, control over the disbursement of funds, and execution of activities rest
with the sarpanch, making the sarpanch and the panchayat salient analytical units.
In the next section I provide a brief outline of the remaining chapters of the
dissertation.
Outline of the Study
This study explores how neoliberal development interacts with democratic
decentralization to shape watershed development and the distribution of its gains. I focus
on the role of political competition and clientelism in panchayats in shaping the
distribution of watershed development‘s material technologies, and the limits of
democratic politics in achieving distributional justice. In the context of the state‘s
devolution of governance to community actors, I highlight the role of transaction costs in
influencing the organization of micro-credit groups; and how asymmetries of
information, resources and countervailing power over panchayats between group20

members and group-leaders gives group-leaders disproportionate control over loans.
Finally, I show how commodity markets are not only economic but also social and
political entities shaped by power relations between dryland commodity producers and
monopsonistic firms, with prices paid to producers being indexical of these power
relations. Firms‘ priorities of maximizing production vest local organizational power with
the wealthiest producers, and household-level commodity production is shaped by local
politics.
Chapter 2 describes the field site and methods. Chapter 3 describes the
significance of Dahod as a site of political competition between the Congress and BJP to
capture state power, and how watershed development is shaped by panchayats‘
implication in large-scale politics. Watershed development is an instrument of political
patronage and is the outcome of political competition between parties to woo voters.
Panchayats‘ implication in large-scale electoral politics vests sarpanches with extensive
power and panchayats are sites of intense competition among local leaders not only to
shape village development but also channel votes to political parties and secure higher
political office. Panchayats‘ significance in the locality and the channeling of vast
resources to panchayats are intimately tied to their significance for macro politics.
Chapter 4 describes how the capital-intensification of watershed development is
mediated by electoral politics. With watershed development‘s devolution to panchayats,
distribution in the locality is shaped by the timing of elections and the political agency of
vote-brokers. Voters secure development not simply on the basis of their electoral size
but their ability to make a credible threat of withdrawing support from a candidate, and
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groups that are least dependent on development patronage for economic advancement
secure the greatest proportion of watershed development.
Chapter 5 explores how neoliberal governmentality and the devolution of microcredit‘s governance to contracted employees and communities impose the transaction
costs of banking on self-help groups. Lineage leaders become the locus for organizing
self-help groups based on their capacity to sanction group members, their mutual
vulnerability with the sarpanch who disburses loans, and their ability to interact with
external actors. Shifts in bargaining advantage between leaders and members from the
collateral-building to the loan-taking stage create space for leaders‘ usurpation of loans.
In Chapter 6 I show that commodity production is facilitated by earlier forms of
capitalist production in eastern Gujarat, and the market is not something that stands above
society but is organized through inherently political means and social relations. This
chapter explores the politics of commodity pricing involving the state, locality and
market which determine commodity producers‘ returns from market-based production
and unsettle policy declarations of commodity-production as a wealth-generation
strategy. I unpack ‗economic value‘ to foreground the elisions of value involved in
market-based production, and power relations of class, geography, caste, gender and
economic ideology that inflect commodity pricing. Chapter 7 concludes with the findings
of the study, recommendations for policy and directions for future research.
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2. Ethnographic Setting, Field Site and Methods
This chapter describes the social, economic and political context of Gujarat,
Dahod district, and the methods employed in the dissertation.
Capitalist Pasts and Neoliberal Presents in Gujarat
Gujarat is a historically capital-friendly state shaped by a past of mercantile
capitalism enabled by a long coastline and proximity to ports. Gujarat was a center for
tobacco, cotton, textile and gem production from 1700-1930. This led to the rise of a
powerful industrial, mercantile and commercial class in the region. Gujarat‘s dominant
social groups comprise Brahmins, Vanias, Patels and Patidars- middle and upper-castes
who control most agricultural land in the state. The class-caste alliance of Brahmins,
Vanias, Patels, Patidars, business owners and commercial interests in Gujarat has
consistently emphasized private property, free reign for business, and state investment in
industrial development rather than redistributive policies.
The Congress ruled Gujarat from 1960-75 and prioritized private enterprise in the
state, with the party being led by pro-entrepreneurship leaders Sardar Vallabhai Patel and
Morarji Desai. These leaders emphasized private-sector led industrialization and
increasing agricultural output by delivering canal irrigation and credit to large
landowners rather than undertaking land redistribution. Unlike other industrialized states
where leftist political parties such as the Communist Party of India have a larger or
smaller presence, the organized Left has not had a strong presence in Gujarat except for a
brief period in the 1970s when the Janta Party-led coalition government led the state. The
lack of the organized Left‘s presence is attributed to Mohandas Gandhi‘s influence over
Gujarat‘s business community in the early 20th century to extend concessions to workers,
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so that labor-capital relations did not have the same antagonism in Gujarat as in other
states.

Figure 1 Location of Gujarat in India
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The state is not an entity that stands apart from society but comprises actors who
bear social identities (Migdal, 1994). The Gujarat government‘s bureaucrats embody the
entrepreneurial spirit of dominant Gujarati society. India‘s federated structure gives
regional states considerable autonomy in designing economic policies, and the
Government of Gujarat‘s bureaucrats have worked closely with the central state to attract
private investment to Gujarat (Sinha, 2003). With the rise in regional states‘ power with
respect to the central state in the post-liberalization period (Rudolph & Rudolph, 2001;
Sinha, 2011), the Government of Gujarat has emerged as the flagship state of marketdriven development in India, particularly under the rule of the explicitly the pro-capital
BJP since 1995. In the post-liberalization period since the 1990s, Gujarat awarded the
second-highest number of mining leases to the private sector (Lobo & Kumar, 2007), and
for 2000-2006, garnered the sixth-highest foreign direct investment in the country worth
4,112,730,000 rupees ($82,254,600).
In urban areas, liberalized governance has taken the form of privatization of
public spaces, devolution of civic services to private corporations, exclusionary urban
renewal that has driven the poor, religious minorities and lower castes to the city‘s
margins (Chatterjee, 2009), labor-displacing investment (UNDP, 2004) and the
deployment of public resources for ‗pseudo-public spaces‘ (Hayward, 2011) of
consumption and leisure. In the case of rural development, the Gujarat government has
articulated a ‗government to business‘ policy and has taken the lead in using information
and communication technologies for gathering market-related information at the village,
block and district- panchayats (GOI, 2006c). Training manuals for rural development
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urge district-level bureaucrats to monitor market trends, advise Block Development
Officers- the highest-level development officers at the block to identify profitable
activities for rural producers to undertake (GOG, 2007), advocate e-marketing
commodities through district level cooperatives and exhort self-help groups to produce
marketable goods.
Market-driven development is facilitated by older forms of commodity production
in semi-arid communities that are already implicated in capitalist economy in Gujarat.
Gujarat has well-developed rural roads and state highways which link producers with
input markets, crop markets and veterinary services, and facilitate information-gathering
through easy access to market towns. There is congruence between the central state and
Gujarat state on technological preferences in watershed development including dambuilding, extending high-yielding seed varieties, fertilizer and pesticide to perennial-well
owning farmers, extending micro-credit contingent on commodity-production, and
connecting producers to cooperative enterprises for selling high-value commodities.
With the rise of a federal market economy since the 2000s, public-private
partnership has been an ascendant feature of the Indian state‘s development policy. There
is congruence between the goals of market institutions such as commercial banks and
cooperative commodity enterprises and the state government in Gujarat regarding rural
monetization, input-intensification and value-added agriculture. In Dahod district in
eastern Gujarat for instance, the District Development Officer has ardently promoted
commodity production as a development strategy ‗to increase GDP and per capita income
five-fold‘. Congruence between the state and market on implementing market-driven
development combine to produce a highly capital-intensive form of watershed
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development in Gujarat, making Gujarat a compelling site to study how market-based
development unfolds in the drylands, the mechanisms through which the state links
remote communities to financial and commodity enterprises, market-based
development‘s interaction with democratic decentralization, its mediation by informal
rules of governance in dryland communities, and the way it articulates with the
aspirations of dryland subjects. Hariyali is implemented in all seven blocks of Dahod
district. In 2007, the intervention was implemented in 355 villages in Dahod, and by
2008, the intervention was implemented across 84,000 hectares.
Dahod’s Empirical Significance and its Social Groups
India‘s drylands have received little analytical attention compared to agrarian
regions and forested environments in South Asia which have been the staple of South
Asian agrarian studies and environmental studies respectively (e.g. Baviskar, 2005;
D'Souza, 2006; Dubash, 2002; Gidwani, 1996; Gururani, 1996; Mosse, 2003; Pandian,
2009; Saberwal, 1997; Sivaramakrishnan, 1996; Skaria, 1999; Sundar, 1995). Scholarship
on Gujarat‘s many margins has explored social and economic change in agrarian
environments (Dubash, 2002; Gidwani, 2008), forests (Skaria, 1999) and pastoral
communities (Mehta, 2005), but semi-arid communities that are part-cultivating, partwage-migrating and part natural resource-dependent defy categories, and this
dissertation attempts to fill the gap in scholarship on these hybrid zones.
Dahod lies in the semi-arid tropics and is known as the eastern gateway of
Gujarat. The Mughal ruler Aurangzeb was born in Dahod fort in 1618 and gave its chiefs
territories in return for guarding the Satpura passes. Dahod‘s inhabitants comprise Bhils,
the largest tribe in western India, and Kolis, lower-caste cultivators that have lived side
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by side with Bhils. Kolis are small farmers owning less than two hectares of land and are
concentrated in Limkheda block. Kolis own the flattest land and deep wells ranging from
60 to 70 feet in depth, indicating a long history of iterative well-deepening and surplus
production.
Kolis venerate saints of the Bhakti movement popular from the 14th to 17th
century which produced the saints Mirabai, Tukaram, Namdeo, Surdas and Kabir, many
of them from ritually ‗polluting‘ castes who rejected Brahmanistic rituals and emphasized
every being‘s capacity for unmediated oneness with God through devotion. Kolis in
eastern Gujarat generally worship Surdas and Kabir. Despite the Bhakti movement‘s
egalitarian roots, Kolis live in greater proximity with caste Hindus and consider
themselves hierarchically superior to Adivasis and Dalits. In Gujarat, status among lower
castes is shaped not only by occupation but also by eating meat. Kolis assert ritual
superiority over Dalits by not eating beef and mark themselves as superior (sudhrela) to
Bhils by means of rituals of daily bathing and not drinking liquor. However, these rules
are transgressed in daily life, and on the ground, Kolis and Adivasis are not distinct
groups but fluid boundaries, with many Kolis in particular not distinguishing themselves
from Adivasis. Instead, Dahod‘s social groups define themselves contingently as Koli,
Adivasi, Hindu, or by none of these macro categories but instead by their lineage which
draws its descent from a common ancestor, and which is the most salient market of
identity in eastern Gujarat.
Adivasis in eastern Gujarat comprise Bhils on whom anthropological scholarship
abounds. Bhils practiced both cultivation and hunting and gathering, and fully settled and
tax-paying Bhil peasants, occasional-cultivator Bhils and hunter-gatherer Bhils lived side
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by side (Roy Burman, Choudhuri, & Mishra, 2004). The histories of the Bhils in eastern
Gujarat are enmeshed with the ideological proclivities of their historiographers who
constructed Bhil history to fit with larger narratives of particular orders like Rajput
power, Mughal pre-eminence, or, since the 1990s, a pan-Hindu nationhood. Historical
accounts variously suggest that Bhils were a tribe, that they were upper caste Rajputs (a
warrior-caste) driven to the forests of eastern Gujarat, and that an autonomous Bhil ruling
group, neither tribal nor Hindu was driven to the forests by the Rajputs.
Statemaking, Appropriation and Resistance
Eastern Gujarat has always been implicated in broader forms of ‗statemaking‘ or
the state‘s attempt to penetrate society, extract and appropriate resources, exact
compliance and govern social relations (Migdal, 1988; Sivaramakrishnan, 1999). The
colonial state tried to induce forest-based tribes to switch to cultivation because land was
abundant but labor was scarce, therefore labor was highly prized (Sundar, 1995).
Settlement officers gave tribal chiefs titles, pagdis or tax collection rights and extra
shares of village land to persuade them to settle people. Settlement officers also granted
individual concessions to Adivasis to induce them to cultivate land rather than inhabit the
forest (BPA, 1903). Officals carefully monitored the expansion of settlements (BPA,
1902a) and extracted rent from cultivators (BPA, 1902b).
Eastern Gujarat has a long history of irrigated agriculture, surplus production, and
state investment in irrigation to increase agricultural productivity. Wholesale crop
markets operated in semi-arid central India by the 1860s. In 1899, farmers in Pathari
State in central India grew not only the staples of barley and maize but also wheat and
rice which were urban grains (BPA, 1899). Cultivators in eastern Gujarat grew rice,
29

wheat and yellow gram for market sale, with 21 per cent land under gram cultivation in
1877-88 and four per cent under wheat in 1898-99 (Hardiman, 1988). The state
incentivized irrigation for cash-crop production, and since at least the 13th century,
Gujarat‘s rulers encouraged well-deepening to be able to tax irrigated land at a higher rate
than unirrigated land.
From at least the 15th century onwards, Vanias (middle-caste Hindu) and Vohras
(Muslim) traders-merchants who expanded their operations in eastern Gujarat became a
major source of credit for well-deepening for cultivators (Hardiman, 1988). Cultivators
often became indebted to these trader-merchants, who dictated crop choices and
appropriated a significant part of the harvest as soon it was cut in the fields. After taking
control over many parts of Gujarat in 1817, the British supported well-deepening through
tax-exemption of irrigated cash-crops for two to eight years (Hardiman, 1998). The state
intervened selectively to remedy Vanias‘ and Vohras‘ excesses because trader-merchants
contributed to flourishing markets, but peasant revolts produced state response in the
form of closer monitoring of Vanias‘ and Vohras‘ usurious lending practices.
By the 18th century, Bhils were experiencing immiseration due to both Vanias and
Vohras and liquor merchants who sold liquor to Bhils and indebted them. This was
worsened by the colonial state‘s ban on brewing mahua used to make taadi, local liquor.
The aim behind the ban was to increase the state‘s revenues from taxes on liquor sale.
The Bhagat movement, a reform movement among Bhils arose in various parts of
western India in the 19th century in response to colonial laws evicting Bhils from forests
and increasing intolerance of Bhil lifestyle and custom of hunting and carrying bows and
arrows, growing Bhil immiseration due to indebtedness, and tightening control of
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moneylenders over Bhils. Bhagats were Bhils who had given up meat, liquor, bearing
arms and engaging in blood-feuds, took to daily bathing and settled cultivation, venerated
saints in the Bhakti tradition, ‗reformed‘ their ways and urged others to do so (Hardiman,
2003). Along with parts of southern Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, Dahod was the site
of the Bhil leader Govind‘s Bhagat movement around 1911. Govind emphasized nonviolence, exhorted Bhils to give up carrying bows and arrows, advocated rejecting a life
of violence and of cattle theft; advocated giving up alcohol and meat, and eschewing
bride price. Govind also urged Bhils to refuse to do forced labor (veth) which both the
princely states and the colonial state imposed on Bhils.
The Bhagat movement led to a fall in revenue from liquor tax for the princely
states of Sunth, Banswara and Mewar and hurt these states‘ economic interests (GOI,
1913b). Govind and 10,000 of his followers gathered at Mangadh hill on the border of
Dahod and Banswara district, Rajasthan in November 1913 to assert their power, gain
recognition from the colonial state, have it check local rulers‘, trader-merchants‘ and
moneylenders‘ exploitation, and perhaps try to form a separate territory (GOI, 1913a).
While Govind was captured and sentenced to death, his sentence was reduced to 10
years‘ imprisonment and Govind continued to preach after his release. Mangadh is the
site of the largest gathering of Bhils in western India every winter to commemorate
Govind‘s movement, carry out commerce, find suitable matches for marital alliances and
mobilize Bhils politically. The Mangadh fair is an important space for NGOs to raise
their visibility among semi-arid communities and for parties to woo this politically
powerful constituency in Gujarat, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh.
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Gujarat‘s Bhils are regarded as the most mainstream of all Bhil groups in western
India, with little distinguishing many of them from their Hinduized Koli neighbors. The
Congress ironically contributed to Bhil Hinduization in Dahod and Panchmahal in the
course of its famine relief work in the region in 1911 under the leadership of Amritlal
Thakkar. The Congress‘s vision for Bhil advancement was mainstreaming them. Drawing
upon Gandhi‘s emancipatory tropes which came from orthodox Hinduism and included
Hindu hymns, advocating vegetarianism and prayer, Amritlal Thakkar established the
Bhil Seva Mandal (Bhil Service Society) in Dahod in 1920 which initiated tribal
education through its residential schools, using Hindu symbols in Bhil education. Bhil
Seva Mandal contributed to crafting a new generation of Bhils that talked differently than
their elders (in Gujarati rather than Bhili), dressed differently and gained social mobility
through a measure of government employment. Due to its Gandhian roots, the Bhil Seva
Mandal is closely affiliated with the Congress party. The Bhil Seva Mandal was a vehicle
of vote-mobilization for the Congress until the 1980s, but its role in district politics has
diminished since the rise of the BJP in Dahod in the 1990s.
Dahod was carved out of Panchmahal district in 1997 and spans 3,642 square
kilometers. Dahod is cheek by jowl with Banswara district in southern Rajasthan and
Jhabua district in eastern Madhya Pradesh. The 2001 census lists Dahod‘s population at
1,636,433, 14th out of 25 districts in Gujarat (GOI, 2001). Dahod is 91.45 per cent rural.
The district has the second highest sex ratio in Gujarat, with 985 women per 1,000 men
(GOI, 2001). Overall literacy is 46 per cent with male literacy being 59 per cent and
female literacy being 32 per cent (GOI, 2001).
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Figure 2 Location of Dahod in Gujarat
Ecology and Livelihoods
The district is dominated by low hills, shrubs and dry deciduous trees of madhuca
indica (mahua), teak, sal, butea moosperma (khakhar), tamarindus indica (khati amli),
acacia catechu (khair), acacia nilotica (desi bawal) and gemalina arborea (sewan). The
region‘s low hills are crisscrossed by stream beds that gush with water during the rains in
July and August. Dahod has low and erratic rainfall and periodic drought, as Table 1
shows. In recent history, the district faced drought or scarcity during 1980-1983, 19851987 (GOI, 1991), and 1999-2000. Excess rain in 2004 and 2006 wiped out the staple
maize crop.
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Table 1 Annual Rainfall in Dahod in Millimeters, 2004-2009
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Total rainfall
1056.3
529.6
1199.3
860.1
529.9
428.1

Fluctuation in precipitation and food production mean that livestock are a critical
for economic security because they can be sold for cash in an emergency without having
to resort to mortgaging land. Well-being is based not only on land ownership but also
access to forests, grazing lands, watering ponds called tanks and stream beds for fodder.
Village forests provide fodder, fruits, tubers, flowers, seasumwood, gum, resin, wax,
bamboo, soapnut, grass for thatching roofs and making implements, and tendu and
khakhar leaves for cigarette-manufacturing and plate-making.
People practice multi-pronged livelihoods combining migration, subsistence
production and surplus production. Twenty four per cent households in Dahod are
medium farmers, 34 per cent are small farmers, 27 per cent are marginal farmers and 19
per cent are landless (GOG, 2008). Most families cultivate on sloping, erodible, infertile
upland plots solely in the rainfed (chaumaso) season from July to September and have
food for no more than six months. The two main agricultural seasons are chaumaso and
the winter cultivation season (shiyaalo) from December to February. The staple crops are
local varieties of drought-resistant maize, upland varieties of rice and millets which are
grown using conserved seeds. Only wealthier households with winter- and perennial-
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wells grow winter-crops of wheat and gram, or summer (unaalo) crops of lentils, oilseeds
and vegetables from April to June.
Livelihoods comprise agriculture, livestock production and migration as fieldlabor in irrigated districts to harvest cotton and barley (bajra) crops, and as laborers in the
construction industry. Migration is a strategy of both accumulation and survival.
Migration earnings are used to purchase seeds, fertilizer, deepen wells and repay loans.
Not just the poorest but middling households also migrate, finding it a more viable
strategy than cash crop production for accumulation because of widely fluctuating
agricultural prices and high levels of risk in cash crop production. Due to widely
fluctuating precipitation, even better off farmers maintain surplus foodgrains which can
be converted into cash for market purchases of foodgrains, fertilizer, seeds, medicines,
diesel and textbooks.
Settlement
Villages consist of scattered hamlets which are made up of houses set amidst their
fields. Villages are bordered by grasslands, forests, streambeds, village ponds called
tanks and sacred groves. Settlement is based on the lineage which draws its descent from
a common male ancestor. Villages are patrilineal and patrilocal and lineages practice
village exogamy, which expands social networks. Kolis and Adivasis have overlapping
lineage names indicating their shared histories. Major lineages in Dahod include Baria,
Chauhan, Patel, Nayak, Nayakda, Khat, Pageer, Vaghadia, Bhabhor and Patelia.
Each hamlet (falio) is founded by a single lineage but also includes sections of
subordinate lineages who may have settled along with a dominant lineage. Over time,
hamlets become more heterogeneous as new sections of a lineage bring distant lands
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under cultivation and build their houses amidst their fields in farther hamlets. Households
comprise both extended families consisting of an elder couple, their married sons with
spouses, and unmarried children; and nuclear households comprising only a married
couple and their small children, depending on how soon a couple is able to build its own
house. The immediate family, kin and the lineage are the basis of exchange and the
immediacy of social life.
The division of labor is gendered. Women manage livestock, clean sheds, graze,
lop grass for fodder and water livestock. Both women and men migrate for work in
poorer families, and only men migrate in wealthier families. Women exercise greater say
than men over decisions on food crops and men exercise greater control over cash crops.
Field tasks are gendered. Men perform plowing and women perform weeding, and both
harvest grains and irrigate. Grain cleaning and processing is exclusively women‘s task.
Kin pool labor for rice transplantation and wedding and death feasts.
Residence
Houses are thick-walled and built with mud mixed with straw. Dwellings have
elevated mud flooring to keep the interiors dry in the rains. Koli houses are spacious and
long with a broad verandah running along the length of the house. Beyond the verandah
lie a single large room or one large room and another smaller one with an earthen stove,
grain storage urns and a large area for tethering animals at night to prevent cattle theft
and predator killing. Grains are stored in covered earthen urns (kothi) in both inner rooms
and the verandah and are made with fine clay and earthen legs which keep them raised,
dry and free of pests. Urns are three to six feet high and have a two-foot radius. Housebuilding costs are high and require expenses on stones, cement, bricks, timber for beams
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and roof tiles. Married sons continue to stay with their fathers, and as more sons marry
and more space is needed for growing families, a new house may be built and two or
more sons may move into it.
Property
Wealth is shaped by kinship. Land and wells are inherited through the male line.
Widows‘, divorcees‘ and female inheritors‘ rights to land are relatively weak, and more
so among the Hinduized Kolis than Adivasis. Kin pool resources to dig a well and wells
are inherited along with land. The number of claimants to a well increase over time and
each perennial well may have more than 15 households holding water-rights. Welldeepening is undertaken incrementally and inter-generationally, and each family may
have water-rights in more than one well. Kin pool funds for well-deepening and repairs.
Once a well is deepened, it may be lined with bricks and a stone rim be built around its
mouth to prevent it from caving in. Farmers hire the services of uddos- well-digging
experts to deepen wells. Both Kolis and Adivasis use the services of water diviners called
balvo to identify the location of an aquifer. Well-digging is prohibitively expensive and
requires investment of 50,000-60,000 rupees to pay for machinery, labor and dynamite to
blast rocks.
Irrigation requires electric or diesel motors and rubber or PVC pipes which lift
water from wells and channel it to fields. While wells are joint property, irrigation motors
and pipes are privately owned or shared solely by siblings. Kinship promotes channels of
communication and access to kin networks for tools, credit and information on
development schemes.
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Local Governance
Due to male-centric inheritance rules and village exogamy, leadership in local
decision-making institutions such as the panchayat and panch is controlled by men.
People bestow the title of leader (agevaan) on a dispute-mediator on the basis of his
ability to enforce punishment and sanction offenders. While dispute-mediation vests
lineage leaders with considerable power, it is also fraught with danger- if a lineage leader
is considered unfair then disputants may not call upon their lineage leader but take their
dispute to the sarpanch or patel for resolution, and this may harm the lineage leader‘s
reputation. All ex-patels in a community are regarded as leaders and may be called upon
to resolve disagreements.
The panch is not a standing body but a network of leaders who are contingently
called upon to resolve disputes. Smaller disputes may involve just one or two disputemediators‘ intervention while larger disputes, including inter-lineage, inter-hamlet and
village-wide disputes entail all lineage-leaders‘ involvement. Likewise, small
misdemeanors may be resolved through sanctioning by hamlet-level leaders while murder
or grievous harm leads to the intervention of the patel and sarpanch.
Credit Institutions
The lineage is the first source of credit for wealthy lineages. Most households lack
access to institutional credit due to banks‘ demand of cash collateral. The Indian state
created primary agricultural credit societies to meet small cultivators‘ credit needs, and
Gujarat had 14,596 cooperative societies in 1962. In 1965, out of a rural population of
15,300,000; 14,900,000 were covered by cooperatives (GOG, 1965). Out of 19,017
villages, 18,531 were covered by primary agricultural credit societies which deliver
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seeds, fertilizer and veterinary care (GOG, 1965). However, the extent of household
coverage suggested by these numbers is misleading because cooperative credit societies
require cash collateral just like nationalized banks. Only the wealthiest borrowers with
diversified income through government employment, a lucrative political career,
contracting or trade can borrow from credit societies. These wealthy borrowers secure
credit at the lowest rates because cooperatives‘ interest rates are 1-3 per cent lower than
nationalized banks.
Chaandlo is an informal credit institution that fills the gap between cash-strapped
borrowers‘ credit needs and banks‘ rigid loan criteria and private lenders‘ usurious rates,
including Vania and Vohra moneylenders, shopkeepers and cash-crop farmermoneylenders. Chaandlo is a type of reciprocal clan-based credit institution activated in
summer whereby a household with a major expense such as house-building or welldeepening sends invitations to clan members for a fund-raising meal. Invitees visit the
borrower, partake a small meal, ascertain progress in the borrower‘s economic activity
(i.e. well-building or house-building‘s commencement) and give a small cash gift ranging
from 30-200 rupees depending on economic circumstance, proximity of kinship and
extent of personal reciprocity. The number of chaandlo invitations a family receives
indicates its standing in clan networks, and wealthier families receive more invitations.
Wealth shapes how much money a family can raise in a chaandlo. The more chaandlo
invitations a family responds to each year and gives cash gifts to, the more cash it can
expect when it hosts a feast for a major expense in turn. Identity, lineage and personal
wealth shape how much money a family can raise in a chaandlo. While a poor Adivasi
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family may be able to raise only 4,000-5,000 rupees through a feast, a Koli family may
easily raise 40,000-60,000 rupees.
Methods
This dissertation is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted from August 2006
to January 2008. However, this was not my first experience in Dahod. I was fascinated by
issues of social development in communities dependent on the environment, and had first
gone to Dahod to do field research for a master‘s thesis on irrigation systems in semi-arid
communities. I had conducted fieldwork in an Adivasi village in Garbada block and a
Koli-dominated village in Limkheda block. My first field experience got me interested in
local politics and power as the drivers of ecological change and development. I returned
to Dahod in the winter of 2004-2005, interested in the role of local institutions and
panchayats in shaping development. I conducted fieldwork in three communities- one
comprising Bhils, Patelias who are Adivasis and regard themselves as hierarchically
superior to Bhils; another comprising Bhils, Patelias and Dalits; and a third comprising
Kolis and Bhils. In Bhil-dominated Dahod, the social status of Bhils in Bhil-dominated
villages is very different from that in Koli-dominated villages, which kindled my interest
in how patterns of social stratification were created and enforced, and how they interacted
with development policies to shape different groups‘ social and economic mobility.
I had established contact with Sadguru and Foundation for Ecological Security
which are among Dahod‘s largest development NGOs during my first fieldwork
experience in 2000; and came to appreciate how communities did not accept NGOs‘
interventions on NGOs‘ terms but by appropriated development strategically to meet
their own priorities. I also familiarized myself with the local bureaucracy at the district
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headquarter, including the Forest Department, the Minor Irrigation Department, the
Tribal Sub Plan, the District Magistrate‘s office, the District Development Office and the
District Rural Development Agency. I was intrigued by how state agencies penetrated
rural communities to execute goals of economic production, natural resource
conservation and development, and the way policies were transformed on the ground
through shifts in the locus of knowledge and power.
The Indian state‘s enactment of panchayati raj coincided with the resurgence of
academic interest in democracy, and I became interested in how democratic
decentralization influenced elected leaders‘ development strategies and development
subjects‘ political engagement. I returned to Dahod for pre-dissertation fieldwork in
December 2004-January 2005 and conducted fieldwork in a village inhabited by Bhil
lineages, another village comprising Patelias (who regard themselves as superior to
Bhils), Bhils and Dalits; and a third village comprising Kolis and Bhils.
The Choice of Ethnography
Ethnography involves understanding reality from the worldview of those being
studied by living among them for a prolonged period of time, ‗a fusing, however
precarious‘, (Pachirat, 2009) of the researcher‘s ‗life-world with the life-worlds of those
she seeks to understand‘ (Pachirat, 2009). As an urban dweller who had grown up in a
metropolis and was ignorant about dryland economy and society, extended fieldwork in a
village was essential for me to understand forms of property, production, social and
political institutions, and dryland communities‘ relationship with the state.
Knowledge is produced through theoretical and methodological vantage points
from which research is conducted (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 2003). Epistemological
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questions are not separate from ontological ones- which questions are asked critically
shape what methods are best for answering them. Epistemological vantage points are also
spatial vantage points (Pachirat, 2008). I was committed to staying in a locality
implementing watershed development for an extended period of time to understand
statemaking- the state‘s attempt to extract resources, exact compliance and govern social
relations (Migdal, 1988; Sivaramakrishnan, 1999) from the perspective of those who
were the subjects of state action. A commitment to understanding what watershed
development and democratic decentralization meant for those experiencing them entailed
long term fieldwork, as it turned out, ten months in a village implementing watershed
development.
Ethnography relies on fieldwork, with the ‗field‘ denoting a site of data collection,
a method of collecting data and a location that provides an opportunity to understand
social processes (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997). Ethnographic fieldwork involves studying
people‘s actions in the social contexts in which they arise and engagement with the
social, economic and political context of the field rather than isolating data from the
contexts in which it is generated (Miller, 1997). Ethnography is a long-term commitment
to an investigation that ‗allows people to return to a daily life beyond what is performed
for the ethnographer‘(Miller, 1997), which reduces the reactivity of the research setting to
the researcher.
Ethnography enabled accessing the ‗everyday‘ practice of watershed development
through the actions of ordinary actors in the state, community, market and political
society, and the points at which the lowest level actors of these entities- district level
bureaucrats and technocrats, block level staff, sarpanches, ward members, political
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parties‘ leaders, lineage-leaders, self-help groups‘ leaders, bank managers, dairy
managers and development aspirants came into contact with one another.
Village level fieldwork gave insight into how subsistence production was
transforming and generated insight into cultivation‘s experimental nature, its aesthetics,
the ideas, experiences, travels and inclinations that influenced agricultural techniques and
crop choices; and people‘s keen understanding of cloud movements, surface water
movements and groundwater flows. Living in a village was invaluable in grasping how
macro structures impinged on daily life and gave insight into how geography was
politically produced, such that the drylands were hinterlands for water, forest produce and
foodgrains obtained cheaply; while the reverse flow of industrial inputs for agriculture,
processed goods, building materials, health, education, electricity, clothes, shoes,
medicines and transportation were dearly priced.
A commitment to ethnography embodies recognition that knowledge production
is a social process, i.e. knowledge is co-constituted by the interaction of the researcher
and the researched. Ethnography involves striving for objectivity through accountability
and openness about the research process. The ethnographic method attempts to deepen
objectivity by collecting data at multiple points of time to identify patterns of social
structure and individual action. Ethnography relies on seeking multiple data sources to
increase validity and gain contextual insight, including archival records, newspaper
articles, oral histories, organizational documents, local reports and evidence gathered
through participant observation, in-depth interviews, field observation and interactions
with key informants.
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The ethnographic method traces how the locality is produced through the actions
of both local and non-local actors (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002). To situate the locality
within larger institutions shaping actors‘ constraints such as democratic decentralization,
state transformation and the devolution of governance to non-state actors, I undertook
multisite fieldwork in Limkheda block, in Banswara district in Rajasthan, Panchmahal
district in Gujarat, and the cities of Ahmedabad, Delhi and Bombay. At the village level,
I used ethnography to build an account of the distribution of power and shifts in resource
endowments and bargaining advantage among different social groups over time. In
attempting to understand how panchayats were implicated in national parties‘ state-level
and national-level electoral contests, I conducted fieldwork on political parties, and
ethnography enabled extending the temporal thread of analysis on parties‘ moves back in
the recent past by combining archival evidence with oral histories and newspaper reports.
Fieldwork on the locality, local actors and local institutions was conducted in
Mahipura and Himmatpur villages in Limkheda block. Fieldwork on political society was
conducted at the BJP and Congress‘s public meetings in Dahod, interviews with Dahod‘s
BJP and Congress leaders, block-level bureaucrats, grassroots cadres of the BJP and
Congress, sarpanches, lineage-leaders, peasant intellectuals and voters; walk-alongs with
panchayat leaders; observation of village assemblies; participant observation of
panchayat elections in December 2006; and newspaper research.
Fieldwork on markets was conducted at the Panchmahal dairy in Godhra, the
Bank of Bandibar in Bandibar, markets in Limkheda, Devgadh Baria, Jhalod and
Fatehpura; and interviews with village shopkeepers and cash-crop farmers. Fieldwork on
the state was conducted at the panchayat office in Mahipura and Himmatpur villages, the
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Limkheda Block Development Office, the Limkheda Watershed Development Team‘s
Office, the Division Forest Office at Baria, the Range Forest Office at Randhikpur, the
District Rural Development Agency in Dahod, the Circuit House in Dahod, the Ministry
of Rural Development in New Delhi, the Ministry of Agriculture in New Delhi, the
Planning Commission in New Delhi, and archival research at the National Archives and
Nehru Memorial library, both in New Delhi.
Selection of the Field Site
I began district level fieldwork in Dahod in mid-September 2006, securing
housing, establishing a workspace and introducing myself to government agencies‘ and
NGOs‘ representatives including the District Rural Development Agency‘s Director,
Deputy Director and Assistant Deputy Director; and the NGOs Anandi, Pravaah, Prakruti
Foundation, Bhil Seva Mandal, Mahatma Gandhi Pratishthan and Mahila Swaraj Abhiyan
(Women‘s Self-Governance Movement). I familiarized myself with the routines of
Gramin Vikas Trust, the Lead NGO and introduced myself to the district-level MultiDisciplinary Team‘s members. My proficiency in Gujarati led to my being regarded as an
insider by most people, and repeated fieldwork in Dahod had familiarized with the dialect
of Gujarati spoken in eastern Gujarat, therefore I encountered no difficulty in
communicating with people.
Dahod town has a flourishing grain and spice market (mandi). With banking
sector reforms and private banks‘ entry in the drylands, the private-sector banks Housing
Development Finance Corporation (HDFC), Industrial Development Bank of India
(IDBI) and Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) have opened
their branches at the district headquarter in 2006-2007, and report profitable returns from
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providing credit and insurance services to cash-crop farmers. The district-headquarter is
dominated by government offices, NGOs, nursing homes and a sprawling Western
Railways residential colony. Smaller towns include the block headquarters at Limkheda,
Baria, Jhalod, Fatehpura and Santrampur and the market towns of Piplod, Morwa and
Bandibar. Market towns and block headquarters have intense activity, with health clinics,
banks, grain traders‘ stores, clothes shops, jewelry stores, seed stores, jeep stands, bus
stops, timber stores, tea stalls, soft-drink shops and cell-phone stores.
I searched for a fieldwork village while conducting district level fieldwork,
obtaining a list of panchayats implementing watershed development from Gramin Vikas
Trust. I looked for a village that was at a middling distance from the district headquarter.
My aim was to control for villages that were too close to the district headquarter and
might have had a development advantage because of their proximity to markets and
government offices, and for villages that were too far and might not have all activities
implemented due to logistical obstacles. Three blocks met my distance criteriaLimkheda, Jhalod and Garbada. I had conducted pre-dissertation fieldwork in Limkheda
and Garbada blocks and zeroed in on these two blocks. None of the communities in
Garbada that I had conducted previous fieldwork with were implementing watershed
development while one community in Limkheda was, and I decided to undertake
fieldwork there, in Mahipura village.
Local government officials and development professionals consider Limkheda,
the block where I did block-level fieldwork an oasis of civilization in a ‗backward‘
district because of its flatter topography and villages that are well-connected to roads and
market towns. The Lead NGO‘s project director told me that Mahipura was a good
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choice for fieldwork because unlike some villages whose sarpanches had close ties to the
BJP or Congress and refused to heed to the District Rural Development Agency,
Mahipura had implemented watershed development largely in line with the rules. I
traveled to Mahipura and met the sarpanch, an old acquaintance from my previous visits
to the village, and requested to be allowed to study watershed development in the village.
The sarpanch agreed to my extended presence in the village and I started village trips in
November 2006. I moved to Mahipura for good in January 2007 and set up abode with
the sarpanch‘s second cousin‘s family.
Mahipura lies in a valley surrounded by hills on three sides. The village has a
population of 823 persons. Mahipura is a part of a three-village panchayat comprising
Mahipura and its neighboring villages Limdi and Himmatpur connected to one another by
roads and broad tracks. The village is connected to the market towns of Piplod and
Randhikpur by a smooth road on which auto rickshaws, jeeps and buses ply several times
a day. Proximity to the road has spawned entrepreneurial villagers‘ tobacco stalls, cycle
repair shops, grocery stores, stationery stores and a pay phone service.
Familiarity with Dahod and Mahipura was beneficial for my research. I already
had a level of familiarity with district-level government agencies, NGOs, land and well
ownership systems and rules governing natural resources. People remembered me from
my earlier roles as a researcher and accepted my presence in the village. There were no
undue expectations about any benefits from the study because I had made it clear that I
was there purely for research, and the benefits of the study would be in terms of
informing policy-making and not any tangible resources.
Dissertation fieldwork in Mahipura was different from my earlier spells of
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fieldwork, each of which had lasted no more than a week. While I had stayed as a guest
of the sarpanch during my previous visits, I needed to set up an independent abode for
long-term fieldwork because much of my research dealt with the panchayat. I had rather
naively imagined that I could live with a different family in the village every week, but
this was unacceptable to everybody in Mahipura because this made me a transient being
and allowed me to avoid establishing roots with any family.
I lived in the sarpanch‘s house during my first week out of deference to his
authority. I stayed with another family for a week and was subsequently invited by the
sarpanch‘s second cousin‘s wife Saroda to stay at her house. Saroda was the single head
of her household for most of the year because her husband migrated to Surat as a skilled
laborer in the construction industry. I would be company for her and her three children
aged 8, 10 and 12, the oldest two of who studied at a local boarding school, a common
practice among well-to-do Kolis.
Saroda‘s home was conducive for fieldwork because of its proximity to powerful
actors while remaining in the ‗outer circle‘ of Chauhans, Mahipura‘s most powerful
lineage and the one that the sarpanch belonged to. That I would continue to stay with the
Chauhans even if not at the sarpanch‘s own house also preserved the sarpanch‘s authority
and allowed him to continue to act as my formal host. Saroda‘s house was ideally located
near the village‘s main street and the road which enabled me to reach the village quickly
from my trips to Dahod and leave late in the evening on days when I had to travel to the
district headquarter. Saroda also became a friend, drawing me into the extended networks
of her family and friends which provided welcome sociality during my stay in the village.
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Figure 3 Location of Limkheda Block in Dahod
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Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used to elicit data. I gathered
documentary evidence from newsletters, notices, leaflets, pamphlets, files, circulars and
reports; narratives from interviews, oral histories and public speeches; and participant
observation of consultative processes, conferences, public hearings, tribunals, summits,
village assemblies and group meetings, which enabled cross-checking information,
corroborating evidence from one source with evidence from another and filling gaps.
Participant observation. Participant observation was a continuous part of the
study. Participant observation involves obtaining knowledge not simply from what
people said they do in interviews or surveys, but what they actually do in their
interactions with other actors (Miller, 1997). Participant observation was also a
preliminary strategy to build further lines of inquiry and questions for interviews and
surveys.
Archival research. Archival research enabled extending the ethnographic eye to
the past and was used to gather evidence on recent events including policy shifts in
watershed development and the neoliberalization of the state, and state-society relations
in eastern Gujarat and the history of statemaking in Dahod and Panchmahal.
In-depth interviews. In-depth interviews were conducted with national-level
bureaucrats, district-level bureaucrats, block-level officials and panchayat secretaries (the
lowest-level government employees who collect village taxes and maintain land records),
representatives of development NGOs and researchers in Gujarat, key informants,
political actors at the district, block and village levels; development subjects, and
economic actors in Dahod.
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Household surveys. Household surveys were conducted close to the end of my
village stay when I knew enough about village institutions, actors and livelihoods to ask
detailed and unambiguous questions using accurate terminology. Methods are described
in detail below.
Participant Observation
From August-October 2006, I undertook participant observation of the District
Rural Development Agency‘s meetings with Dahod‘s seven blocks‘ block-level
watershed development teams‘ agricultural extension experts, social development experts
and civil engineers. The last cohort of NGO-implemented projects was implemented from
2002 to 2007. The District Rural Development Agency held joint meetings with NGOs
implementing the last NGO-led watershed development projects and contractually hired
staff implementing Hariyali.
To understand the shift in Hariyali‘s administrative techniques, I used a schedule
to note bureaucrats‘ deportment and agenda-setting at these meetings and differences in
the breadth of NGOs‘ staff and contracted staff‘s tasks and capacity to alter
implementation rules. I recorded the proceedings of these meetings, recording their
structure, content, which actors initiated changes in themes of discussions, and how
bureaucrats responded to NGO staff and contractual staff. Joint meetings manifested
contracted staff‘s work burdens and constraints on decision-making when juxtaposed
with NGOs‘ autonomy in decision-making.
From 1st to 15th September 2006, I observed the Limkheda watershed
development team‘s activities at its block office located on the premises of Limkheda
Block Development Office, and observed villagers‘ attempts to access information on
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government schemes, the Block Development Officer‘s work routine, and sarpanches‘
interactions with administrators, accountants and peons, paying attention to the
negotiation of relations of power in these bureaucratic settings. I noted the frequency with
which people visited the block level office to seek information on watershed
development, seek clarification on guidelines, or demand specific inputs, and noted the
outcomes of their interactions with the watershed development team.
In December 2006, I observed village panchayat elections in Limkheda, Jhalod,
Fatehpura and Devgadh Baria blocks as part of an independent election observation team,
focusing on the process of filing nominations and panchayat and ward-member
candidates‘ electoral strategies at tea stalls, photocopying shops and bus stands. I
observed the state‘s procedures to organize and manage polling for the lowest level
elected bodies in India, social norms regarding the polling process, voter turnout,
activities around polling booths, candidates‘ activities near booths to measure voter
turnout and estimate vote counts, disputes over electoral conduct, candidates‘ attempts to
mobilize the state for re-polling in case of booth-capturing, and bureaucrats‘ response to
electoral wrongdoings.
Observation of elections helped develop insight into the stakes involved for
candidates and voters in village panchayat elections, the sophistication of village
panchayat election strategies, the highly charged nature of elections to these lowest-level
democratic bodies, and all peoples‘- voters‘ and candidates‘ alike- deep familiarity with
the rules and practices of liberal procedural democracy.
I observed Chief Minister Narendra Modi‘s public addresses in Dahod to gain
insight into the universe of development through electoral politics. Public speeches are a
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statement of authority, have elements of performance and are put to work in cultural
ways (Handelman, 1990). I treated election speeches as texts which are not only a vehicle
of discourse but ‗active agents‘ (Prior, 2008) sent out into the world in an election year to
arouse sentiments of awe, materialize development via discourse, and reach out to
significant constituencies by naming them in development contexts. I observed the
pageantry of Modi‘s arrival at speech venues, recorded and transcribed all leaders‘
speeches, and noted audience response to speeches while traveling back from rallies and
through follow-up interviews in Mahipura and neighboring villages.
Intermittently from November 2006 to July 2007 in Mahipura, I observed visitors
at the panchayat office, noted the absence and presence of the panchayat secretary, the
duration of his stay at the office during each visit, visitors‘ waiting time and the
panchayat secretary‘s responsiveness to them. I observed the extent of the sarpanch‘s
presence at the panchayat office and the extent to which meetings between the panchayat
secretary and the sarpanch were held at the panchayat office and at non-public venues
such as the sarpanch‘s house. Participant observation in Mahipura was also used to
develop indicators of wealth, livelihoods, political participation and village governance
for household surveys.
I conducted fieldwork on the macro-context of watershed development‘s policy
shift in New Delhi. I observed the India Rural Business Summit, 8-9 October 2007 at the
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) Auditorium in New
Delhi, the Sixth South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Conference on
Gender Reforms at Vigyaan Bhavan, New Delhi in January 2008, and the Independent
People‘s Tribunal on the World Bank Group in India at Jawaharlal Nehru University,
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New Delhi from 21-24 September 2007 to gain insight into economic reforms from a
market perspective, state perspective and critical perspective respectively. At the India
Rural Business Summit, I observed discussion panels and information sessions on rural
banking, corporate rural investment, the rural consumer market, global financial
institutions‘ priority areas for rural investments and the role envisaged by the Ministry of
Panchayati Raj for village panchayats in facilitating land and natural resource acquisition
for market expansion in rural areas.
At the Independent People‘s Tribunal on the World Bank Group in India, I noted
evidence submitted by academics, think thanks, NGOs, activists and social movements
on market-driven reforms, focusing on sessions on seed technologies, regulatory
mechanisms, water policy, climate change, agriculture, food security, fiscal policy and
environmental policy. At the Sixth South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
Conference on Gender Reforms I recorded the President of India‘s articulation of women
as economically productive actors rather than simply as reproductive actors- the focus of
earlier gender policies, noting the entry of economic growth as a national goal for which
women‘s empowerment was now constructed as a new instrument.
Analyzing Texts
Government documents were a major data source which I treated as ‗schemes of
organization‘ (Prior, 2008) that tied together themes of citizenship, globalization,
economic reforms, monetization and corporatization, themes that were more ‗diffused,
dissipated and obscured in the everyday‘ (Handelman, 1990). I accessed the Prime
Minister‘s Independence Day public addresses in 2006, 2007 and 2008, and his speeches
to the National Development Council in 2006 and 2007 from the Prime Minister‘s
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official website. The Independence Day address is an important form of evoking the
‗imagined community‘ (Anderson, 1983) and it orders citizens, activities, and national
visions for the future, giving insight into the transformation of state-society relations.
I also scanned newspaper reports which were an excellent data source on
economic reforms because they are a single platform with information on national
agencies‘ priorities, global institutions‘ prescriptions, civil society‘s opinion and reports
on policy impacts from different parts of the country. Newspaper reports were analyzed
from September to 2007 to January 2008 for 24 leading English and Hindi news dailies
published from Delhi, Mumbai (Bombay), Kolkota (Calcutta), Chennai (Madras),
Bengaluru (Bangalore), Jaipur, Lucknow and Amritsar; representing five major regions
of the country. English dailies include the Indian Express, Hindustan Times, The Hindu,
The Times of India, Daily News Analysis, Deccan Herald, The Telegraph, The Tribune,
Financial Express, Economic Times, Business Line, The Statesman, Pioneer and The
Asian Age. Hindi dailies include Amar Ujala, Jansatta, Rajasthan Patrika, Punjab Kesri,
Hindi Hindustan, Rashtriya Sahara and Dainik Jaagran. Articles, reports and
commentaries in the weekly news magazines India Today, Outlook and Frontline which
covered the spectrum from corporate to critical perspectives were read and notes made.
In each newspaper, I searched for and read articles on agricultural policy, land
reforms, environment policy, irrigation, fiscal reforms, development policy, food policy,
rural poverty, infrastructure, agro-food reforms and trade policies. I read each article to
check for its relevance to my research, cut the relevant article, pasted it on a blank sheet,
scanned it as a PDF file, re-read it and made notes. Newspaper articles generally followed
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a thread wherein related articles on a topic appeared sequentially, facilitating
comprehensive insight into an issue.
Watershed development guidelines, circulars, letters, notices and technical reports
gathered in New Delhi, Godhra and Dahod were analyzed to document state actors‘
creation of new social and economic categories in the drylands. Policy texts were treated
as a representation of social reality (Cosgrove & Daniels, 1988) that shifted from framing
the drylands as ‗erodible‘ to articulating them as ‗water-scarce‘. Documents are as
revealing by what they highlight as by what they are silent on and create social reality by
framing the problem of poverty in the drylands in specific ways. Drawing upon the
notion of ideology as that schema of relations which ensures that only certain questions
are asked and solutions are sought from a given range of alternatives, and that some
questions are never asked and some alternatives never considered even if they are
available in principle (Althusser & Balibar, 1965), I read watershed texts through an
interpretive lens, reading in capital-intensification, irrigation-intensification and
commodity production the preclusion of labor-centric strategies, water conservation and
food security. Utilizing policy texts, press briefings and concept notes, I also constructed
a timeline of shifts in watershed development‘s technologies and activities from the
1990s to the 2000s.
Apart from macro-institutional and policy-related government documents,
documents gathered from civil society were an important source of information on
panchayat leaders‘ decision-making environments and constraints, panchayat elections
and watershed development‘s technological shifts. Civil society documents include
Mahila Swaraj Abhiyan’s monthly newsletters for women panchayat leaders titled
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‗Panchayat Saheli‘ (A Friend of the Panchayat), Sadguru‘s training manuals for microcredit groups, Utthan and Prakruti Foundation‘s annual reports, and Unnati and
Ahmedabad Social Action Group‘s booklets on panchayats. I analyzed the Mahipura
village files of the National Tree Growers‘ Cooperative Federation Limited which
facilitated the formation of a village tree growers‘ cooperative in Mahipura, conflict over
which shaped panchayat elections and watershed development from 2004 to 2006.
Secondary evidence on cash-milk production, watershed development‘s core
cash-crop activity include the Bank of India‘s reports on the efficacy of livestock-loans to
the poorest households, the web pages of National Dairy Development Board- the apex
agency of the cooperative dairy sector in India, the World Bank‘s report on its loan to the
National Dairy Development Board for the second phase of the white revolution,
academic research on price-setting in the cooperative dairy sector in Gujarat and
Panchmahal District Cooperative Milk Producers‘ Union Limited‘s annual report.
Research at the Nehru Memorial Library focused on the history of cooperative credit,
irrigation and milk production in Gujarat and relationships between technocrats and
bureaucrats in milk societies.
Village level documents were a critical source of insight into the conduct of the
state in the locality and partnerships between the state and grassroots political society to
enact the state‘s visions of social change. Village level documents include village
watershed development files, vouchers and muster sheets (sheets listing the names of
wage-laborers, the number of days worked, the wage rate for their task, total wages
earned and their signatures), self help groups‘ registers, groups‘ meetings‘ minutes,
attendance records, affidavits of activities undertaken and payments received. Panchayat
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documents analyzed included the Himmatpur-Mahipura-Limdi panchayat committee‘s
meetings‘ minutes (N=50) for the period 2001-2006 and Mahipura and Himmatpur‘s
village assemblies‘ meetings minutes from October 2001-February 2007 (N=28).
An analytical reading of panchayat council and village assembly proceedings
enabled identifying the scope of these public meetings, which issues were included in the
panchayat‘s agenda for discussion and which were excluded, how development subjects
presented their demands, negotiation within the panchayat, negotiation between the
panchayat and the panchayat secretary, and disagreements between the assembly and the
panchayat secretary.
While watershed development channeled the largest development resources to
Mahipura from 2003-2007 and involved distributional decisions on dams, farm ponds,
seed kits, micro-credit groups, committee formation and afforestation; the intervention
was mentioned only once in village assembly minutes, when the sarpanch announced that
Mahipura had been selected for watershed development implementation. To understand
distributional decisions regarding watershed development, I consulted Mahipura‘s
watershed development files which were maintained separately from panchayat
documents. These files and panchayat documents were used to identify development
beneficiaries to pursue interviews with.
In-depth Interviews
Interviews were conducted with ward members, lineage leaders, the sarpanch,
village elders, vote brokers, dissident voters, micro-credit groups‘ leaders and members,
milk society committee members, milk-sellers, long-term migrants, subsistence
producers, cash-crop farmers, surplus producers, shopkeepers, researchers, NGO
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representatives, national bureaucrats, district bureaucrats, peasant intellectuals, districtlevel politicians, bank managers and dairy technocrats. The interview schedules are in
Appendices B, C and D. Most of these interviews were recorded and transcribed, and
where this was not possible, I took notes during the interview and wrote up a detailed
account on the same day.
Repeated interviews were conducted with Mahipura panchayat‘s sarpanch in 2006
and sarpanch-elect in 2007 on distributional decisions in watershed development.
Interviews with current and past ward members (N=4) focused on how they mobilized
development from the panchayat and influenced the sarpanch. Interviews with patels and
lineage leaders (N=10) focused on how they came to be regarded as lineage leaders, what
they meant by justice; and how they resolved disputes, punished offenders, enforced
sanctions, negotiated differences among themselves and oversaw the sarpanch. In-depth
interviews with lineage leaders, patels and ward members lent insight into both the
constraints they imposed on the sarpanch and the limits to their power. Interviews were
also conducted with vote-brokers, development agents, cash-crop farmers and religious
leaders.
Interviews with older key informants shed light on the colonial Baria state‘s rule.
Interviews were conducted with some of the poorest families to understand how they
secured development and basic services from the sarpanch and their voting patterns in the
panchayat election when it was imperative that they continue to be delivered services
irrespective of who won the election. I interviewed disenchanted voters and dissident
voters identified through key informant interviews with the sarpanch and his supporters.
Questions to dissident voters focused on their vote mobilization strategies, patronage
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from their chosen candidate, and engagement with the panchayat for developmental
resources in the post-election scenario.
Interviews with self-help groups‘ leaders (N=8) focused on how they met the
transaction costs of micro-credit, disciplined errant borrowers, maintained group records
and individual members‘ passbooks, communicated with the sarpanch to ensure his
cooperation in delivering credit, secured the social development expert‘s assistance in
book-keeping, and groups‘ informal rules on meetings and traveling to the bank to
deposit monies. Interviews with market actors included the manager of the Bank of
Bandibar which delivered micro-credit in Limkheda, technocrats and managers of the
Panchmahal Milk Producers‘ Union and the Limkheda watershed development team.
Fieldwork focusing on civil society actors included participant observation of a
civil society-led social audit of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act led by
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (Laborers‘ and Peasants‘ Union Collective) in
Banswara district; and interviews with technocratic, environmental, feminist, local selfgovernance and rights-based NGOs in Gujarat including Anandi, Mahila Swaraj
Abhiyan, Sadguru and Prakruti Foundation in Dahod; Utthan, Unnati, Ahmedabad Social
Action Group, Mahila Swaraj Abhiyan (Ahmedabad and Dahod staff) and Development
Support Center in Ahmedabad; and Mahatma Gandhi Pratishthan in Panchmahal. All data
was entered in NVivo which enables analyzing, managing and aggregating qualitative
data.
Archival Research
Archival research on colonial and postcolonial state institutions enabled exploring
continuity and change in statemaking, and was conducted at the National Archives and
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Nehru Memorial Library in Delhi, at the Nehru Memorial Library; and the libraries of the
International Institute for Population Sciences (Mumbai), Tata Institute of Social
Sciences (Mumbai), Gujarat Vidyapeeth (Ahmedabad) and Washington University (St.
Louis). Archival documents consulted are listed in Appendix E.
Research at the National Archives of India, New Delhi lasted for six weeks in
September-October 2006. I traced settlement and agricultural production patterns and
colonial statemaking in eastern Gujarat, focusing on the colonial state‘s reports on
settlement, agriculture, irrigation, public works, soil improvement, tax and forests in
semi-arid central and western India. I examined documents from 1857 onwards because
colonial rule in India became deeper and more coherent after the rebellion of 1857, a
moment when British power was seriously challenged, after which a set of detailed and
better-enforced laws for the governance of India were enacted.
At the National Archives of India, I first scanned maps of eastern Gujarat from
1857 to 1947 with the help of the archives‘ map specialists to identify princely states and
British territories which corresponded to the area covered by present-day Dahod district.
The British-controlled Bombay Presidency and the princely states of Rajputana, Bhopal,
Rewa Kantha, Baroda, Idar, Sunth and Baria exercised control over territories in
contemporary Dahod. I placed requests with Archives staff for the complete files of the
princely states and the settlement and taxation files for the Bombay Presidency whose
extensive records were categorized into distinct sub-headings such as ‗police files‘,
‗political files‘, ‗settlement files‘ and so on. At the National Archives I also accessed the
postcolonial state‘s Irrigation Department‘s reports until the 1970s.
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I read and made notes from the settlement, taxation, credit, land improvement and
crop production records. Correspondence between higher- and lower-level officials on
problems in implementing policy, exchange of information, and reports of the success or
failures of state actions indicated what kinds of policies regarding agriculture, irrigation,
crop production and social transformation were being implemented, with what intentions,
and with what response from colonial subjects. Government actors‘ correspondence lent
insight into settlement patterns, continuity in state preoccupation with increasing
agricultural productivity in rainfed areas, and the construction of the drylands as erodible,
as well as periodic campaigns to increase crop production by bringing more land under
cultivation, improving credit institutions, extending subsidies and expanding irrigation,
echoing contemporary strategies in watershed development.
I conducted archival research at the Nehru Memorial Library in New Delhi from
30 November 2007 to 17 January 2008 to examine the All India Congress Committee‘s
files because it was the governing body of the Congress party and its most powerful
organ, and the site where major ideological disputes within the Congress were carried
out, business leaders petitioned for tax and cess concessions, and where the contours of a
postcolonial development strategy took form.
The All India Congress Committee microfilm rolls examined include 8607, 8634,
8635, 8648, 8681 and 8685, which focused on the rise of the Kisan Sabha (Peasant
Assembly) of the Congress Party from 1928-1945 and the opening of a window of
opportunity for a pro-poor and labor-intensive development strategy. Additionally,
correspondence to the All India Congress Committee by private enterprises after its
victory in the 1937 provincial legislative elections, and documents of the National
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Development Council established by the Congress to frame postcolonial development
policy were analyzed. While the Bharatiya Janata Party is known as India‘s explicitly
pro-business political party (Shah, 2002a), many of watershed development‘s capitalintensive changes were implemented during the Congress government‘s rule from 2004
to the present. This called for re-examining the common-sense understanding of the
Congress as a populist and even pro-poor political party.
Analysis of the records of the ‗All India Congress Committee‘ at the Nehru
Memorial Library, New Delhi, the central governing body of the Congress Party during
the 1930s and 1940s, two critical decades before independence when the Congress
emerged as the most powerful party in India revealed that the Congress was an umbrella
of diverse political ideologies from the left to right spectrum. The Congress contained a
stable pro-capital, pro-landlord and private enterprise-oriented base. Analytical reading of
the All India Congress Committee‘s files revealed that business, urban and professional
interests were well-represented in the party at the turn of the 20th century, and the party
had a strong pro-business wing in late colonial India.
Household Surveys
Household surveys were administered from 1st May 2007 to 31st July 2007. The
survey instrument is included in Appendix A. A list of all the households in the village
was built from Mahipura‘s voters‘ list obtained from the Limkheda Mamlatdar‘s (Tax
Collector‘s) Office. A household was defined as that entity which had a common kitchen.
The instrument was developed using Krishna‘s (2002) and Lesorogol‘s (2002) surveys in
western India and Kenya respectively which provided comparable rural and semi-arid
contexts for developing household surveys. Lesorogol‘s (2002) questionnaire was used to
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develop questions on income and wealth in semi-arid contexts marked by livestock
dependence, hybrid subsistence- and cash crop-cultivation strategies, market participation
and wage labor migration, and Krishna‘s (2002) surveys were used to develop questions
on political capital, social norms, household participation in village institutions including
the panchayat, development agency and relationship with the panchayat secretary.
The survey instrument was pilot-tested in April 2007 to check the appropriateness
of wording, flow and respondent burden, which was approximately two hours. Surveys
were administered to the head(s) of each household. 122 out of 124 households in
Mahipura participated in the survey, with one head of household refusing to participate
and the adults in another being away from the village, resulting in a response rate of
98.38 per cent. Well-ownership, irrigation motor rights and livestock-holdings were the
main variables to measure wealth, the most important form of power. The measurement
of wealth indicators is described below.
Well ownership. Well ownership was measured in terms of irrigation rights to
wells. Wells are inherited jointly with land and shared by kin who pool funds to meet
well deepening and repair costs. Sole ownership of a well was assigned a property right
of 1, joint ownership .5, one-third .33, and so on. A perennial well enabling three or more
cropping seasons was weighted 1, a winter well enabling two cropping seasons was
weighted .66, and a monsoon well holding water only in the rainy season was weighted
0.16 because it did not enable irrigation. A household with half a share in a perennial well
and one-third share in a winter well held .7 well rights (1*.5 + .66*.3).
Irrigation motors. Irrigation requires the conjunctive use of wells and motors
which pump water to fields through rubber or PVC pipes. Motor ownership gives control
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over the timing of irrigation. After well-deepening, a household makes its first investment
in a diesel or electric motor, therefore motor ownership is an important indicator of
wealth. Common motor brands are Kirloskar, Fieldmaster and Usha. Motors range from 2
to 5 horsepowers. A brand-new diesel motor costs 20,000 rupees while a second-hand
diesel motor cost 10,000 rupees and a new electric motor cost 10,000 rupees. Most
irrigators prefer diesel motors to electric motors because the former are more powerful
and can irrigate a plot in one-fourth the time. This is important because there are
competing claimants to dam-water, which places owners of powerful motors at an
advantage in surface irrigation. In cases where motors are shared by siblings, buyers
prefer a diesel motor with each irrigator purchasing her own diesel to water a plot, while
commercial electricity (which is used by electric motors) is charged to a single accountholder who may have to pay for others‘ use in case they do not contribute to the electric
bill each month. A household with exclusive ownership of a diesel or electric motor was
allotted full motor rights of ‗1‘ while a household sharing a motor with another kin was
given .5 rights, and so on.
Livestock. Livestock were assigned weights based on their market prices. The
market prices of bulls, cows, calves and goats are 25,000 rupees, 20,000 rupees, 10,000
rupees and 5,000 rupees respectively. Bulls were assigned a weight of 1.25 because of
their centrality for plowing, milk cattle a weight of 1, calves a weight of .5 and goats a
weight of .25. The total number of each livestock type was multiplied by its weight and
this figure was added across livestock types to measure overall livestock wealth.
Per capita livestock was measured by dividing each household‘s livestock by the
number of household members using the adult equivalent scale which is often calibrated
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based on nutritional requirements for individuals by age and gender. I used the adult
equivalent scale described by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) which assigns a weight of
0.2 to children aged 0-6, 0.3 to those aged 7-12, 0.5 to those age 13-18 and 1.0 to those
aged 18 and over. This formula was used to convert the number of individuals in the
household to the adult equivalent by multiplying the total members in each age category
by the category‘s weight, and adding the figures across age groups. This figure was used
to divide household livestock to obtain per capita values. Data was entered in SPSS
Version 17.0 and univariate and bivariate analysis was conducted in SAS Version 9.1 due
to my greater familiarity with SAS. There was no missing data.
Household surveys were invaluable in measuring individual actors‘ and lineages‘
resource endowments. Household surveys were a preliminary source of information on
the identities of those regarded as lineage leaders and dispute mediators. Household
surveys enabled me to familiarize myself with all families in Mahipura and allowed
everybody to learn about the study and ask questions.
This chapter provided a history of eastern Gujarat and described contemporary
social and political institutions in the region, its social groups, and the methods used to
answer the questions of the study. The next chapter describes how development policy
implementation is shaped by competition between political parties to woo dryland voters
by delivering material resources to sarpanches, and the mechanisms through which
panchayats are implicated in large-scale democratic politics.
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3. Parties, Panchayats and the Political Economy of Development
In this chapter I describe how panchayats are implicated in electoral politics
involving national parties, how watershed development in particular and development in
general is an instrument of political patronage, and how development in the drylands is
shaped by political competition between parties to woo dryland voters.
The Rise of the BJP in Gujarat
With the decline of the Congress‘ dominance in Indian politics in the late 1980s,
the rise of the pro-capital BJP and the party‘s uninterrupted rule in Gujarat since 1998,
Gujarat has become symbolic of both neoliberal success and the political success of
Hindu nationalism. Gujarat is regarded as the laboratory of Hindutva or Hindu nationalist
ideology based on the construction of India as a Hindu nation.
Despite successive losses in national assembly elections in 2004 and 2009, the
BJP has ruled in Gujarat continuously since 1995. The BJP‘s success in Gujarat lies in its
breaking the Congress‘s KHAM alliance comprising Kolis, Harijans (Dalits), Adivasis
and Muslims (Singh, 2002) and building a pan-Hindu alliance of upper- and middle-caste
Hindus, Adivasis, Dalits and Kolis (Shah, 2002a). Gujarat‘s share of Adivasis is 15 per
cent, well above the national average of 8.08 per cent (Shah et al., 1998), and Kolis are
the state‘s largest caste cluster, comprising 24 per cent of the state‘s population (Shah,
2002a), therefore Kolis and Adivasis are significant electoral constituencies. Kolis, who
are listed as ‗Backward Classes‘ in the Indian constitution due to exploitation rooted in
caste (GOG, 1976; GOI, 1980), Dalits and Adivasis together comprise 61 per cent of
Gujarat‘s population (Shah, 2002a), making these voters the largest electorate in the state.

67

The BJP is a part of the Sangh Parivar (‗Family of Organizations‘) which
includes, apart from the BJP, civil society organizations including the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) (National Volunteer Corps), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad
(VHP) (World Hindu Congress) and the Bajrang Dal, all grounded in the ideology of
Hindu majoritarianism.
The RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal have been instrumental in mobilizing Kolis and
Adivasis in tribal districts to vote for the BJP since the 1990s. In Dahod, the RSS‘s tactics
have comprised giving state-wide travel opportunities to Kolis and Adivasis to participate
in the BJP‘s political activities, distributing t-shirts, granting youth local organizational
positions, building temples, conducting health camps (see Thachil, 2009 for central
Indian evidence), and carrying out hate speech against Muslims, particularly Vohra
Muslim traders, moneylenders and shopkeepers in Dahod to whom many Bhils and Kolis
are indebted. The BJP-ruled government‘s tourism ministry has funded the re-writing of
Dahod‘s history in a form heavily tinged with anti-Muslim allusions (see Singh &
Maharaol, 2006) that constitute a rewriting of Rajput, Muslim and Adivasi rule into a
binary opposition between Hinduism and Islam. In Dahod, Bhil youth, the section most
targeted by the Sangh‘s activists in dryland western India, newly identify themselves not
as ‗Bhil‘ or ‗Adivasi‘ but as ‗Hindu Bhil‘, fusing the historically antagonistic categories
of Hindu and Adivasi.
While the BJP‘s activism has led to Kolis and Adivasis in the drylands shifting
their allegiance from the Congress to the BJP in significant numbers throughout the
1990s, the party is still regarded as more anti-poor than the Congress by subaltern voters
(Shah, 2002a). Therefore just before state assembly elections, the RSS, VHP and Bajrang
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Dal perpetrate violence against religious minorities citing missionary proselytization of
Adivasis or Muslim terrorist threat to polarize the electorate. In 2002, just months before
the state assembly election in Gujarat, the Sangh Parivar unleashed violence against
Muslims across Gujarat in the worst episode of communal violence in postcolonial India
which lasted for 28 days. The BJP-ruled administration is widely considered complicit in
the violence involving the burning of shops and homes, looting, rape and killing, through
its inaction to restore law and order and actively aiding rioters (HRW, 2002), and Dahod
was one of the worst affected districts due to its proximity to Godhra, the epicenter of the
violence.
Riots are localized and shaped by local calculations of acquiring political control
(Berenschot, 2011), controlling economic resources (Pandey, 2001) and settling scores in
interpersonal disputes (Das, 2007). Violence in Dahod was targeted at Muslim traders,
shopkeepers, business owners and moneylenders by middle- and upper-caste Hindu
traders to acquire monopoly over the local private transportation business in Dahod, and
by selective attacks on Vohra moneylenders by Kolis and Adivasis while sparing Vania
(Hindu) moneylenders.
Tenuousness of Support for the BJP in Dahod
The BJP won the 2002 state election on the basis of a highly polarized electorate
but the riots eroded the BJP‘s popularity in Dahod because of the damage of violence on
all social groups given Kolis‘ and Adivasis‘ long-term economic relations with their
Vohra moneylenders, the escalation of violence against all women during the riot, Kolis‘
and Adivasis‘ experience of upper- and middle caste perpetrators of violence getting off
scot-free while Adivasis and Kolis were punished disproportionately, and migrant
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workers being forced to flee their urban worksites in the riots and return to their villages
with life and limb barely intact, losing a season‘s wages.
Adivasis‘ and Kolis‘ ambivalence to Hindu nationalism stems from the
intermingled pasts and presents of Muslims, Dalits, Adivasis, Kolis and Rajputs who
share similar histories and subjectivities of economic marginalization, discrimination,
similar livelihoods and non-vegetarianism. For instance, the Tadvi Bhils of western India
are descendants of Muslim soldiers who mated with Bhil women. During Aurangzeb‘s
rule (1658-1707), Bhils converted to Islam in large numbers and Muslim Bhils and
Hinduized Bhils live side by side. Muslims in Dahod continue to be regarded simply as a
different jati and are called Ghanchi which translates into a lineage or occupational
category. Syncretic worship is common across Gujarat‘s drylands that mesh animism,
Hinduism, Islam and Sufism (Roy Burman, 2005). Kolis and Adivasis continue to name
their children with not only Hindu but also Muslim names which upper- and middle-caste
Hindus would consider transgressive. With regard to how he sees Muslims in Dahod,
Ramabhai, a Koli peasant intellectual succinctly said:
The citizens of the state (praja) are one. They comprise different castes- Ghanchi,
Koli, Adivasi, Vaghri (Dalit) and so on, but they are the same citizenry. They
have to be treated the same. … The state is formed by the people, but the people
are created by God.
Neoliberal Development during the BJP’s Rule
BJP rule in Gujarat is led by Chief Minister Narendra Modi who is considered
complicit in the 2002 violence has been instrumental in the BJP‘s successive wins in
Gujarat. Gujarat has emerged as the poster-state of market reforms in India under
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Narendra Modi, who has been proactive in attracting private investment and facilitating
land acquisition for industrial parks in the state. Since 2002, Narendra Modi has
attempted to demonstrate good governance and the protection of private property in
Gujarat in order to compensate for his alleged complicity in the 2002 riots, in order to
attract private investment in the state.
In 2003, Modi initiated the Vibrant Gujarat campaign, an annual investment
festival to attract private investment to the state, and invited the Tata Corporation to build
its Nano manufacturing plant in Gujarat when the company faced obstacles to land
acquisition for its plant in Singur, West Bengal in 2008. Consequently, Gujarat has been
celebrated by a significant section of the middle- and upper-classes, the Indian diaspora,
and Indian and global corporations for its pro-business economic policies, and the
Financial Times awarded Gujarat the ‗Person (sic) of the Year‘ award for 2009.
However, deepening inequality in the state remains the BJP‘s Achilles heel.
Neoliberal reforms have been accompanied by deepening inequality in Gujarat, and rural
poverty in Gujarat declined by 2.8 per cent from 1993-2005 as against 8.5 per cent for
India as a whole, and poverty in Gujarat‘s tribal areas increased during this period
(Hindu, 2009). From 1996 to 2006, Gujarat slipped one rank each in the human
development index‘s education and health indices (Hindu, 2009).
The Political Significance of Dahod for the Congress and BJP
Due to both skewed development and communal violence, Dahod is a
battleground for the BJP to restore faith in the electorate and enable Chief Minister
Narendra Modi to buttress his large political ambitions, including Prime Ministerial ones
by winning over Kolis and Adivasis in the district. Narendra Modi refers to Dahod as the
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border of the nation (sarhad), which is a frontier metaphor of many kinds, including the
frontier of the BJP‘s rule in Gujarat- turning out to be the district where the BJP won the
2007 assembly election by the smallest margin in the state, the place where the limits of
violence were explored in 2002 which produced limits to Modi‘s ability to stake a claim
to higher leadership, and a site of the limit of statemaking in districts from where natural
resources are extracted and whose inhabitants lay bare the exercise of power saturating
skewed development. While the BJP won the 2002 state assembly election seat in Dahod,
its MLA Babubhai Katara was caught in a human trafficking offence in 2006 and lost his
seat. Therefore Dahod was up for grabs and the Congress believed it could win the
election there by re-fielding its candidate Prabha Taaviad, who Katara had won against
the by a hairline margin in 2002.
Why Development Patronage to Panchayat Representatives
Following the decline of the Congress party‘s hegemony and the rise in power of
regional political parties in the 1980s, both the Congress and the BJP, India‘s largest
parties have been able to form central governments only through coalitions with powerful
regional parties. The enactment of Panchayati Raj Institutions at the village, block and
district levels reflects national parties‘ attempts to regain control over electoral politics
relative to regional parties by channeling resources directly to panchayats (Gupta &
Sivaramakrishnan, 2011).
Liberalization in the 1990s has led to the devolution of public works and service
delivery to contractors, leading to the rise of a new economic class in semi-arid districts
which has diversified occupationally from cash-crop agriculture to contracting and is
closely involved in local politics. Contractors have close affiliation with the BJP and
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Congress and secure state-government and central-government contracts for building
public infrastructure through ties with parties‘ leaders, and in turn channel votes to the
party. Contractors are a new set of political leaders who build alliances with sarpanches
in panchayat elections. The same person may bear the identity of both contractor and
sarpanch, because contracting generates the wealth to contest panchayat elections and
sarpanches in turn using their familiarity with government agencies to diversify into
contracting. The BJP has wooed voters in the drylands not only through direct
engagement with voters but also by building critical links with contractors and
sarpanches. Watershed development may be more intensely implemented in Gujarat than
other states as a form of patronage by the Congress to sarpanches in Gujarat to wean
them from the BJP, whom it cannot influence through grassroots mobilization given its
weaker local cadres.
Dahod‘s political leaders including sarpanches, block panchayat representatives,
district panchayat representatives, patels and ward members are affiliated with both the
Congress and BJP, and affiliations are not set in stone but open-ended to take advantage
of a constantly changing political landscape, because rural areas experience intense voter
mobilization for a major election every year- of either the village panchayat or block
panchayat (block level local self-governance body comprising a president and members,
with the president elected by the entire electorate of a block and members elected from
block-level wards) or district panchayat (district level local self-governance body
comprising a president and members, with the president elected by the entire electorate of
a district and members elected from district-level wards) or state assembly or national
assembly, each of which has a five-year term. Leaders use political parties to advance
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their careers and often switch party affiliation, therefore political parties use development
to woo all local leaders irrespective of whether they are expressly aligned with a
particular party or not.
Development schemes are announced at village assemblies and voters are familiar
with them. Schemes‘ names signal the name of the party delivering them- Congress-led
schemes bear the prefix ‗Mahatma Gandhi‘ who the party deploys as its founding father,
or the prefix ‗National‘ indicating that it is delivered by the central state, leading voters to
link the scheme with the Congress which has formed the central government
continuously since 2004. The Gujarat government‘s schemes have Gujarati names so that
they can be associated with the party in power in the state which is the BJP. Moreover,
under BJP rule, schemes invoke Hindutva, use Sanskritized words based on the ideology
of India having a solely Hindu past united by the Sanskrit language, and invoke Hindu
religious symbols that exclude both religious minorities and lower castes in their
imagination. Examples include the state government‘s largest schemes, Gokul Gaam
(Comprehensive Village Development) and Nirmal Gaam (Total Sanitation) whose
literal translations reference Gokul, the village of the Hindu god Krishna‘s birth, and
upper-caste ideas of caste-pollution and purity.
Development delivery, social service delivery, land allocation, loan waivers, and
foodgrain delivery at subsidized prices are major instruments for securing voter support
in the drylands. Of these, development delivery, social service delivery and land
allocation have been utilized to the greatest extent in tribal Gujarat. Both central-statedelivered and regional-state delivered schemes are channeled to the district, and a
region‘s MP, MLA, and with the enactment of panchayati raj, district panchayat president
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and block panchayat president attempt to influence the selection of villages, blocks, and
constituencies for delivering services. In return for their village, block or constituency
being selected, elected leaders promise the delivery of votes to their parties. Through the
specific case of Mahipura‘s selection for watershed development, I demonstrate how
electoral politics shapes the delivery of development.
Village selection for development schemes is shaped by bargaining among
MLAs, the MP, district panchayat members and block panchayat members. Tusharsinh
Maharaol, a district level Congress leader and ex-district panchayat member explained:
The MLA does influence village selection, and he should influence decisionmakers in favor of his constituency- that‘s what he‘s got elected for. He‘s got to
be able to say he‘s done ‗this and this and this‘ when the election comes.
Once a development policy is initiated, the District Development Officer who is
the Chief Executive Officer of the District Panchayat informs the local MLA, MP and
district panchayat leaders about the intervention at the Panchayat‘s monthly meeting.
Armed with information and undertaking a close reading of the guidelines, district- and
block-level panchayat leaders mobilize the District Rural Development Agency to choose
villages of electoral significance to them. Vinchhia Bhuria, president of the Limkheda
Block panchayat clarified:
Watershed villages are selected by the MLA and we are simply delivered the list
by the District Rural Development Agency. We tell the MLA ‗this village in our
constituency meets watershed development criteria and should be selected‘, but
the MLA makes the final decision. The district panchayat president and members
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also try to influence village selection.
The Congress’ Campaign and Patronage to Panchayati Raj Leaders
In Dahod, while older leaders like patels have greater affiliation with the
Congress because of patronage ties with the party during the KHAM alliance in the 1970s
and 1980s, the BJP, a newer party in Gujarat‘s drylands has opened up political
opportunities for younger leaders to vie for panchayat leadership by giving them
affiliation with the BJP. Therefore the Congress faces a tough task in wooing voters.
Implemented by NGOs until 2002, watershed development‘s transfer to
panchayats in 2003 has enabled the Congress which controls the central state since 2004
to woo voters through the delivery of development. Delivering watershed development to
sarpanches in 216 dryland districts enables the ruling party at the centre build a link with
numerically preponderant subaltern voters in remote districts. Watershed development‘s
technological choices fuse with the techniques of patronage politics, channeling
machinery, loans, livestock and irrigation to sarpanches who are pre-eminent votebrokers. Hariyali is thoroughly shaped by the imperatives of democratic politics- in
policy formulation which transfers resources from NGOs to panchayats to enable national
parties to channel development to sarpanches in exchange for votes, and in village
selection which is shaped by district-level bargaining among MLAs, the MP and district
panchayat members.
The Congress‘s election campaign was kicked off by Congress President Sonia
Gandhi who addressed a public meeting at Baria town on 21st January 2007, ten months
before the Gujarat assembly election, and again at Chhaparwad in November 2007, just
weeks before the election. Tusharsinh Maharaol, local Congress leader and one of the
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Baria meeting‘s organizers remarked:
We (Congress leaders in Baria) organized the Baria gathering. We wanted to
center it solely on Gujarat‘s voters so we chose Baria. If we held it at Dahod there
would have been people coming from Banswara and Jhabua districts in Rajasthan
and MP (Madhya Pradesh). We decided to go deep within the district so that only
people from Gujarat came, and more came from Gujarat than neighboring states.
We wanted the entire tribal belt of Gujarat to come.
At the meeting, Sonia Gandhi emphasized the Congress‘s pro-poor credentials by
citing the delivery of watershed development and the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act, among other schemes. The Congress‘s meeting was advertized leanly but
effectively through the blue slogan ‗Onward to Baria!‘ (Chalo Baria!) painted on
whitewashed walls in Dahod. The Congress‘s meeting was better attended than four
public addresses by Narendra Modi in 2007- in January, July, and twice in August,
despite the Chief Minister ordering district and block-level bureaucrats to marshal
contractors‘ vehicles to bring villagers to the BJP‘s meetings. Despite lacking the
resources to hire buses, trucks and jeeps to bring audiences to the meeting in a state
where it was out of power, the Congress commanded a larger crowd at its meeting at
Baria. A senior block-level bureaucrat in Dahod explained why:
Ask about the Congress‘s work in the tribal belt and people will recognize it. The
BJP can‘t command the same numbers in a district-wide rally even if it calls Atal
Behari Vajpayee (senior BJP leader and popular national figure). Sure, the BJP
has expanded in the blocks and villages through the RSS and VHP and has had
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the chance to win the Block Panchayat and District Panchayat elections in the past
10 years. But at the MLA and MP levels it‘s still the Congress that has recall for
people. As far as higher-level elections go, the hand (the Congress‘s election
symbol) is still the most familiar symbol in rural areas. The government (sarkaar)
is associated with the Congress, and given a choice between the lotus (the BJP‘s
symbol) and the hand, voters choose the hand.
Not only symbolic recognition of the Congress‘ election symbol but also an older
political alliance with the Congress, and the Congress‘ clientelism, including via
watershed development, shaped Koli-Adivasi voting patterns. The selection of Mahipura,
my fieldwork village for watershed development is illustrative of market-driven
development unfolding by the calculations of electoral politics and the Congress‘ use of
Hariyali as a tool of clientelism. Mahipura adjoins the forest where Bilkis Bano, a 21 year
old Muslim woman‘s infant and family members were killed by a Hindu mob from her
village while fleeing to safety in the aftermath of violence at Godhra in 2002. Bilkis was
gang raped and left for dead, survived, filed a police case with the assistance of civil
society actors, and after a protracted struggle, became the only riot rape-victim in
postcolonial India to secure justice in a riot-rape case.
Mahipura‘s sarpanch was summoned as a witness in the case conducted in-camera
in Mumbai (Bombay). The sarpanch later asserted that while the Koli-Adivasi
perpetrators were punished, upper castes were allowed to go scot-free. Seven persons
were in fact acquitted in the Bilkis Bano case, including two doctors and five policemen,
reinscribing subaltern groups‘ experience of state discrimination against lower castes and
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tribes. A contributing factor for the village‘s selection for implementation in 2003- the
very first year of Hariyali‘s initiation- was its significance in one of the most widely
known crimes of the Gujarat riots.
Village selection was shaped by a locus of politics across district and block levels.
While Koli appeasement in the aftermath of communal violence played a critical role in
Mahipura‘s selection, the crafting of the Mahipura watershed was also shaped by
bargaining within the Limkheda block panchayat. Limdi, the smallest and therefore
numerically weakest village in the Mahipura panchayat was replaced by a discontiguous
village Bordi located 12 kilometers away, morphed into the Mahipura watershed by a
Limkheda block panchayat representative who was from Bordi. Mahipura and
Himmatpur‘s selection also demonstrated the primacy of already-existing market
connections in favoring certain villages‘ selection because both villages supplied milk to
the Panchmahal dairy in Godhra. Despite flouting watershed development‘s major
criteria by being relatively wealthy, having irrigation and being dominated by cultivator
castes rather than tribes, Mahipura and Himmatpur were selected due to the existence of a
milk society.
This section explored the politics of village selection and the way in which the
priorities of capital-intensive development meshed with the goals of electoral politics. In
the next section I show how watershed development also influenced the BJP-led state
government, leading it to design, advertise and deliver schemes that mimicked watershed
development to open alternative channels of political patronage for the 2007 assembly
election.
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Political Competition in Dahod
While Gujarat has been feted globally as a model of neoliberal success, there is
widespread local criticism of deepening inequality under the BJP‘s rule in Dahod, and
support for the BJP is contingent on its delivery of social services. Therefore tribal
districts like Dahod have received intense political attention from the BJP, whose leaders
have invoked development delivery in tribal districts through rhetoric and discourse in an
attempt to bypass the material reality of skewed distribution.
‗Seventy per cent voters in a village vote for the BJP but 30 per cent vote for the
Congress‘ was one voter‘s pithy summary of Congress-BJP voting patterns in Dahod.
Ramabhai Chauhan elucidated, ‗Some people‘s minds are tilted in favor of the Congress
and some in favor of the BJP. Those who like the BJP will vote for it but those who don‘t
like the BJP will not.‘ An electoral victory was as uncertain for the BJP as the Congress,
and the following section explores the BJP‘s attempt to deliver development patronage in
Dahod.
The BJP’s Attempt at and Failure of New Development Patronage
At a public meeting in Limkheda on 10th August 2007, BJP leaders waxed
eloquent on the resources channeled to tribal districts during the party‘s rule, with
Randhikpur MLA and Minister of Forests Jaswantsinh Bhabhor enumerating that he
spent 12,000 crore rupees on regenerating Dahod‘s forests, and Narendra Modi asserting,
‗In just five years, I have spent 6,200 crore rupees on Gujarat‘s tribal districts, and… I
have resolved to spend 15,000 crore rupees more.‘
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Parties periodically mobilize poor voters for their public meetings, and poor
voters have an intimate familiarity with political discourse. Upon hearing Modi‘s
proclamation, a Koli audience member remarked to another, ‗We didn‘t see any of that
money come to the villages, did we?‘ When my Koli friends and I returned to Mahipura,
one said in mock confusion, ‗All the money Modi talked about- where did it go?‘
In Mahipura, on the morning of leaving for the Chief Minister‘s ‗Save the Girl
Child‘ address, Heeriben, a Koli Chauhan woman remarked, ‗We‘re going to a nautra to
eat sweetmeats (laadva).‘ Heeriben used the metaphor of traveling to a bride‘s family
from the groom‘s family‘s side which has an upper hand in bride-groom relations, to
describe voters‘ position of power with respect to parties during an election. The nautra
is a ceremony involving the bride‘s family serving sweetmeats to the groom‘s family to
erase any slights that might have taken place during the wedding, aptly used to describe
political parties‘ atonement for any ills towards poor voters in the past five years, the
offering of development-delivery to erase systematic resource-extraction, and request for
votes on the basis of giving voters a free trip to a public meeting venue and serving them
snacks there.
In 2006-2007, the state government announced the launch of two unprecedentedly
generous schemes- Sakhi (Friend), a micro-credit scheme, and Vanbandhu Kalyan
Yojana (Tribal Welfare Scheme), delivering loan-buffaloes to tribals who constitute 72
per cent of Dahod‘s population (GOI, 2001). The two interventions together mimic
watershed development‘s most desired material technologies- microcredit and livestock
loans. However, after just three months of its introduction, Vanbandhu Kalyan Yojana
was quietly withdrawn due to lack of funds. But the intervention remained enacted in
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discursive practice, with glitzy advertisements strategically erected on Station Road,
Dahod‘s arterial road; such that Dahod town‘s inhabitants believed that the BJP was
doing an outstanding job of rural development. A police superintendent from Godhra
involved in security arrangements for the Chief Minister‘s public addresses in Dahod and
Godhra articulated:
It‘s more important to show that work has been done than to do it. All of Modi‘s
public addresses in the past two years in districts across Gujarat are exercises in
creating his persona in the public mind.
My attempt through this case is to show that development and democratic
governance are thoroughly inter-twined, in that the delivery of development constitutes
the measure of democratic governance at both the local national and beyond. To
compensate for lack of actual development delivery such as the withdrawal of the Tribal
Welfare Scheme, Narendra Modi used subsequent public meetings to channel cashpatronage directly to sarpanches throughout 2007. At the ‗Girl Child Protection‘ meeting
in Limkheda, the BJP-led government delivered 1,700,000 rupees to female students for
exemplary performance in the 10th and 12th Board exams and entrepreneurial women‘s
self-help groups for successful market participation; an overwhelming proportion of
whom were sarpanches‘ family members. The Mahipura sarpanch‘s middle daughter who
was close to completing a college degree received an award for excellence in the 12th
board exam she passed several years ago.
The BJP delivered patronage in the form of government employment as well in
late 2006, announcing the appointment of five ‗village friends‘ (gram mitra) in every
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village panchayat specializing in agriculture, education, health, development and family
welfare at a monthly salary of 1000 rupees each, ‗to disseminate information on the
honorable government‘s schemes for development in rural areas and to enable the
participation of eager youth in the rural community development endeavor‘. This is
striking in light of the overall rolling back of the state from employment.
Development Patronage Failure and the State’s Proposal of Consensus Panchayats
In the face of fickle local leaders without deep alliances with the BJP, the BJP‘s
poor development performance, the fallout of violence in Dahod, and competition from
the Congress, Narendra Modi announced the samras (‗consensus‘) scheme in October
2006 to attempt to craft ‗uncontested‘ panchayats in village panchayat elections because
elections threatened to open up crevices of dissent against the BJP‘s illiberal politics and
neoliberal policies. Modi called for contestants to abandon elections and cited strains on
government coffers that could instead be used for development. Modi called for selecting
a candidate by consensus, announcing that he would reward panchayats that decided not
to hold elections with a ‗development fund‘ of 500,000 rupees. This fund actually
consisted of bribes to panchayat contestants to incentivize withdrawal of their
nominations.
A BJP MLA‘s evocative command to Block Development Officers was ‗Kill or
murder, but make them consensual‘. District and block level bureaucrats threatened to jail
defiant candidates, report intractable candidates to higher level BJP leaders and accused
dissenting candidates of being Congress supporters. This was the second time that the
Chief Minister had floated the consensus proposal, having proposed the scheme in the
2002 village panchayat elections, just after the 2002 carnage.
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Resistance to Consensus Panchayats
In what follows, I attempt to show that development and democracy mutually
constitute each other: not only is development a tool of securing political authority as
both the Congress and BJP‘s patronage politics demonstrate, but democracy is also
deployed as a tool to secure development. Through an account of deliberation over the
Chief Minister‘s consensus in Mahipura, I show how voters rejected consensus and
asserted their right to be able to check leaders‘ power through elections, secure social
services, and shape the trajectory of community development.
The creation of non-elected panchayats contradicts the very objective panchayats
have been created for- to increase representatives‘ accountability through the threat of
being voted out of power and having to win an election, which propels broad-based
distribution. Consensual politics eliminated the exercise of secret ballot which forced
leaders to broaden development beyond their lineage. Panchayat elections have created a
politicized understanding of the state among voters. By uniquely constituting
representational politics in the locality, panchayats craft a politicized understanding of
development and the state among marginalized groups and a deep sense of justice and
legitimacy of rule, and voters in Mahipura challenged the selection of a unanimous
candidate.
At bureaucrats‘ behest, every panchayat conducted a village assembly to explore
whether voters were agreeable to selecting rather than electing a candidate. I was allowed
to observe Mahipura‘s village assembly which was conducted by the deputy sarpanch.
The meeting was attended by the panchayat‘s seven prospective candidates, their
supporters, voters and lineage leaders. At the meeting, voters broadened the meaning of
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consensus beyond that intended by the state and asserted that a consensual process
needed to turn back to the hamlets to choose unanimous candidates. More radically,
voters stated that a different criterion was required to select a unanimous candidate,
which would necessarily exclude all those who had set out to win through opposition and
contest. This discourse destabilized the state‘s very architecture for securing unelected
panchayats by narrowing the space of contestation to candidates.
The consensus notion put negotiation under wraps because powerful candidates
negotiated for the sarpanch‘s position among themselves. However, people grasped the
possibilities opened by a village assembly on consensus to problematize a political
practice of opposition and contest rather than deliberation, challenging the legitimacy of
both the state and panchayats.
In Mahipura, not only voters but even contestants challenged the consensus
proposal, asserting their right to become legitimately elected leaders which was an
immense source of power. Panchayat contestants in Dahod challenged consensual politics
by circulating the phrase ‗consensus if consent, else not‘. Contestants revealed a keen
intelligence of the cost of an unelected panchayat to their political careers. Contestants
responded to consensual politics with the rhetorical question ‗Why doesn‘t Modi
implement ‗consensus‘ for his own seat?‘ challenging the Chief Minister‘s ethics not
from a position of subjecthood but as equal political actors. People‘s challenge of the
Chief Minister‘s proposal also stemmed from familiarity with parties‘ vote-buying
practices, and Narendra Modi‘s argument of rising election expenses rang hollow given
that both the BJP and Congress gave large sums of money to village leaders for votes. On
the eve of the state assembly election in December 2007, Ramabhai Chauhan, elaborated,
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‗They corrupt leaders with all the money and leaders corrupt voters. The leaders are
greedy…. They give people a few rupees here and there and fill their own pockets.‘
Five candidates for the sarpanch‘s post attended Mahipura‘s village assembly,
four from Himmatpur and the incumbent‘s husband from Mahipura. Mahipura
panchayat‘s sarpanch seat was reserved for a woman in 2002, and Mahipura‘s long-time
contestant Shankar had made his wife Kampa the de jure panchayat candidate, helping
her win the election and conducting the panchayat‘s business himself. No independent
women leaders have emerged in the Mahipura panchayat at either the sarpanch or wardmember level, and this is commonplace, although there is a critical mass of women
leaders in Dahod as a whole.
To resolve conflict among contestants in choosing a unanimous candidate in
2006, bureaucrats had suggested that the strongest candidate be chosen as sarpanch, the
next strongest as the deputy sarpanch and the rest be made ward-members. Three of the
weakest candidates withdrew their nomination. Tersing, 30, the youngest and first-time
candidate from Himmatpur had served as the Mahipura de facto incumbent Shankar‘s
assistant from 2002-2006 on the promise that Shankar would support Tersing‘s
candidature for sarpanch in 2006. Shankar backtracked on his promise and proclaimed
that he would re-contest the election (the seat was no longer reserved for a woman).
Tersing asserted that if Shankar contested so would he. The Mahipura village assembly
decided against selecting a unanimous candidate, and Shankar and Tersing contested the
election.
Only forty-seven villages turned consensual in Dahod, the lowest proportion in
any district in Gujarat. Dahod also had the largest extent of re-polling in cases of voter86

intimidation and poll-booth capturing, signifying intense electoral conflict, an
autonomous political culture that challenged election verdicts, and the high stakes
involved in panchayat elections in the drylands, where democratic politics rather than
capitalist production is a source of accumulation, unlike in irrigated districts.
Panchayat leaders exhibit an agency that it denied to them in most accounts of
local politics. Formal democracy buttresses panchayat power through electoral politics,
majority rule, secret ballot and resources to deliver services. This makes panchayats
implicated in the state but precisely through implication, enables voters and leaders to
critique the state.
The BJP won the Gujarat election in 2007 by the smallest margin in Dahod, and
panchayat leaders were a critical part of its victory. In exchange for development
patronage, political parties secure sarpanches‘ active connivance in every step of an
election, from campaigning to controlling polling booths to vote-counting. Bharat, 28, the
youngest lineage-leader from Mahipura revealed:
Narendra Modi called a meeting of all the MLAs of the BJP and two lineage
leaders from each village. Depending on the polling booth, he called leaders from
the respective booths so that two BJP people could be placed at every booth.
DD: So you will be at the polling booth on polling day?
BS: Yes.
DD: Was anyone from the Election Commission present?
BS: No. Block panchayat BJP representatives, district panchayat BJP
representatives, village panchayat representatives and lineage leaders.
DD: So this was a party meeting.
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BS: Yes.
DD: What was the topic of discussion?
BS: That the BJP must get the votes.
Becoming sarpanch not only gives control over development but also
opportunities to build relationships with parties‘ leaders and deepen political power by
campaigning for parties in elections, delivering one‘s lineage‘s and village‘s votes, and
assisting parties in ‗managing‘ the polling process, making panchayats deeply contested.
Development Patronage on the Congress’ Part
Political competition between the BJP and Congress continued to shape
development in Dahod after the state assembly election. The Congress-led central
government initiated the Backward Regions Grant Fund (Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana) in
2007, two years before the general election in 2009, to channelize funds to
infrastructurally backward districts inhabited disproportionately by poor voters. The
Backward Region Grant Fund delivers resources for building infrastructure across the
village, block and district level to bridge critical gaps in development, and its funding
criteria are broad so that the central-state can reach out to any constituency of electoral
significance with this scheme. The scheme‘s provisions are generous- if a particular
village has been excluded from a certain development activity it can receive funds
through this scheme. If the funds for a particular activity are exhausted with a certain
department, the Backward Region Grant Fund delivers funds for that activity.
The District Rural Development Agency‘s director traveled across every block
headquarter in Dahod and conducted meetings with sarpanches, panchayat secretaries and
Block Development officers to disseminate information on the Backward Region Grant
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Fund. Sarpanches were informed that every panchayat that applied for the Backward
Region Grant Fund would receive at least 300,000 rupees. Six strategic districts were
selected for implementation- Banaskantha, Dangs, Panchmahal, Dahod, Narmada and
Sabarkantha; all tribal districts inhabited disproportionately by Adivasis and Kolis.
The Backward Region Grant Fund also delivered micro-credit to women, an
electoral category of growing importance. Micro-credit was delivered through seven
NGOs; each allotted a target of forming 125 self-help groups. Two districts were selected
for micro-credit delivery- Dahod and the Dangs, both up for grabs because the Dangs is
the poorest district in India and has witnessed intense violence against missionaries by
the Sangh in recent years, and in Dahod, BJP MLA Babu Katara recently lost his seat.
Precisely like the BJP, the Congress delivered privatized, high-value development
technologies such as micro-credit and capital-intensive infrastructure as a form of
patronage to hamlet leaders and lineage leaders who control property in their lineage,
have patronage ties with kin, and shape kin voting behavior.
In the 2009 national assembly elections, while the BJP won 14 seats in Gujarat,
the Congress won a surprisingly large 12 seats. Prabha Kishore Taaviad, the Congress
candidate won in Dahod.
Discussion
Development is implicated in democratic politics and is mediated by political
competition between national-level parties. Like other development interventions,
watershed development is shaped by democratic politics because of panchayats‘
implication in higher scales of power. While panchayats continue to be considered standalone elected bodies in most scholarship on democratic decentralization and their links
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with broader processes of statemaking remain understudied, this chapter attempts to fill
the gap by teasing out the complex relationships between sarpanches and parties, and
sarpanches as conduits of development patronage to numerically dominant poor voters in
India by two among the world‘s largest parties, the Congress and BJP.
Panchayats play a central role in enabling political parties to reach rural voters,
and more so in the remote drylands than other rural areas. The panchayat is a greater
source of wealth and power in the drylands than in irrigated agrarian districts where the
market economy is a bigger source of wealth and the panchayat is subordinate to
economic institutions. Panchayats in semi-arid districts are centers of local leaders‘ and
voters‘ aspirations of development, access to economic resources, control over natural
resources, political careers and wealth. Patronage politics meshes well with capitalintensive development including micro-credit, infrastructure-building and watershed
development. This produces trickle-down ownership of material resources from
sarpanches to ward members, vote brokers, patels, development agents and lineage
leaders, and from them to kin and neighbors.
Watershed development unfolds in the realm of local ‗self-governance‘ by three
million elected representatives comprising sarpanches and ward members across the
world‘s largest democracy, with panchayati raj constituting the world‘s largest
institutional framework of democratic governance. Watershed development‘s grassroots
implementation by panchayats enables studying how market-driven development shapes
and is shaped by democratic decentralization, and what the distributional consequences of
such an institutional arrangement of development policy implementation are, which are
the themes of the next chapter.
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4. Democratic Decentralization, Electoral Politics and Distribution in the
Community
The state relies on political actors in society to achieve commodity production and
agrarian change (Yang, 1989), and watershed development is implemented by
panchayats. I describe the process of bargaining involving the sarpanch, ward members,
vote brokers, development agents and lineage leaders to shape the distribution of material
technologies and wage employment delivered through watershed development; and the
conflicts over natural resources, infrastructure delivery and political inclusion that
inflected contestation over control of the panchayat.
Watershed development comprises natural resource management and
interventions geared towards private land including dam-building, building farm ponds
for in-situ water harvesting, building field bunds and delivering seed-kits to farmers for
cash-crop production. In Mahipura, watershed development was implemented from 2003
to 2008 and comprised afforestation of grazing lands, dam-building for surface irrigation,
cash-crop demonstrations, building farm ponds, extending micro-credit and undertaking
high-value commodity production.
The Village and its Factions
Mahipura lies in Limkheda block in the flatter western part of Dahod district.
Mahipura is considered a cultivator village dominated by Kolis where Adivasis are in a
minority, unlike the rest of Dahod where Adivasis form half or more of a village‘s
population. Mahipura consists of 105 Koli and 17 Adivasi families. Koli lineages include
Chauhan, Baria, Patel and Labda. Adivasis lineages include Taaviad, Nayak and
Bhabhor. Kolis have settled on the best quality land, enabling surplus production and
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cash earnings to invest in well-deepening. Voters vote largely along lineage lines.
Mahipura‘s three largest lineages- Chauhans, Barias and Patels control the panchayat.
There are three social actors in the local struggle I describe: the Chauhans; larger sections
of Patels and Barias; and a coalition of weaker Barias, less influential Patels and
Bhabhors. At stake is development channelled to Mahipura of which watershed
development was the largest intervention; the panchayat‘s provision of infrastructure; and
control over the village forest.
Mahipura consists of level fields stretched out until village borders where low
hills mark village boundaries on three sides, the fourth boundary being a dry stream bed.
One end of the village is against the natural wall of the catchment of the Patangadi dam.
Mahipura consists of two sections, the main village and Bordi hamlet, which is nestled
against the Patangadi dam‘s catchment. Bordi gives the appearance of a self-contained
village and a broad track separates it from Mahipura. Mahipura has a village forest spread
over 67 hectares and its grazing lands are spread over 35 hectares, of which 25 hectares
are under the Revenue Department‘s jurisdiction and 10 hectares under the panchayat.
The village adjoins an arterial road of the Gujarat state highway system which has
facilitated its large farmers‘ participation in cash-milk production for the Panchmahal
dairy located outside Godhra town 20 kilometers away. Mahipura is connected to the
market towns of Piplod and Randhikpur by auto rickshaws, jeeps and buses which ply on
the road adjoining the village several times each day. The village received electricity in
2003 and all hamlets except one have household electricity connections.
Cultivation and migration are the mainstays. The soil is generally brown and
loamy. Fields are a combination of flat unbunded plots and bunded fields with one to
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three feet high embankments to conserve water for rice transplantation. Beyond the fields
lie fallows to be brought under the plow when claimants on land increase. Fields are
unfenced and borders are planted with bamboo and madhuca indica (mahua) to mark
field boundaries, for shade and for fodder. Mahua yield a harvest of sticky, sweet and
nutritious yellow fruit in spring which is consumed fresh, and dried and sold to
shopkeepers at a handsome price for brewing liquor.
Soil fertility varies according to security of tenure (Meinzen-Dick & Gregorio,
2004), proximity to homestead land and wells, and proximity to surface irrigation sources
like streams or irrigation tanks (Sengupta, 1993). Cultivators apply more fertilizer to
leased land than land they own (Gupta, 1998). Organic manure is applied only to land for
subsistence cultivation. People grow local varieties of maize and rice for consumption,
and hybrid varieties of rice such as Gujarat 40, Gujarat 80 and Kamod; wheat, vegetables
and oilseeds for sale. Perennial well-owners grow summer crops of lentils and cereals
which are nutritious food crops with nitrogen-fixing properties and attractive cash crops
because of their high prices.
People prefer to consume local varieties of milky-white maize rather than hybrid
yellow maize because of local seeds‘ greater weight, meatiness and pest-resistance in
storage. Households with winter- and perennial-wells grow chillis, garlic, cilantro, okra,
eggplant, flat beans, bitter gourd and yellow gourd for consumption. Seeds are conserved
by allowing some vegetables to over-ripen and develop massive seeds, which are
extracted, dried and stored. Seeds are preserved in airtight containers and stored in a cool,
dark place. Homestead land has vegetable plots and useful trees like acacia arabica (desi
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bawal) for toothbrushes. Milk is an infrequent food which is a by-product of calving to
increase livestock holdings to gift to kin at weddings or the birth of a child.
The proportion of households who purchase commercial seeds for cash-crop
production is miniscule even in this cultivator village, largely because of lack of access to
a lift-irrigation scheme. Development schemes, subsidies and agriculture fairs (krushi
mahotsav) are major sources of affordable commercial seeds. While government sources
provide subsidized seeds, stores sell market-price seeds of both private companies like
Mahyco and government seed research institutes at Godhra, Anand and Dahod.
Thirty five per cent of all households in the village have access to perennial wells,
a high proportion for Dahod district. In families without either perennial-wells or winterwells, both men and women migrate, and children start wage-migration at younger ages
of 13-14. The migrant labor market is highly segmented and shaped by caste networks
between migrants and contractors who hire them. Kolis migrate as ‗skilled‘ laborers in
higher-paying work while Adivasis migrate as ‗unskilled‘ laborers in low-paying
occupations (Breman, 1996; Mosse et al., 2002). In the construction industry, entry
wages for Kolis are 70 rupees per day and rise to 200 rupees. Even at the same worksites, Adivasis are relegated into lower-paying tasks and wages range from 30 rupees (60
cents) per day to 70 rupees ($1.3). In Mahipura, Adivasis have lower levels of education
than Kolis, fewer livestock and lack perennial wells. Table 2 compares Koli and Adivasi
educational attainment, well rights, irrigation motor rights and per capita livestock in
Mahipura.
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Table 2 Distribution of Economic Resources According to Caste
Resources
Kolis N=105
Well rights
2.59 (SD=0.75)
Irrigation motor rights
0.43 (SD=0.46)
Bulls
1.76 (SD=0.81)
Milk-livestock
1.6 (SD=1.63)
Per-capital livestock
1.13 (SD=0.60)
Education
6.9 (SD=4.44)
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007

Adivasis N=17
1.35 (SD=1.16)
0.2 (SD=0.33)
0.94 (SD=1)
0.82 (SD=1.66)
0.46 (SD=0.60)
3.6 (SD=4.03)

Well-rights are scaled from 0 to 3, and 0 indicates no wells, 1 indicates summerwell ownership that provides water only during the rainy season, 2 indicates access to a
winter-well with water through most of winter, and 3 indicates access to a perennial well.
Kolis have 2.59 well rights on average indicating the ability to grow a second irrigated
winter crop and provide partial summer irrigation, constituting surplus production.
Average Adivasi well ownership is 1.35, indicating assured production of only a rainfed
crop and uncertain ability to provide winter irrigation. Kolis own .43 motors on average
while Adivasis own .20 motors, that is, 43 per cent Koli families have an irrigation motor
while only 20 per cent Adivasis do.
Bulls are critical for food security because they enable sowing seeds for
subsistence. Those without bulls must borrow others‘ bulls after they have finished
sowing their fields and a delay of even a few days affects the harvest adversely. Most
households cannot afford the upkeep of two bulls. Instead, siblings with separate
households tend to a bull apiece and yoke their bulls for plowing. Each Koli family owns
1.76 bulls on average, far more than the minimum one, indicating adequate fodder
availability and surplus production. Each Adivasi family owns .94 bulls on average, less
than the minimum one required for joint plowing, indicating that some Adivasis have to
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borrow others‘ bulls. Data on total livestock presents a similar scenario. Each Koli owns
1.13 livestock while each Adivasi owns .46 livestock. Kolis own more milk-livestock
comprising cows and buffaloes, with 1.6 milk livestock on average against Adivasis‘ .82.
Koli-Adivasi disparities in wells, motors and livestock are statistically significant (for
wells, t value= 2.2, d.f.=120, p=.02; for motor rights, t value= 2.01, d.f.=120, p=.04, for
livestock, t value=3.74, d.f.= 120, p=.0003.)
A marked disparity between Kolis and Adivasis is divergence in education among
men in the ‗political cohort‘ aged 20-55 comprising men active in village politics
(Krishna, 2002). The average education among Koli men is 6.9 years while the average
for Adivasi men is 3.6 years.
Panchayat Structure, Actors and Distribution of Power
Mahipura is part of a three village panchayat comprising Mahipura, Limdi and
Himmatpur, with the contest for the sarpanch‘s position usually being between Mahipura
and Himmatpur, the larger villages‘ sarpanch-candidates. The village panchayat consists
of the sarpanch elected by all adults of the villages that comprise a panchayat. Panchayati
Raj is under state governments‘ jurisdiction; therefore each state designs its own specific
rules of local self-governance. In Gujarat, a panchayat consists of a population of
approximately 1,500 people. In semi-arid districts, one large village may have its own
panchayat while smaller villages comprising 600-800 people might have two or three
contiguous villages being under one panchayat. The panchayat council comprises the
sarpanch and ward members who are elected from each electoral ward of the village
which overlaps with hamlet boundaries. Each ward-member represents 300-400 people.
In the Mahipura panchayat, Mahipura and Himmatpur each have two ward-member seats
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while Limdi has one ward-member seat. Voters elect the sarpanch from among
panchayat-wide sarpanch-candidates and ward member from their respective wards.
The panchayat carries out its work at monthly panchayat council meetings
involving the sarpanch, ward members and the panchayat secretary (talati), who is the
lowest-level government agent in the community. The panchayat secretary also collects
taxes and manages land records. The panchayat secretary assists the sarpanch in filling
forms to secure funds for development schemes, signs checks to disburse funds to the
sarpanch and shares information on new schemes. At the first panchayat council meeting
of a new panchayat, the council elects its deputy sarpanch from among ward members.
The deputy sarpanch acts on behalf of the sarpanch in his absence.
Institutional power in the panchayat is concentrated in the sarpanch and panchayat
secretary. The devolution of political power with decentralization has been accompanied
by the recentralization of executive power, so that the panchayat secretary wields
significant control over panchayat resources. Panchayat secretaries are in charge of
disbursing monies to sarpanches and an overburdened Block Development Officer can
exercise limited oversight over panchayat secretaries, therefore panchayat secretaries
have considerable opportunities to skim off resources from the panchayat. The Limkheda
Block Magistrate remarked:
The morale and incentives for lower level staff in the government are a huge
problem. Clerks, section officers, junior officers- the highest corruption is at that
level. Panchayat secretaries are the wealthiest in a district and the most corruptthey take bribes from above and from below. Promotions entail bribery, and even
in tribal areas, panchayat secretaries keep aside 300,000- 700,000 rupees for a
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bribe for their promotion.
The sarpanch and panchayat secretary act in collusion because they jointly
operate the panchayat‘s bank account. There is no mechanism for oversight by ward
members in the panchayat‘s financial transactions. Ward members deprecatingly describe
themselves as those who ‗roam around behind the sarpanch‘, using the Gujarati phrase
vaade-vaade (behind) to pun on the word ‗ward‘. Ward members exercise control over
the sarpanch only in the case of public goods and village-wide development schemes.
The panchayat council deliberates on development projects at its monthly
meetings. The sarpanch and ward members are mutually dependent in approving
activities because the sarpanch requires ward members‘ signatures to approve his
development proposals, and ward members require the sarpanch‘s approval of their
request for funds to implement projects. Mahipura‘s ward-member Veera, 45, elaborated:
If there‘s a road building project, all the hamlets get together and figure out which
route works best. We hold a meeting at the panchayat office on a particular date.
Then all the ward members put forth concerns or justifications concerning their
wards. The panchayat secretary records all the demands and submits the proposed
activity to the block panchayat. The block panchayat accepts or rejects the request
as it sees fit, and then the work commences.…. If the sarpanch says, ‗We will
bring the project here‘ and a particular ward member doesn‘t approve of it, the
ward member can say so- he has every right to. We are fully allowed to record our
demands with the sarpanch.
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The panchayat rather than the village watershed development committee is the
salient analytical unit for studying how watershed development unfolds in the community
because control of the committee is vested in the sarpanch, precisely for the central state
to be able to deliver patronage to the sarpanch. The sarpanch selects watershed
development committee members on the basis of reciprocity, mutuality and trust between
the sarpanch and pivotal actors who are included in committees from among village
leaders including ward members, lineage leaders, patels, development brokers, religious
leaders, contractors, political parties‘ grassroots workers and government employees.
In an institutional framework of panchayat implementation, financial power in
watershed development is vested in the sarpanch, who receives all monies through checks
from the block office, and in turn disburses funds and inputs to beneficiaries. Watershed
development committee members that I interviewed including lineage leaders and kin of
the de facto sarpanch Shankar report that they were never invited to attend a meeting of
the panchayat council to discuss watershed development activities, and their only role
had been to attend a training session with the sarpanch at Limkheda to learn about
watershed development‘s objectives, activities and delivery mechanisms.
The Distribution of Power across Individuals and Lineages
Mahipura‘s leader Shankar, a leader of the Chauhan lineage had ‗won‘ the
panchayat election in 2002, being the sole sarpanch contestant from Mahipura and
making his wife contest the election as a ‗proxy candidate‘ as the seat was reserved for a
woman. The next panchayat election was in December 2006.
The numerical distribution of lineages is enumerated in Table 3. The Barias are
the largest lineage with 49 households followed by the Patels with 28 households and
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Chauhans with 23 households. The main protagonists of struggles over development
involve these three Koli lineages. The Chauhans control the office of the sarpanch on the
basis of their numerical compactness compared to the larger Barias and Patels, and vote
as a unity, out-voting other lineages in electing their candidate to the panchayat. Different
sections of the Chauhan lineage identify only one lineage-leader, Shankar, while the
Patels identify two lineage-leaders and the Barias identify four, indicating the fragmented
nature of these larger lineages.
Table 3 Distribution of Households According to Lineage
Lineage
Chauhan
Baria
Patel
Taaviad
Nayak
Labda
Bhabhor

Number of households

Proportion in the village

23
49
28
14
3
4
1

18.5
39.5
24
11
2.4
3.2
.08

Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
Shankar, 45, is known as the finest orator across Mahipura, Himmatpur and
Limdi; expends the same financial resources on his daughters‘ education and careers as
his sons‘; and is respectful towards women who say they would not hesitate to go to his
house alone at night to call him to resolve a conflict. Shankar is a career politician who
contested his first election in 1994. A patel then, Shankar won the first panchayat election
because Himmatpur‘s vote got divided among its numerous candidates. Shankar is an
expert strategist who co-opts, divides, sets up false candidates in an election to divide an
opponent‘s vote, and has built a small but significant voter base in Himmatpur, the
opposition village. Even though older Chauhans scoff at Shankar‘s political ambitions,
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his distant manner and self-importance, all acknowledge his command of the law.
Shankar is illiterate but has his children read pamphlets, leaflets and development
schemes‘ guidelines aloud to him every evening and memorizing them. Over a 15-year
political career, Shankar had amassed a plethora of knowledge on development schemes.
Shankar recently fought for a seat in the Limkheda block panchayat as the Congress‘
candidate, losing the election by less than 200 votes.
The Chauhans consider themselves a privileged lot in Mahipura. The Chauhans
have the best access to markets, information on subsidies, and wage-employment on
works that Shankar delivers to them. The Chauhans have the highest levels of
government employment and education. As Table 4 illustrates, Chauhan men in the
political age-cohort have the highest educational attainment of 9.3 years, followed by
Barias and then Patels.
Table 4 Educational Attainment among Men Aged 20-55 According to Lineage
Lineage Years of school attendance
Median
Standard deviation
Chauhan
9.30
10
4.38
Baria
6.65
8
4.32
Patel
5.88
6.5
4.05
Taaviad
4.07
4
3.79
Nayak
0
0
0
Labda
3.25
2
4.27
Bhabhor
9
9
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
The Mahipura sarpanch seat was reserved for a woman in 2002, and as is widely
practiced, Shankar installed his second wife Kampa as a proxy candidate to contest the
election. Reservation is carried out by rotation across panchayats, with the sarpanch‘s
seat being reserved for a woman every third election in each panchayat, and in each
election, one-third of the ward members‘ seats in every panchayat being reserved for
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women. In the Mahipura panchayat, all contestants, exclusively male, had contested the
election by naming their wives as formal candidates. Shankar and his first wife Charu are
illiterate, and as Shankar‘s involvement in panchayat politics deepened and women‘s
reservation in panchayats was enacted, Shankar married an educated woman who he
could install as a nominal sarpanch. Bigamy is uncommon but not exceptional among
wealthy Kolis. The practice of installing spouses and daughters-in-law as nominal
sarpanches is widespread and men who rule panchayats through their spouse or daughterin-law are called pati-sarpanch (‗husband-sarpanch‘) and sasra-sarpanch (‗father-in-law
sarpanch‘) respectively.
Panchayati Raj led to the rise of powerful women in Dahod even before women‘s
reservation was enacted, but women leaders are still few in number. However,
reservation of one-third seats in panchayats for women has led to some women in the
political cohort aged 20-50 deciding to contest elections and considering politics as a
viable career. This is facilitated by growing female literacy, changing gender norms, the
state‘s attempt to strengthen women‘s formal rights to land ownership, and intervention
by external actors- social movements, NGOs and women‘s micro-credit enterprises- to
increase women‘s political representation.
Male career politicians, lineage leaders who contest as sarpanches and ward
members, patels and male panchayat aspirants are threatened by women‘s (and Dalits‘
and Adivasis‘) entry in panchayat elections. Male leadership resists women‘s political
participation because it broadens electoral contestation beyond men to include women,
Dalits and Adivasis. Shankar refers to unreserved seats as ‗men‘s seats‘- tacitly stating
that women candidates may not contest an election on a general seat. Upon my clarifying
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that unreserved seats were ‗general seats‘ which men and women alike could contest,
Shankar said viciously, ‗We have given you your 33 percent (reservation). Stay with that.
You won‘t get any more than that.‘
Most women still remain puppet sarpanches for male relatives, and at block-level
meetings where the District Rural Development Agency‘s technocrats share information
on schemes with sarpanches, bureaucrats lament that not one sarpanch in attendance is a
woman. Early in 2006, women panchayat leaders affiliated with Mahila Swaraj Abhiyan
(Women‘s Self-Governance Movement) sent a petition to the state-level Ministry of
Panchayati Raj Institutions demanding that that pati sarpanchs not be allowed to sit in
meetings with their wives. Women leaders also demanded that bureaucrats mandate that
pati-sarpanches and sasra-sarpanches not take decisions or cast a vote at these meetings.
While scholarship by Esther Duflo and Rohini Pande is correct in arguing that
women leaders deliver women-centered public goods in greater proportion than men
(Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Pande, 2003), a large-N research design does not
measure whether women leaders are nominal or effective leaders and such a design may
contribute to a significant effect size despite the fact that more women-leaders may be de
jure leaders than de facto leaders. The Mahipura panchayat‘s sarpanch‘s seat and two
ward members‘ seats were reserved for women in 2002, but both the sarpanch and wardmembers were women propped by their career-politician husbands as candidates. No
independent women leaders have emerged in Mahipura and a contributing factor may be
greater Hinduization and patriarchal norms among Kolis than Adivasis, which restrict
women‘s mobility, property rights and land ownership. Throughout the dissertation, I will
use the terms sarpanch and ward member to refer to the person who held de facto power
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rather than the person who was elected de jure.
The Barias are Mahipura‘s largest lineage and comprise 49 households,
constituting almost 40 per cent of the village‘s families. The Barias hold 178 votes,
commanding 37.7 per cent of the village‘s vote share. While the Barias are politically
powerful, they are also the most segmented of all lineages in Mahipura. The Barias
dominated politics in Mahipura in the pre-panchayat era of the patel‘s rule, and boast
three patels who governed Mahipura including Mahipura‘s longest-tenured patel Jethra.
While the sarpanch controls development; Jethra adjudicates interpersonal disputes and
reports serious offences such as murders to the police. Jethra is well-known among police
officers and political parties‘ leaders, and he rather than the sarpanch investigates deaths
under suspicious circumstances. In the following account, I show how the patel exerts
palpable political control over the community.
Jethra recently examined the death of a newly-married Patel bride after repeated
quarrels with her husband. The Patel youth was physically abusive with his wife and the
village‘s lineage-leaders warned him that if he did not mend his ways stricter punishment
would follow. Upon the young woman‘s death, her family drove up to Mahipura in a
tractor-carrier filled with kin in a show of strength, threatening dire consequences if
Mahipura‘s leaders did not establish the cause of her death.
The Patel youth insisted that the woman had committed suicide. Jethra examined
her body and stated that there were nail marks around her throat which indicated that she
was strangled. Jethra informed Shankar the sarpanch that the woman had been murdered.
Shankar requested Jethra to report the case to the police as he had examined the body.
Jethra called the police station for a jeep and took the Patel youth to the police station and
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deposed evidence against him. Murder often involves testifying against someone from
one‘s own village, and only a powerful patel backed by the state and sarpanch can testify
against a fellow-villager, yet not face retributive action from the accused. The
government selected patels based on their fearlessness, leadership, and economic power.
Jethra describes his own interview for the patel‘s position thus:
The Mamlatdar (Block Revenue Collector) asked me, ‗If there‘s a quarrel what‘ll
you do?‘ I said, ‗I‘ll ask both the parties what the quarrel is about, resolve it and
not let the matter come to the police station. If there‘s death, I‘ll inform the police
and let them take the body for post mortem. And I will let them take the accused
to jail.‘
In another case of a suspicious death, Jethra established death due to accident
rather than injury despite all evidence pointing to deliberate harm. In this context, the
father and son exchanged blows in an inebriated state over the question of land division
and the son reported the father‘s death soon thereafter, saying that his father climbed a
tree to harvest leaves for his goat, lost his balance, fell and died. Jethra took the son‘s
word for it, in marked contrast to the strangulation case where Jethra examined evidence
carefully, in no small part due to the bride‘s family deploying threats. I found the account
of a tree-fall death highly implausible because livestock are last fed at dusk rather than
nightfall, and people, even when drunk, do not climb trees at night for practical reasons
of poor visibility and superstitious reasons of spirits inhabiting trees. I told Jethra as
much, who clarified, ‗If they turned the son in for killing the father we‘d not only have to
do the father‘s last rites (vidhi) but also try to get the son out of jail to pay for them.‘ If
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the son were sent to jail because the patel ruled that he had murdered his father, the
burden of organizing his father‘s death feast that costs upward of 20,000 rupees would
fall on village leaders. Therefore Jethra chose to believe the son‘s account. Jethra
described what transpired at the police station when he reported the death:
The Superintendent of Police (jamaadaar) said, ‗What happened?‘
I said, ‗He fell from a tree. You‘re not to do anything to the son.‘
He said, ‗You‘ll have to give me some money.‘
I said, ‗I‘ll borrow 300 rupees tomorrow and get it to you the day after.‘
He said, ‗No, 500.‘
I said, ‗No, 300.‘ And we settled it at that. Then I told the jamaadaar, ‗We‘ll
make the case that he fell from a tree and we took him to the doctor house but he
died en route.‘
The matter of establishing criminality is shaped by contingency and coercion, not
necessarily ‗truth‘, therefore Jethra, who establishes criminality, commands immense
power. Jethra‘s decision was shaped by economic contingency. ‗Truth‘ is open to
manipulation on the basis of all parties‘ circumstances, and the ambiguity of establishing
criminality and the police‘s reliance on the patel‘s account makes the patel one of the
most powerful actors in the village. Sarpanches rely heavily on village patels to deal with
serious offences and present the village as peaceful and law-abiding. Therefore Jethra‘s
role as a patel makes him as powerful as the sarpanch, enabling him to command
development for himself, his hamlet and Barias. Shankar has made Jethra the vicechairman of Mahipura‘s tree-growers‘ cooperative established in the village to afforest
grazing land and harvest timber when trees reach maturity.
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Because of their large size, the Barias are divided into several sections, each with
its own leader. In addition to Jethra who is a lineage-wide leader, Baria leaders include
Paaru, the youngest Baria leader who was a ward member from 2002 to 2006. Wardmember actors are subsumed within lineage-leader actors- a ward member is necessarily
a lineage leader but every lineage leader cannot be a ward member. Ward members are
territorial and their spatial rule combines two or three hamlets, therefore one ward
member is elected from among many lineage leaders.
The Barias are spread across four hamlets with varying proximity to the
Chauhans. The Barias‘ numerical size, control over the institution of patlai,
representation on the panchayat through a ward member, proximity to Chauhans, and
influence over the forest cooperative makes them one of Mahipura‘s most powerful
groups. However, the Barias‘ overall wealth is less than the Chauhans‘ and Patels‘, with
lower access to perennial wells, livestock and irrigation motors. The Barias‘ fortunes are
entwined with the Chauhans because of greater dependence on development schemes
controlled by the sarpanch.
Unlike the Barias, the Patels, Mahipura‘s wealthiest lineage are autonomous from
the sarpanch. The Patels enjoy symmetric relations with the sarpanch and conduct their
internal affairs independent of the main village. The Patels inhabit Bordi hamlet which is
a 20 minute walk from the main village. The forest surrounding Bordi is out of bounds
for people and livestock due to the hazard of drowning when water is released from the
Patangadi dam‘s reservoir. The dam‘s reservoir recharges the water table of adjoining
villages, and Bordi‘s cultivators dig 20-30 feet less for a perennial well than the main
village‘s farmers. As a result, the Patels have the highest ownership of perennial wells in
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Mahipura, as described in Table 5. Twenty-four out of 28 Patel families comprising 86
per cent of all Patels have water rights in perennial wells, followed by the Chauhans with
78 per cent and the Barias with 59 per cent families.
Table 5 Ownership of Perennial Wells According to Lineage
Lineage
Perennial irrigators Percentage in the lineage
Chauhan
18
78
Baria
20
59
Patel
24
86
Taaviad
5
35
Nayak
0
0
Labda
2
50
Bhabhor
0
0
Total
69
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007

Percentage in the village
26
28.9
34.7
7.2
0
2.8
0
100

Motor and livestock ownership are closely associated with perennial wells.
Perennial well-owners invest in irrigation motors worth 10,000-20,000 rupees to lift
water from deep wells with pipes. The Patels have the highest motor ownership at .55,
indicating one motor between two households, followed by the Barias with .42 motor
rights and the Chauhans with .31, as outlined in Table 6. The Labdas have the same
motor rights as the Patels. The Taaviads lag in motor rights and the Nayaks and Bhabhors
have none.
Table 6 Average Motors Rights According to Lineage
Lineage
Average motor rights
Median
Standard deviation
Chauhan
.31
.2
.38
Baria
.42
.33
.48
Patel
.55
.41
.52
Taaviad
.27
.12
.36
Nayak
0
0
0
Labda
.5
.5
0
Bhabhor
0
0
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
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Perennial well-ownership enables cultivating in all three agricultural seasons and
the luxury of growing fodder crops like bajra (barley). The water-rich Patels have the
highest per capita livestock holdings, delineated in Table 7. The Patels have 1.28 cattle
per capita while the Barias have 1.08 and the Chauhans have 1.04. These groups are
followed by the Labdas and Taaviads with .91 and .66 per capita livestock respectively,
and trailed by the Nayaks with only .15 per capita livestock.
Table 7 Average per Capita Livestock According to Lineage
Lineage
Per capita livestock
Standard deviation
Chauhan
1.04
.32
Baria
1.08
.62
Patel
1.28
.72
Taaviad
.66
.73
Nayak
.15
.13
Labda
.91
.68
Bhabhor
0
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007

Median
.98
1
1.15
.42
.19
.74
0

The Patels are the second largest lineage in Mahipura with 28 families comprising
24 per cent of the village‘s households, and hold 101 votes comprising 21.3 per cent of
Mahipura‘s vote share, the second-highest after the Barias. The Patels are known to drive
a hard bargain with all candidates in a panchayat election, aided by their numerical size,
cohesive voting behavior, and low dependence on electoral outcomes due to their wealth.
This leads sarpanches to deliver disproportionate resources to the Patels.
The Patels have two leaders, Bharat, 28, the wealthiest Patel, and Veera, 45, from
Shankar‘s cohort. Veera is a founding member of the milk society along with Shankar,
and protects Patel milk-sellers‘ interests in the society. Veera contested the first
panchayat election in 1994 against Shankar but lost, and has subsequently only contested
the ward member‘s seat from Bordi hamlet, winning it each term. Veera was a ward
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member from 2002-2006. When Mahipura formed the Tree Growers‘ Cooperative
Society Shankar made Veera its chairman because the main village incorporated Bordi‘s
forest into the cooperative.
Bharat, 28, the second Patel leader controls a smaller sub-lineage and has recently
emerged as a lineage leader. Where access to just one perennial wealth is a sign of
wealth, Bharat has water rights in three perennial wells, owns two bulls, four cows, five
buffaloes and 12 goats; a motorcycle, a diesel motor and an electric motor. Bharat lends
money, gives kin employment as field laborers and negotiates with the sarpanch for
public goods in Bordi such as a school for the hamlet.
The next largest group, the Taaviads own sloping land, lack irrigation, and rely on
long-term migration to meet subsistence needs. The Taaviads leave the village for 6-11
months. The Taaviads inhabit the Chauhan hamlet but their Baria and Chauhan
neighbours do not interact with them and consider them unclean. In a poignant
enforcement of social boundaries, Adivasis like the Taaviads never offered me water to
drink when I went to their homes in the summer months because Adivasis assumed I
would take offence or reject their offer. I always asked for water and while everybody
readily gave me water, the Taaviads, my neighbours elaborately rinsed the beaker (lota)
before offering me water, ritually cleansing it to make it fit for my consumption, tacitly
showing me how rigidly boundaries of accepting food and water were enforced.
The Taaviads are followed in number by the Labdas who are Koli. The Labdas
are the smallest Koli lineage (N=4) and are considered inferior by other Kolis. The
Labdas lost the patel‘s office to Chauhans due to a Labda patel‘s misdemeanor, and Kolis
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twist their name to Labad and Labaad which connote sexual deviance. The Labda hamlet
is the only hamlet in Mahipura to which the sarpanch did not extend electricity.
The Nayaks are Adivasi and inhabit Bordi. Unlike the Patels, Bordi‘s other
inhabitants, the Nayaks have sloping upland plots, lack irrigation, migrate for 9-11
months each year to earn subsistence wages, and are the least well-off lineage in
Mahipura. The solitary Bhabhor family in Mahipura has land and houses at the furthest
edges of the main village. The Bhabhors are Adivasi and at the margins of sociality in
Mahipura.
Distributional Decisions during the Sarpanch’s Ascendance
Shankar, Mahipura‘s Chauhan leader, won the panchayat‘s first election in 1994,
and after his first victory, monopolized Mahipura‘s candidature for the sarpanch‘s
position on the basis of early familiarity with Panchayati Raj‘s rules, leadership in the
milk society and tree growers‘ cooperative and single-minded pursuit of a political
career. Shankar won his second election in 2002. Watershed development was
implemented from 2003 to 2008. From 2003 to 2005, the intervention was shaped by
Shankar‘s patronage to Chauhan kin and Baria neighbours and his attempt to keep the
powerful Patels in good humor because they controlled Bordi‘s forest. In this early phase,
watershed development also exhibited a strong strain of capture by the sarpanch,
reflecting in-built rules in panchayati raj and watershed development policy that vest
decision-making power in the sarpanch.
One of the first watershed development activities implemented in Mahipura was
crop demonstration, the intervention‘s single-most desired activity, which delivered 5,000
rupees worth of inputs including seeds, pesticide, fertilizer, payment for irrigation and
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field labor wages. Shankar delivered two demonstration plots to his supporters in
Himmatpur given that their votes not only supported him but also undercut Himmatpur‘s
candidates‘ support base, delivering them 10,000 rupees worth of inputs, and
appropriated two plot monies worth 10,000 rupees. Shankar also appropriated 5,000
rupees for an afforestation nursery.
Shankar delivered wage-employment on afforestation to Chauhan kin and
proximate Barias including the lineage-leader cum ward-member Paaru. Afforestation is
one of the largest sources of wage employment because its funds consist entirely of
wage-labor payments for digging pits, planting saplings and watering them. Afforestation
enables extending smaller patronage to more numerous persons and reflects asymmetrical
relations of dependence between the sarpanch and dependent client-voters such as
Chauhan kin and proximate Barias, who are constrained in building alternative patronage
channels due to social norms of voting for one‘s kinsman in the Chauhans‘ case, and
economic vulnerability in the Barias‘ case.
The older Patel leader cum ward-member Veera, 45, secured materials and wage
employment for dam building in Bordi, allotting wage-labor worth 1,100 rupees to his
kin. Bharat, 28, the younger Patel leader secured 5,000 rupees for a nursery for
afforesting Bordi‘s section of the village forest. Bharat insisted on purchasing saplings
and polyethylene bags and transporting the materials to be able to strike deals with the
nursery owner and transport operator for discounts.
In February 2003, Shankar formed Mahipura‘s first self-help group ‗Saraswati‘,
named after the Hindu goddess of learning, for Chauhan hamlet residents comprising
Chauhans and a few Barias. The group purchased subsidized buffaloes and Shankar
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bought four of the group‘s 11 buffaloes. The watershed development team‘s social
development expert reports that sarpanches are loath to distribute benefits widely and
social development experts have to pressurize sarpanches to broaden self-help group
formation beyond their own lineage. Therefore when Shankar formed the next microcredit group ‗Gayatri‘, the social development expert allowed him to include Chauhans
only if the group were a disability group. This group comprised disabled Chauhans,
Barias and Patels, with non-disabled members being added thereafter. However, Shankar
vested leadership in his Chauhan kin and the group did not conduct meetings after the
first two months. Group leaders did not give Baria and Patel members a written record of
their bank deposits. Barias and Patels left the group after discord and the sarpanch added
Chauhan members in 2005. Shankar used this puppet group to purchase a subsidized
tractor for himself, sharing smaller benefits with some Chauhan members, described in
chapter 5. Watershed development in 2003-2004 exhibited a strong strain of elite capture,
with Shankar securing four buffaloes, a tractor, two demonstration plots and a nursery.
Capture by the sarpanch was facilitated by both external rules in Panchayati Raj
and watershed development policy which vest disproportionate power in the sarpanch
and lack institutions above sarpanches that people can reach up to to challenge the
panchayat leader. While panchayati raj‘s guidelines provide for impeaching a sarpanch,
this action requires the signatures of more than a third of the village assembly and
submitting the petition to the District Magistrate, the highest-level administrator of a
district, a civil servant. The collective action costs of dismissing a sarpanch are
prohibitive because of the coercive power that sarpanches command through synergistic
relations with informal institutions of dispute-resolution whose leaders are their clients,
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assisting the patel in establishing criminality, and control over economic resources.
Sarpanches can retaliate against those who organize a vote of no confidence by filing
false police cases. The no-confidence motion has in fact been used by powerful exsarpanches to dismiss legitimately elected women and Dalit leaders in panchayat
elections (MSA, 2004). Government officials themselves avoid exercising this provision
due to the public sanctity of elected leaders and government officials‘ dependence on
panchayat leaders to execute development.
While village assemblies, identified as the mainstays of Panchayati Raj, are
assumed to introduce publicity, transparency, probity and openness to panchayat
decision-making; participation, accountability and answerability are reduced to single
meetings four times a year where elected representatives and voters have asymmetrical
access to information on schemes and procedures. Village assemblies are not simply
democratic spaces but deeply social and political spaces marked by relations of power
shaped by caste, gender, ‗social citizenship‘- dominant norms of inclusion and exclusion
in the community, and birth order.
For instance, social norms in Mahipura prohibit women from attending the
assembly, except at a once-a-year meeting attended by district- and block-level
government officials in an attempt to bring the state closer to the people, when panchayat
leaders might be severely reprimanded for the absence of women, and in Koli-dominated
villages, women are included in village assemblies only in this village assembly of high
visibility. Caste rules dictate that Adivasis sit at the outer edges of the assembly. To
narrow the scope of participation, some panchayats, including Mahipura insist that only
the oldest brother in each extended family participate in the assembly on behalf of all his
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siblings‘ households. Village assemblies are controlled by the panchayat, particularly the
panchayat secretary, the sarpanch and the deputy sarpanch who set the agenda.
A village assembly is announced one to two weeks in advance by the panchayat
peon who goes from house to house to inform people of the date, time and venue. But
neither the meeting‘s agenda nor its proposals are shared with voters in advance. The
panchayat agenda, crafted largely by the secretary consists of routine affairs related to
child immunization, controlling public health hazards, exhorting villages to refrain from
encroaching on grazing lands, encouraging them to participate in afforestation,
monitoring the village school‘s activities, installing handpumps in new settlements,
asking villagers to pay taxes, and announcing new schemes. In a reading of Mahipura and
Himmatpur‘s village assemblies‘ minutes, Hariyali was mentioned in just one meeting
which announced its initiation, despite it being the single-largest intervention in
Mahipura. Panchayats are better understood as forms of statemaking- the state‘s attempt
to extract resources, govern behavior, secure compliance and legitimize rule, than as
spaces of self-governance.
Bargaining over development is conducted not at village assemblies but at the
panchayat council‘s internal monthly meetings with narrowed contestation between ward
members and the sarpanch. A comparison of the panchayat‘s internal monthly meetings‘
minutes with those of village assemblies revealed that most distributional decisions were
taken at monthly meetings rather than village assemblies which opened spaces for voters
to participate in meetings and could produce unexpected outcomes, or at the very least,
protracted verbal conflicts.
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By and large, conflict and negotiation are concealed in written texts which
presented a bland narrative of proceedings and simply stated final distributional decisions
rather than deliberative proceedings. Minutes invariably state that decisions were taken
by consensus (sarvamati sammat) because panchayat secretaries, sarpanches and ward
members seek to present solidarity to higher level officials who may inspect panchayat
documents. This is an attempt to maintain panchayat sovereignty over local politics rather
than allow external actors to gain insight into fissures within panchayats and village
assemblies which they might exploit for larger ends of statemaking. Limkheda‘s recently
appointed Block Magistrate exuded frustration when he commented on the opacity of the
Limkheda block panchayat‘s meetings‘ minutes, presented as blandly as lower-level
panchayats‘ records:
You‘ll never see anything in the block panchayat‘s meetings‘ minutes. In the
written documents everything has to look proper and perfect. You‘ll always find
the statements ‗everyone agreed to the proposal‘, and ‗it was decided by
consensus‘.
The distribution of large inputs- crop demonstration, nurseries and dam-building
reflects Chauhan control over the panchayat and Patel political clout, who have the
second-largest vote share in Mahipura and are least dependent on development patronage.
The sarpanch and the two Patel leaders not only secured wage employment but also
serviced their own client networks by distributing resources to kin. Watershed
development was shaped by both direct channels of patronage between the sarpanch and
voters and indirect channels mediated by lineage-leaders and ward-members. Ward
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members have extensive information on watershed development through monthly
panchayat meetings, and mobilize for resources at these meetings.
Situating the Case within Theoretical Debates and Empirical Evidence
Grassroots democratization is assumed to promote pro-poor development because
it enables relatively small constituencies to have greater say in governance through
lower-level territorial representation (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Cornwall & Gaventa,
2000; Goetz & Jenkins, 2001; Isaac & Franke, 2002). Elected local bodies‘
implementation of development is considered an improvement over donor-driven
‗community-driven development‘ (Platteau & Gaspart, 2003) because grassroots
democratization makes incumbents‘ re-election contingent on their performance as
development agents (Krishna, 2002).
While one stream of scholarship suggests that grassroots democracy reduces elite
capture, another suggests that elected leaders may capture development because it
enables them to invest in ‗de facto political power‘ (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008) which
is the ability to shape development and the allocation of public goods irrespective of and
in addition to the powers vested through elected office, particularly during years when
they are out of office. Capturing development enables sarpanches to increase their wealth
to spend resources for the next election; continue to provide patronage to clients, travel to
government offices to collect guidelines on new schemes, and limit other actors‘ ability
to challenge their authority in future.
Sarpanches justify development capture because unlike all other elected
representatives including block-level and district-level panchayat leaders, sarpanches
receive no monthly salary or reimbursement for expenses incurred on travel to offices,
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phone calls, photocopying, hosting external visitors, stationery and emergency expenses.
Sarpanches allege that they have to bribe the panchayat secretary and the accounts officer
at the Block Development Office to obtain funds; and sarpanches spend upward of
100,000 rupees on an election campaign.
In the Mahipura panchayat, candidates give ‗gifts‘ to hundreds of voters on
election-eve as an advance ‗token of gratitude‘ for their vote. In an elaborate routine,
each candidate goes from house to house with his spouse with gifts of cloth. Shankar
gifted a sari to women voters and a towel to male voters. Tersing, 30, Himmatpur‘s
candidate gifted unstitched cloth for blouses and underskirts to women and towels to
men. Tersing later joked that between himself and Shankar they had assembled a
complete outfit for all the women voters and accessories for men. Across semi-arid
western India, candidates pay for migrants‘ return to induce them to cast their vote in
their favor, pay cash for votes, and host feasts and drinking parties.
Shankar took the lion‘s share of watershed development in 2003-2004 but capture
was moderated by kin-based reciprocity and mutual vulnerability with the Baria and Patel
leaders who assist him in mediating disputes and influence their lineages‘ voting
behavior. As Hariyali was announced at the village assembly as is mandatory to do,
everyone in the village knew that Hariyali was implemented in Mahipura. People refer to
watershed development as ‗Hariyali Kranti‘ or ‗watershed revolution‘, the moniker
bureaucrats, technocrats and sarpanches themselves use to describe it. Development
subjects in Mahipura identify the intervention with the delivery of seed kits.
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Election and Distributional Expansion
Most studies of democratic decentralization treat the community as a passive site
rather than an actor that responds strategically to electoral democracy. Periodic elections
institutionalized by democratic decentralization broaden political contest when an
election approaches. The impending panchayat election in 2006 increased Baria and Patel
leaders‘ power vis-à-vis the sarpanch on the basis of control over their lineages‘ votes,
which the sarpanch would have to remobilize for the 2006 election. In what follows, I
show how conflict over the village forest led the Patels to withdraw their support for the
incumbent sarpanch, and how political brokers used vote-promises as bargaining tools to
secure material technologies from the sarpanch.
Mahipura crafted a tree-growers‘ cooperative in 1997 with assistance from the
National Tree Growers‘ Cooperative Federation to meet household fuelwood, fodder and
timber needs. The cooperative leased 40 hectares of grazing land from the Revenue
Department and planted shorea robusta (sal) saplings to be harvested 15 years later, when
the trees reached maturity in 2012. Bordi‘s verdant forest adjoining the out-of-bounds
catchment area of the Patangadi dam is free of encroachers an easy to protect because of
its location, and Bordi‘s rich patch was incorporated into the cooperative‘s lease because
trees under a cooperative‘s jurisdiction could be harvested while those under the Revenue
Department‘s control could not. Shifting tenure to the cooperative provided all
households an opportunity to legally fell Bordi‘s trees.
Shankar became the secretary of the cooperative because he was the National
Tree Growers‘ Cooperative Federation‘s contact-person in Mahipura, and at the
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cooperative‘s first general body meeting, Shankar proposed his own name as the
cooperative‘s secretary. Shankar secured the powerful Patels‘ support for his candidacy
by proposing that Veera, the senior Patel leader from Bordi, be made the chairman; and
secured Baria support by making Jethra, the Baria patel the vice-chairman. Veera and
Jethra were strategic choices. Making Veera an office-bearer recognized the Patels‘ rights
to Bordi‘s forest while simultaneously co-opting Veera in leadership structures. Jethra,
who is from the main village, could be trusted to take the main village‘s side in any
dispute that might arise between the main village and Bordi over property-rights to
Bordi‘s trees. Every household in the village was made a shareholder in the cooperative
(NTGCF, 2004).
Afforestation in the main village‘s denuded section was unsuccessful because of
the forest‘s long open boundary with neighboring villages which was left unfenced, given
that fencing forests is an expensive proposition because it entails building miles of
trenches, stone walls or barbed wire fences, which are often damaged by intruders or
cattle and are ultimately ineffective. At the end of six years, the main village realized that
its forest would yield little timber. During this time, Bordi‘s naturally inaccessible and
easy-to-protect forest flourished. At the cooperative‘s 2004 general body meeting,
Shankar enacted a sleight, proposing that all shareholders be given equal claim to Bordi‘s
forest at harvest in 2012. This was approved by the main village including the Chauhans
and Barias.
While village forests are considered common property, rights are in fact discrete
and fine-grained (Spiertz, 2000; von Benda-Beckman, 1995). Each hamlet accesses only
specific sections of the forest proximate to it. Bordi‘s customary rights over its forest
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were recognized by the entire village until Shankar proposed novel property rights. This
usurped the Patels‘ and Nayaks‘ informal rights to Bordi‘s forest which they had asserted
through systematic protection and sustainable use.
The Patels wrote to the Randhikpur Range Forest Officer, the highest-level officer
of the range, an administrative level that includes a group of village forests in which
Mahipura lay, requesting that the Patels and Nayaks be granted the right to form a
separate cooperative with jurisdiction over Bordi‘s forest. The Patels were denied this
request on the ground that Bordi lay within Mahipura and could not be granted a
cooperative as if it were a distinct village. The Patels believed that Shankar‘s familiarity
with the Range Forest Officer at Randhikpur was instrumental in the Forest Department
rejecting their claim, and retaliated by cutting down on social intercourse with Shankar.
The Nayaks and Patels stopped attending the tree growers‘ cooperative‘s meetings and
did not sign on any of the cooperative‘s resolutions from then on. This undermined the
cooperative‘s legitimacy, particularly because Veera, the senior Patel leader was the
cooperative chairman. This created uncertainty about the cooperative‘s future and
whether Mahipura‘s lineages would have access to Bordi‘s forest at all, and the main
village‘s lineages started felling trees in the main village‘s protected area clandestinely to
harvest whatever little timber there was. In 2006, the Patels announced that they would
not support Shankar‘s reelection, a move that signified likely defeat for Shankar.
Enter Micro-Credit
The Patels effectively increased the price of their votes. Shankar responded to the
Patels‘ withdrawal of support by helping each Patel leader fill forms to create microcredit groups in 2006, an election year; and to ensure continued Baria support, assisting
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the Barias in forming a micro-credit group. Micro-credit generated a stream of benefits
including seed kits, fertilizer, motors and tractors, and signified generous developmentsharing by the sarpanch. While Limkheda‘s social development expert had conducted two
meetings in Mahipura in 2003 to familiarize people with micro-credit, Shankar only
formed Chauhan groups from 2003 to 2005. In the spring of 2006, Shankar assisted Baria
leader Paaru and Patel leaders Bharat and Veera in filling forms and arranged for the
social development expert‘s visit to Mahipura to formalize their groups. Table 8
illustrates the temporal order of group formation in Mahipura. Chauhan groups were
formed at the peak of the sarpanch‘s power and Baria and Patel groups at the height of
voters‘ power.
Table 8 Rate of Self-help Group Formation from 2003 to 2007
Group

Dominant
Year of
members
formation
Saraswati
Chauhan
2003
Gayatri
Chauhan
2004
Surdas
Baria
2006
Lakshmi
Patel
2006
Hanuman
Patel
2006
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
Grassroots democracy has led to village leadership being characterized by
brokerage rather than patronage wherein elected leaders cultivate political support not
through their property but by facilitating the delivery of government programs and
services (Gupta, 1998). Micro-credit constituted significant development brokerage on
the sarpanch‘s part because it enabled the Barias and Patels secure loans for livestock,
seeds, tractors and motors. While a tractor‘s market price is Rs. 500,000, unaffordable
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even for wealthy farmers, self-help groups receive a 50 per cent subsidy, reducing the
price to 250,000 rupees.
The Barias planned to buy buffaloes worth Rs. 180,000 with their loan at a
subsidized cost of Rs. 130,000. Bharat planned to buy a tractor and Veera hoped to
produce organic fertilizer commercially. By 2006, Shankar crafted three of Mahipura‘s
five micro-credit groups for non-Chauhans. Micro-credit allocation was shaped not by the
size of Baria versus Patel electorate, but the credible threat made by each group to
withdraw support from Shankar. While the election provided the impetus for widening
development, the Patels‘ credible threats forced the sarpanch to allocate them two microcredit groups, while the Barias, who were disproportionately dependent on development
patronage by the sarpanch, secured one group.
The Micro-Politics of Ward Members’ Contests
Panchayat elections also involve electing ward members. The ward is the smallest
level of political representation and overlaps with hamlet boundaries. The ward member‘s
election may involve a face-off between two members of the same lineage. ‗Political
brokers‘- men in the political age-cohort who are subordinate to lineage-leaders and
aspire to lineage leadership contest as ward-member candidates in opposition to leaders
of their own lineage. Political brokers are generally younger than lineage-leaders and
have a smaller sphere of influence.
Elections involve each ward-member candidate aligning with a sarpanchcandidate, and the pair contesting against another ward-member and sarpanch-candidate
alliance. This enables each ward-candidate to make a credible commitment to securing
development through his partnership with a sarpanch-candidate. For a sarpanch123

candidate, partnering with a ward-member candidate enables obtaining the support of
unknown voters outside his or her village. In 2006, ward member candidates in Mahipura
and Himmatpur were divided into two groups that contested as Shankar‘s and Tersing‘s
candidates respectively. Mahipura has two wards, one comprising the main village and
the other Bordi. The incumbent ward members are Paaru, 37, Baria lineage-leader, and
Veera, 45, older Patel leader. Both partnered as Shankar‘s ward-member candidates.
Their weaker opponents- Abhay, an aspiring Baria leader and Bharat, the younger Patel
leader partnered with Tersing who had a weaker support-base in Mahipura.
In Bordi, Bharat desired to replace Veera as Bordi‘s representative in the
panchayat and gain a foothold into its fascinating workings, secure development and
interact with political parties‘ leaders. Bharat chafed at Veera‘s higher status as a wardmember and hoped to beat Veera in the 2006 election, travel to government offices with
Tersing, his partner sarpanch-candidate, attend panchayat council meetings, and meet the
panchayat secretary on a regular basis. In the main village, while the Baria leaders agreed
that the youngest of them- Paaru, 38, incumbent ward-member would re-contest his seat,
Abhay, an aspiring Baria leader contested as Tersing‘s candidate against Paaru. Abhay,
36, has studied till the 8th grade and is a forest guard which gives him the symbolic
resource of a forester‘s uniform, the power to fine encroachers, and prestigious
government employment. Abhay was frustrated by senior Baria leaders monopolizing
lineage leadership and Shankar sharing development solely with already numerous Baria
leaders despite Abhay‘s professional credentials, and partnered with Tersing to gain
influence in the panchayat.
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Exclusion from Infrastructure Delivery
Two groups in a permanent minority, Bhabhors and a group of Barias inhabiting
the Labda hamlet, whom I refer to as the Labda-Barias who Shankar had excluded from
development patronage because of their numerical insignificance, partnered with Abhay
and Bharat to deliver votes to Tersing in an attempt to secure a better development
patron. The Labda-Barias‘ was the only hamlet in the village that lacked electricity
despite all the households in the hamlet having gathered funds for the connection fee and
depositing it with Shankar years ago. This mattered because Limkheda is regarded as a
developed block and brides marrying Limkheda grooms expect to be going to a village
with electricity, and lack of electrification has hindered the Labda-Barias‘ chances of
bringing home suitable brides.
Vikram, 42, a Labda-Baria, mobilized younger Labda-Barias to vote for Tersing
to punish Shankar. Ties of communality vie with citizenship aspirations in voting, and
older Labda-Barias who felt obliged to vote for their village‘s candidate voted for
Shankar while younger members within the same households voted for Tersing. Vikram‘s
mother, 71, who voted for Shankar reflected:
We lose respect- (being) from the same village (as Shankar) but voting for a
different candidate. The older people (gharda-gharda) voted for Shankar. We
can‘t change because we‘ve been voting for him for fifteen years. He‘s our village
leader.
With access to one perennial well and two winter-wells, surplus production and
cash-crop farming, Vikram and was fearless about retribution from Shankar. ‗Shankar did
not do anything for us for 15 years (of his political career). So we voted him out. If
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Tersing doesn‘t, we will vote him out too‘ was Vikram‘s deliberate response about his
vote switch. Electoral support is contingent, not unalloyed- Vikram not only meant to
punish a non-performing leader but also a new leader if he did not deliver on his promise.
The Bhabhors, numerically and politically insignificant for Shankar, received no
gains from watershed development from 2003-2006 and joined the Labda-Barias, Abhay
the Baria aspirant and Bharat, junior Patel leader to deliver votes to Tersing. This
heterogeneous dissident group‘s political choice was shaped by being systematically
deprived of development because they were in a permanent minority in the Bhabhors‘
case; historical deprivation in the Labda-Barias‘ case; and in Abhay and Bharat‘s case,
desire for inclusion in formal leadership. Dissident groups‘ choice was also influenced by
Tersing reaching out to Mahipura‘s marginalized groups for votes to break Shankar‘s
voter-base, and his promise of development patronage to Mahipura‘s dissidents if he won
the panchayat election.
A New Cartography of Development Patronage
Both Shankar and Tersing did intense political campaigning, and there was
extensive cross-voting by Himmatpur‘s voters for Shankar as well as by Mahipura‘s
voters for Tersing. Election rules mandate that external actors leave villages during an
election so that they cannot influence the electoral process; hence I absented myself from
Mahipura during the polling process, but returned to build an account of polling the day
after the election. Tersing and his supporters, unsure of a win at the last minute, allegedly
snatched ballot papers from presiding officers (who are government school teachers
deputed on this duty) at the polling booth, threatened them with violence and stuffed
ballot boxes with votes for Tersing. This was the first instance of booth-capturing in
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Mahipura and Shankar declared that he had never won an election by capturing a booth
and would not do so this time. The election was close and Tersing won.
Shankar had told me that no one would argue that he had not delivered watershed
development because he had distributed fruit-tree saplings delivered through the
intervention to every household in the village. After the election, reflecting upon the agecohort shift in the panchayat, with Tersing, a much younger candidate winning the
election, Shankar declared that he would groom his sons – 21, 19 and 17 to contest future
elections. Shankar is both career politician and capitalist farmer, and both occupations
feed into each other. After the election, Shankar busied himself earning rental income
from his new tractor, leading the milk society as its chairman, and planning his next
move regarding conflict over the tree-growers‘ cooperative, with the 2012 tree-harvesting
deadline approaching. In the panchayat election in 2011, Shankar in fact did not contest
and neither did he groom his eldest son, but backed his cohortmate from Himmatpur,
demonstrating the contingent and fluid nature of panchayat partnerships and animosities.
Tersing embarked on a slew of development projects after his victory. Bharat,
younger Patel leader, and Vikram, Labda-Baria dissident vote-broker who delivered the
largest of Mahipura‘s vote-shares to Tersing received the most remunerative patronage.
Tersing delivered a check dam in Bordi to Bharat, which generated 76 person-days of
work and wage earnings of 4,250 rupees for Bharat‘s kin. Tersing built a road connecting
the Labda-Barias to the Patels through the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in
May 2007. As a supervisor on road-building, Vikram earned 800 rupees, the equivalent
of 29 days‘ field-labor wages, and two Labda-Barias earned a total of 350 rupees for a
week‘s wage-labor. Four youth in Bharat‘s sub-lineage earned a total of 2,400 rupees
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through 28 days of work laying the road. Wage-distribution among Tersing‘s supporters
in Mahipura is described in Table 9.
Table 9 Tersing‘s Distribution of Watershed Development in Monetary Terms
Lineage

Monetary reward in rupees

Patels
6,650
Labda-Barias
1,150
Bhabhors
0
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
Social groups that were both poor and numerically marginal, such as the Taaviads
did not switch their votes from Mahipura to Himmatpur, but at least some Taaviads cast
blank votes in tacit resistance to social exclusion by the Chauhans, including Shankar.
Crafting an alternative channel of patronage may be both because the cost of
disenfranchisement from social life in Mahipura for the Taaviads may be too high, and
because they lack the resources to build an alliance with opposition leaders.
Insights for the Study of Grassroots Democratic Politics
Mahipura‘s distributional trajectory shows that grassroots democracy has
multiplied power such that political brokers have emerged as a major feature of dryland
communities. By creating wards at micro-territorial levels, democratic decentralization
has created explicitly politicized hamlet leaders who engage with sarpanch-candidates for
development. While scholarship on democratic decentralization has focused
disproportionately on leaders‘ strategies, panchayat democracy shapes voters‘ strategies
and brings political ‗public spheres‘ (Calhoun, 1996) into being wherein people vote on
the basis of the delivery and non-delivery of development, and representation. Accounts
of electoral politics assume that candidates are mobile while voters are fixed in space.
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However, both candidates and voters are mobile, as demonstrated by political brokers
who created alliances beyond Mahipura to meet their goals.
Most studies on democratic decentralization treat the community as a passive site
that is simply delivered development goods based on leaders‘ preferences (e.g. Bardhan
& Mookherjee, 2006; Besley, Pande, Rahman, & Rao, 2004; Chattopadhyay & Duflo,
2004) rather than the distribution of development being a dynamic process in which
leaders respond to voters‘ electoral tactics and voters respond to leaders‘ distributional
decisions. Panchayat leaders and voters ‗mutually constituted‘ (Sivaramakrishnan, 1996)
each other in Mahipura and need to be seen as two sides of the same phenomenon to
shape watershed development. Voters‘ and sarpanches‘ strategies were dynamic
responses to one another‘s strategy.
Mahipura‘s account also shows that democratic decentralization does not
eliminate elite capture through ongoing leader accountability but through elections.
Electoral democracy shifts the balance of power towards voters when an election
approaches (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008), creating a moment when voters can demand
wider distributional outcomes. The sarpanch‘s distribution of development was
influenced by the timing of the election- while the early stages of watershed development
from 2003 to 2004 displayed Chauhan capture; lineage leaders used their command over
voters in their lineage to convince the sarpanch of their ability to shift their votes to
Himmatpur if their demands were not met.
The Impact of Policy on Distributional Outcomes
Aggregating Tersing and Shankar‘s watershed development activities, the lineage
with the largest number of households to receive wage employment, as Table 10 shows,
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was Chauhan followed by Baria. This reflects the sarpanch‘s initial distribution of
afforestation and nursery labor to his Chauhan and Baria neighbors. The Patels trailed
with three households while the Nayaks had one.
Table 10 Distribution of Wage-Labor Beneficiaries According to Lineage
Lineage
Beneficiary households
Proportion in the lineage
Chauhan
5
21.74
Baria
4
8.16
Patel
3
10.71
Taaviad
0
0
Nayak
1
33.3
Labda
0
0
Bhabhor
0
0
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
Table 11 describes the number of mean labor-days of work generated for each
lineage in Mahipura. The Chauhans secured the highest number of labor-days on average,
getting 5.42 work-days per family. The Chauhans were followed by the Patels with 4.89
average labor-days per family. The Patels were followed by the Barias with just 0.93
mean days of work indicating that wage employment was spread thinly across this large
lineage. The Nayak figure is high at 0.33 because of a smaller denominator used to
calculate the average as the Nayaks comprise only three households. The distribution of
labor-days was highly skewed within each lineage, particularly the Chauhans and Patels
whose averages have high standard deviations. This is because leaders did not distribute
wage employment beyond their immediate family.
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Table 11 Distribution of Wage-Labor Days According to Lineage, 2003-2007
Lineage
Wage-labor days
Standard deviation
Chauhan
5.42
11.76
Baria
0.93
3.51
Patel
4.89
19.71
Taaviad
0
0
Nayak
0.33
0.57
Labda
0
0
Bhabhor
0
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
Table 12 describes wages earned by each lineage as a whole. It was the Patels
who earned the highest wages per household on average at 244.64 rupees, securing wagelabor from both Shankar and Tersing. This reflects the Patels‘ bargaining advantage in
negotiating development with elected leaders. The Patels‘ wage labor earnings were
followed by those of the Chauhans who earned 211.95 rupees on average per household.
The Barias lagged considerably behind both the Patels and Chauhans in wage-labor
earnings, earning just 38.77 rupees on average. The Nayaks earned 16.66 rupees per
household on average, while the Labdas, Bhabhors and Taaviads, the smallest lineages
apart from the Nayaks earned no wages.
Table 12 Distribution of Average Wage-Earnings According to Lineage
Lineage
Wage earnings
Standard deviation
Chauhan
211.95
608.64
Baria
38.77
142.61
Patel
244.64
985.76
Taaviad
0
0
Nayak
16.66
28.86
Labda
0
0
Bhabhor
0
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
These figures reflect the numerical size and vote-share of lineages, presented in
Table 13, with the largest share of wages going to the Chauhans, Patels and Barias with
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93, 101 and 178 voters; and the ability of each lineage to make credible threats of
withdrawing support from a candidate.
Table 13 Distribution of Voters According to Lineage
Lineage
Number of voters
Proportion in the village
Chauhan
93
19.7
Baria
178
37.7
Patel
101
21.3
Taaviad
59
12.5
Nayak
19
4
Labda
16
3.3
Bhabhor
6
1.2
Total
472
100
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
Overall earnings from wage employment are low and represent distributional
rules embedded in policy which allocate more resources to capital-intensive activities and
channel funds for purchasing materials and inputs rather than labor. While policy
accounts for low overall wage employment, local politics shapes its distribution within
the locality. In light of this, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is an
important countervailing policy that is relatively labor-intensive, although the share of
capital in this intervention has steadily increased and stands at a high of 40 per cent. The
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act was implemented in Mahipura
simultaneously with watershed development, with two dams being built, one road being
laid and Mahipura‘s tank being deepened through the scheme. Of all activities, tankdeepening was the only labor-intensive one, with dams and the road involving
disproportionate expenditure on materials.
Consider the distribution of watershed development by wealth quintiles, described
in Table 14 in terms of livestock-wealth. The highest wealth quintile earned the lion‘s
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share of watershed development in monetary terms, securing an average of 22,423 rupees
per family. The second-highest wealth quintile secured the next highest share, obtaining
an average of 4,144 rupees per family. The third-highest wealth quintile appropriated the
third-highest returns, securing 2,302 rupees per family on average. The fourth-highest
quintile secured a monetary worth of 878 rupees. The lowest quintile secured slightly
higher returns at 1,141 rupees. While not the only axis, wealth was a major axis shaping
watershed development. The results also indicate greater inequality at higher wealth
quintiles, with the resources secured by the second-highest quintile constituting less than
25 per cent of the highest quintile‘s share, while the third-highest quintile‘s share was
approximately half of that secured by the second-highest quintile. The capital-intensive
resources delivered by watershed development since the 2000s constitute an upward
distribution of policy.
Table 14 Distribution of Watershed Development by Livestock Quintiles
Livestock-wealth quintile

Watershed development
gains in monetary terms
1
1,141
2
878
3
2,302
4
4,144
5
22,423
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007

Standard deviation
3912
3309
5017
9990
109602

The distribution of watershed development in terms of well ownership likewise
corresponds to disproportionately large shares for the highest quintile. As Table 15
shows, the average monetary share of watershed development for households without
wells was 70 rupees, the average monetary share for those with monsoon well rights was
300 rupees, the average monetary share of for those with winter wells was 881 rupees,
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and the average share of watershed development for households with perennial wells was
9,437 rupees. However, the range of monetary share by well-ownership is 9,367, lower
than that for livestock quintiles which is 21,282, because wells are shared property while
livestock are private property.
Table 15 Watershed Development‘s Distribution According to Well-Type Categories
Well type

Average monetary share of
watershed development
No well
70
Monsoon well rights
300
Winter well rights
881
Perennial well rights
9,437
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007

Standard deviation
115.95
294.39
3105.21
62173.60

Conclusion
Democratic decentralization and development policy interact with power
inscribed in identity, historical patterns of settlement, and informal governance
institutions that shape the resources that different actors command in interactions to
secure watershed development. Watershed development flowed along electoral alliances.
Democratic decentralization‘s rules of period elections and ward-based representation
interacted with informal norms of village governance, lineage leadership, and property
rights to natural resources to shape actors‘ resources endowments and bargaining
strategies, and watershed development was the outcome of these negotiations.
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5. Neoliberal Governmentality and the Locus of Micro-Credit at the Margins
Micro-credit is watershed development‘s linchpin because it transforms the
technological possibility of cash-crop production into a reality by extending bank credit
to purchase commercial inputs. This chapter describes the institutional framework
through which micro-credit is organized in watershed development, the role of
transaction costs in shaping decision-making in group-based lending, the capabilities
required for specific decisions, and why this leads to specific actors taking certain
decisions in self-help groups.
Political society actors and contractual staff provide the institutional scaffolding
through which the gap between micro-credit institutions and semi-arid borrowers is
bridged. This chapter answers three questions- why the lineage becomes the basis for
forming a group, why members agree to being led by a lineage leader, and how lineage
leaders ensure that the sarpanch delivers loan monies. Through case studies, the second
part describes how policy interacts with informal rules of governance to shape the
allocation of loans, and why asymmetric loan-taking practices between members and
leaders are sustained.
The Macro Context: From Economic Empowerment to Profit Generation
Micro-credit was a largely donor-driven strategy of economic empowerment
throughout the 1990s, but in the 2000s, took the form of commercial banking by private
and nationalized financial institutions (Montgomery & Weiss, 2011) and represents the
movement of capital across space to seek a rate of return (Harvey, 2005), specifically the
expansion of financial capital in geo-economic margins like the drylands. Watershed
development delivers micro-credit through the Ministry of Rural Development‘s micro135

credit intervention Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) (Rural SelfEmployment Scheme).
The work of microfinance, which is often promoted as a part of development
policy, is not separate from the broader process of financialization of the economy (for a
Turkish example, see Bakir & Önis, 2010; Weber, 2004). Micro-credit seeks to get the
poor to establish financial agency and build links with banks (Weber, 2004), and the state
and financial institutions‘ attempt to create a ‗finance mentality‘ (Aitken, 2010) among
the poor. Micro-credit delivered through watershed development signifies the twin
attempt to craft an entrepreneurial class in the drylands and expand nationalized banks‘
economic returns from financial markets in rainfed areas.
Micro-credit is a component of the central state‘s monetary policy in India since
at least 2003 (GOI, 2007b), when the Reserve Bank of India, India‘s federal bank
introduced micro-credit to the lending portfolios of all nationalized banks. By March
2006, nationalized banks financed 224,000 micro-credit groups and disbursed 113.98
billion rupees; and by 2007, 560 nationalized banks including 48 commercial banks, 96
regional rural banks and 316 cooperative banks delivered micro-credit (GOI, 2007b).
Micro-credit‘s institutional arrangements are shaped by banks‘ priorities of
maximizing financial returns. Commercial micro-credit is distinctly different from the
Grameen Bank model of micro-credit consisting of four-five members per self-help
group. The Rural Self-Employment Scheme has groups of 10-20 members which enables
banks to raise higher collateral but dramatically increases transaction costs for borrowers.
The Rural Self-Employment Scheme has a higher collateral-raising period (when
borrowers deposit a monthly sum to demonstrate financial responsibility) of 18 months
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rather than 12. While the monthly contribution is currently 30-50 rupees per month per
member (one to two days‘ field labor wages) it is anticipated to be increased to 150-450
rupees per month. The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, the Indian
state‘s premier rural development banking agency, now emphasizes delivering diversified
and repeated credit to earn continuous returns from lending rather than making a onetime injection of credit as income-generation schemes in the 1990s did (GOG, 2007;
NABARD, 2007).
The shift in micro-credit‘s goal from economic empowerment to profit
maximization has been accompanied by a scaling down of training (Mahmud, 2003) and
‗soft‘ inputs to micro-credit groups such as financial literacy, information on schemes,
and using micro-credit as a vehicle for political participation and human rights. Microcredit‘s ascendance as a tool of profit-maximization has also entailed the removal of
intermediary institutions, largely NGOs that facilitated group formation, trained
members, conducted monthly meetings, oversaw accounting and used micro-credit as a
forum to increasing women‘s participation in decision-making and transparency in the
delivery of social services.
Bank-driven micro-credit deploys contractual employees rather than NGOs to link
self-help groups to banks and diffuses banking to sarpanches and lineage leaders. The
contractually hired social development expert is in charge of delivering micro-credit.
Contractual employees act on behalf of the state but do not belong within it, and are
given higher targets by the District Rural Development Agency for forming self-help
groups compared to NGOs which implemented watershed development until 2007.
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Contractual employees‘ legal distance from the state leads to intense monitoring
of their productivity and they spend disproportionate time writing daily time diaries,
monthly reports, quarterly reports and annual reports. Social development experts have to
form 150 self-help groups in a five-year period and organize 1,500-3,000 women. NGOs
were usually able to form no more than 100 groups and returned the remaining monies to
the District Rural Development Agency. However, contractual employees face a 10 per
cent cut if they do not meet group-formation targets each year. Because they are
governed by weak authority structures at the district level, contractual employees are also
more vulnerable to being deployed by the Block Development Officer for non-watershed
development activities and being unable to protest this, because the Block Development
Officer evaluates their productivity and disburses their pay checks.
Watershed development‘s operationalization is highly formulaic, outcome- rather
than process-based and target-driven (also Baviskar (2004) and Chhotray (2004)).
Contractual employees‘ performance is measured by numerically measurable and
standardized tasks and productivity is measured through task completion, suppressing the
time intensiveness of the process. This leads contract workers to choose the least
participatory method to deliver micro-credit, namely through sarpanches who head the
watershed development committee.
Watershed development mandates that the block-level team‘s social development
expert train only groups‘ presidents and secretaries in a single session, impart no training
to members, and not facilitate meetings except at loan-disbursement, with the result that
social development experts rely extensively on sarpanches and group leaders themselves
to conduct meetings and bank-related activities. Implementation rules are designed
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precisely to expand sarpanches‘ authority. Heena, Limkheda block‘s social development
expert elaborated:
The Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana mandates than a new self-help group
start internal lending (aantarik dheeraan) within six months of its formation. If
they don‘t start internal lending in six months their points (in evaluation rankings)
get cut and they can‘t get their loan. Once a group starts internal lending,
members phone me and ask me how to go about book-keeping. In some groups
the members are educated (younger daughters-in-law) but the office-bearers- the
secretary and chair (typically mothers-in-law) are not. But the secretary and chair
insist that they alone will conduct all affairs. In that case, we have to conduct all
of the group‘s business. Another rule is that every watershed must have 10 microcredit groups. We can manage not more than two or three per watershed, given
that we are in charge of an entire block and shoulder the burden of running
illiterate leaders‘ groups.
In 2003, Limkheda‘s social development expert asked the sarpanch to gather all
women from Mahipura and Himmatpur for an information session on micro-credit. Ward
members and lineage leaders assembled their kin at the meeting held in Himmatpur. In
Mahipura, the sarpanch only informed the Patels, Barias and Chauhans about the
meeting, with information-sharing being shaped by the ‗boundary of an acknowledged
community‘ (Kabeer, 2002).
The social development expert informed at the meeting that the Swarnajayanti
Gram Swarozgar Yojana delivered micro-credit at a monthly compounded interest rate of
three per cent which was lower than moneylenders‘ rate of five per cent, and additionally,
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delivered subsidized seeds, fertilizer and machinery. Many households met this with
skepticism because of development schemes being accompanied by hidden costs such as
demands of cash-contributions from beneficiaries, and the internal dynamics of groups.
‗Rather than join a self-help group and get stuck, it‘s better to create our own livelihood.‘
These words of Lalita, a Baria woman summed up the fears of those who initially decided
against joining a self-help group.
The District Rural Development Agency‘s mandate is to craft as many groups as
possible knowing that a large proportion of groups break down due to internal conflict or
the inability to contribute collateral over 18 months. In eastern Gujarat, micro-credit has
expanded from covering 10 to 20 per cent of a community‘s households to covering 80 to
90 per cent of all households. A second round of village-level meetings was conducted in
Mahipura and Himmatpur. The Taaviads (Adivasi) and Vikram, the Labda-Baria votebroker were informed about the second meeting and attended it. The powerful Patels held
a separate meeting for Bordi at Bharat‘s house.
The Politics of Inclusion in Groups
All the lineages that attended the meetings tried to form a group. Shankar had the
greatest access to information on micro-credit and formed the first micro-credit group
with Chauhans and well-off Barias. Settlement is dispersed with houses set amidst their
fields. Each house is 50-100 meters from the other, and sub-clusters within a hamlet may
be 100-300 meters from one another. Therefore face-to-face interaction is the greatest
within the same hamlet. Fellow-hamlet inhabitants have repeated communication,
multiplex relationships and trust, therefore the hamlet is the basis of forming a group.
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Spatial proximity not only facilitates face-to-face interaction and trust, but also
reduces transaction costs for monthly meetings, enabling leaders to remind members
about a meeting, helping members gather, enabling leaders to go from house to house to
collect deposits before a bank day, or facilitating members going to their leader‘s house
to give their monthly deposit. While lineage-leaders and ward-members decide on the
size of the monthly deposit and who will be included in a group, it is usually the wives
and daughters-in-law of lineage-leaders and ward-members who perform the repetitive,
labor-intensive task of gathering monthly deposits and depositing them in the bank.
Micro-credit is delivered largely to women‘s groups as a strategy of women‘s
empowerment, in an attempt to increase women‘s ownership of capital, because women‘s
rights to land (and therefore wells) are deeply attenuated.
Shankar made his nephew and personal assistant Sagar‘s educated wife Geeta the
chairperson of Saraswati, and his older wife Charu the secretary of the group. Sagar had
been unable to find a job after college and Shankar had employed him as his personal
assistant. Sagar‘s marriage to Geeta, a highly educated woman was made possible by the
fact that he was Shankar‘s personal assistant. Sagar assisted Shankar with panchayat
work, filling forms and traveling to government offices, and Shankar repaid Sagar by
appointing Geeta as the village maternal and child health worker, giving her a
government job. When I asked Geeta how she became Saraswati‘s chairperson, she
replied, ‗I wasn‘t even told about it. All the documents were ready for me to sign when I
came as a bride and I signed them.‘
The Baria leaders were initially unable to convince their kin to join a group but
the same families clamored for a group when they saw the steady stream of rewards
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Saraswati‘s members got, including seed kits and fertilizer. Swarnajayanti Gram
Swarozgar Yojana‘s interest rate is only slightly lower than moneylenders‘ and groupbased lending has high transaction costs. Those who formed groups did so not because of
micro-credit‘s lower interest but subsidized seed kits and capital, which are precisely
tools to offset the perceived drawbacks of micro-credit.
Among the 14 Taaviad families, seven migrated as wage laborers for more than
six months of the year. While better-off Taaviads contemplated forming a group, only
seven households could afford the monthly deposits while at least 10 were required to
form a group. Micro-credit now has higher minimum monthly contributions, making it
harder for the least well-off to participate. Taaviads who were permanent migrants were
not even informed by better-off Taaviads about the group.
The Barias have the lowest level of irrigation of Mahipura‘s three largest lineages
and formed only one self-help group. Three leaders govern this group jointly, reflecting
symmetrical power among all three leaders- the two older lineage-leaders and Paaru, the
younger ward member.
Shankar attempted to form a second Chauhan micro-credit group but was
constrained by the social development expert to form a multi-lineage disability group, in
which Shankar made his cousin Babu and his second-cousin Ramsing‘s wife Madhu,
both with minor disabilities, the office-bearers. Shankar told Vikram that he and the other
Labda-Barias could join this group because the Labda-Barias lacked the numbers to form
a group of their own. The Labda-Barias joined this group, but Vikram left after the first
month, knowing that his interests would not be protected in a group controlled by the

142

sarpanch, and with the most powerful of the Labda-Barias leaving, the rest of the LabdaBarias left as well.
Micro-credit groups are unstable configurations shaped by micropolitics and
power at lower scales. Vikram‘s case shows that while inclusion in development is
typically considered a sign of power, the ability to voluntarily exclude oneself from a
group when one realizes that one‘s interests will not be protected also denotes power.
The Patel leaders Bharat and Veera formed separate groups because each leader in this
wealthy lineage had sufficient perennial- and winter-well owning kin to form a viable
group of 10 members. Veera, the senior Patel leader-cum-ward member incorporated two
Nayaks, Sabur and his householder son with whom he had patron-client relations in his
Patel group. Bharat and Veera made their wives presidents of their respective groups.
Table 16 illustrates the composition of micro-credit groups in terms of lineage identity.
Both the Chauhan groups comprised not only Chauhans but also neighboring Barias, and
Veera‘s group comprised not only Patels but also proximate Nayaks, lending credence to
the idea that spatial proximity and trust rather than solely lineage homogeneity was the
criterion of member-selection.
Table 16 Self-Help Groups‘ Composition in Terms of Lineages
Group
Leader‘s lineage Dominant lineage
Subordinate
leader
lineage
Shankar
Chauhan
Chauhan (n=8)
Baria (n=3)
Shankar
Chauhan
Chauhan (n=8)
Baria (n=2)
Paaru
Baria
Baria (n=11)
Bharat
Patel
Patel (n=10)
Veera
Patel
Patel (n=7)
Nayak (n=2)
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
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Total
members
11
10
11
10
9

Leaders invited those living in proximity to themselves to reduce the transaction
costs of monthly meetings, invited those who could afford to contribute funds every
month, invited no more than 9-10 members rather than 20 people which is the size
permitted by banks, which lowered transaction costs. Leaders controlled group size by
telling kin that they could join a new group to be formed later. Lineage leaders generally
invited well-off proximate kin to join their group. Self-help group membership had a
positive and statistically significant correlation with motor ownership (F=4.14, df=1,
p=.04, R-square= .03, N=122), high wages (F=4.2, df=1, p=.04, R-square=.05, N=122)
and livestock ownership (F=12.61, df=1, p=.0006, R-square=.93, N=122), indicating the
direct relationship between wealth and participation in micro-credit.
There were statistically significant differences between Kolis and Adivasis in
access to micro-credit (χ2 =5.9724, df=1, p= .014). While 45 Koli households comprising
43% of all Koli households secured membership in a micro-credit group, only two
Adivasi households forming 12% of all Adivasis secured membership, likely due to
Adivasis being fragmented across three lineages, each without the numbers to form its
own group; Adivasis‘ absence from the village for long durations and lack of political
representation, which was necessary to ensure that the sarpanch released their loan
monies. Self-help group members belong largely to middle age-cohort of the thirties or
older and play a prominent role in village life. As described in Table 17, the average age
of self-help group members across the three Koli lineages ranges from approximately 33
to 36 years, and is higher for the Nayaks at 44.5 years. For all self-help group members
taken together, age ranges from 19 years to 63 years, with the average being 34.5 years
(SD=9.5).
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Table 17 Self-Help Group Members‘ Age According to Lineage
Lineage

Number of self-help Average age
group members
Chauhan
16
33.75
Baria
16
35.06
Patel
13
35.53
Nayak
2
44.5
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007

Standard deviation
9.08
11.26
6.52
9.19

Comparing self-help group membership with proximity to a public drinking water
source, which is a strong indicator of political capital and elected leaders‘ responsiveness
to particular social groups (Miguel, 2004; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005), reveals significant
association between access to micro-credit and drinking water. I created an index of
drinking water access by combining the number of water sources (public hand pumps and
private wells) each household had access to for daily needs, and the number of months a
year each source provided safe water: wells are unusable in monsoon and winter-wells
dry up from March to June, increasing reliance on handpumps, which are public goods.
The index ranges from zero to seven in the direction of higher water security.
Proximity to hand pumps is a strong measure of political capital in the context of
democratic decentralization (Besley et al., 2004). Hand pumps are public goods and their
location is shaped by power because the panchayat installs hand pumps on the basis of
mobilization by lineage-leaders and ward members. Powerful leaders have the panchayat
install hand pumps near their house while less powerful hamlets‘ residents have to walk
greater distances with heavy pots twice each day.
Eighty three per cent (39 out of 47) self-help group members had high drinking
water access scores ranging from 5-7, reflecting access to a handpump less than 100
meters from their house; while only 65 per cent non-self help group members (49 out of
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75) households had drinking water access scores of 5-7. Both micro-credit group
membership and the installation of hand pumps flow through lineage leaders. Lineage
leaders control membership in micro-credit groups by inviting those they have face-toface, repeated and mutual interaction with, which are necessarily proximate households.
Lineage-leaders also shape where a handpump is installed. This confirms both the
spatialized nature of the structure micro-credit groups in the drylands due to dispersed
settlements and lower transaction costs for borrowers living in proximity, and that microcredit‘s locus of power is centered on lineage leaders who form groups.
Seventy per cent of all Chauhans, 33 per cent of all Barias and 46 per cent of all
Patels became self-help group members. Each of the wealthier leaders formed his own
group in an attempt to secure a bigger loan for himself. The Baria leaders, on the other
hand, pooled their smaller resources and formed one group jointly. Table 18 lists the
proportion of self-help group members in each lineage.
Table 18 Extent of Self-help Group Membership According to Lineage
Lineage

Total Households

Member of a selfhelp group
Chauhan
23
16
Baria
49
16
Patel
28
13
Taaviad
14
0
Labda
4
0
Nayak
3
2
Bhabhor
1
0
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007

Proportion of total
in the lineage
69.57
32.65
46.43
0
0
66.6
0

Micro-Credit’s Governance in the Locality
The social development expert fills the necessary forms of the Rural Self
Employment Scheme and gives group leaders a group register, account book, and
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individual members‘ passbooks. Social development experts and banks are far more
efficient in delivering group-level financial instruments than member-level instruments,
and individual members‘ passbooks are usually delivered after 6-12 months, leaving
members frustrated about the lack of a personal account of their deposits.
Limkheda‘s self-help groups have their bank account at the Bank of Bandibar, a
rural bank in a quiet street in Bandibar, a small but bustling market town. The bank is an
incongruous, low-set modern structure with a glass door, in contrast to the surrounding
structures which are raised, with a narrow porch and long wooden windows that open
into cool, dark, high-ceilinged rooms. At the end of 12 months of saving, the group
withdraws its saving which is designated an ‗internal loan‘. Members use this fund for
small expenses and repay this loan over the next six months along with their monthly
deposit. After 18 months, the group becomes eligible for its first bank loan.
The social development expert trains the presidents and secretaries of all self-help
groups in account-keeping, conducting monthly meetings, writing minutes, depositing
money and maintaining records. The new micro-credit imparts training solely on
financial aspects to meet banks‘ book-keeping requirements. The new credit is driven by
banks‘ attempt to secure returns from their investment and group governance is delegated
to authoritative leaders. Financial sector-driven micro-credit uses the rhetoric of women‘s
empowerment for entrepreneurial ends- the Gujarat‘s government‘s bureaucrats urge selfhelp groups to change their ‗worldviews, attitudes, beliefs and values‘ to participate
successfully in ever-changing commodity markets (GOG, 2007).
This section describes why micro-credit groups are largely led by lineage-leaders.
Reciprocity with the sarpanch, authority over group members, and the resources to host
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bank officers when they visit the group are essential characteristics for group leaders. It is
lineage leaders alone, and ward-members who are subsumed within this category that can
perform all three functions. Reciprocity with the sarpanch ensures that the sarpanch
releases loan monies. Lineage leaders check the sarpanch‘s power through their
membership in the panchayat, influence over their lineage‘s votes and dispute-mediation.
Lineage leaders govern lineage-members by resolving conflicts over property, marriage,
violence and injury; govern access to shared resources, and can enforce members‘ deposit
each month. Paaru, Baria lineage leader and dispute mediator describes how lineageleaders mediate disputes:
DD: Do you resolve village-level disputes or hamlet ones?
SP: Hamlet-level- just among kin… marital disputes. If a woman says ‗I don‘t
want to live with him‘, or a man says ‗I don‘t want to keep her‘- we tell them the
pros and cons of the situation and how much money it will take to obtain a
divorce. We say, ‗Why do you say that? This‘ll be your fine, and this is the
amount you‘ll have to pay her.‘ If they still don‘t resolve their quarrel, they have
to go to the police station. Otherwise the panch resolves it (nikaal) and that
works.
DD: What qualities do you feel made you a dispute-mediator?
SP: I‘ve done it before and people have agreed with my judgment… found it
fair… so I‘ve been asked to arbitrate again. I suppose because they appreciate my
arguments. I guess they feel, ‗He‘s speaking well, he knows what‘s customary
(vyavahaarik), he‘s got the thinking and articulation right‘.
DD: How do you have a sense of what the rules are?
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SP: Intelligence! Experience. See: this side is saying this, that side is saying that.
Then you have to allow your intelligence to decide what the right course is and
how a judgment should be made. In a dispute we ask both parties what the trouble
is. They tell us for instance that they have quarreled over land. ‗How?‘ ‗He
encroached on my piece while plowing.‘ Then we measure the land on all sides
and re-mark the boundaries. Then when we‘ve resolved it, we get jaggery and
gram (gol-dhaana) and make them restore amicus. When others come to know of
it they approach us to resolve their conflicts as well. So your reputation as a leader
(agevaan) keeps growing.
Arbitration and the ability to fine offenders within their own lineage gives lineage
leaders latent power over lineage-members which they can activate to secure micro-credit
payments. Referring to Shankar‘s de facto leadership of her group, a member of Gayatri
explained, ‗There is no one else who is capable of making people pay, no one else who
can impose the rules‘. Table 19 illustrates self-help group leaders‘ leadership roles in the
community. Shankar is village-wide dispute-mediator, sarpanch, village leader (agevaan)
and development agent. Paaru, Baria leader resolves Baria disputes and is a wardmember who constrains the sarpanch. Bharat is a Patel lineage leader who governs his
faction of the Patels and mobilizes resources from the sarpanch. Veera is senior Patel
leader and ward member.
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Table 19 Village-Wide Leadership Roles of Self-Help Group Leaders
Group leader
Group Leader‘s Informal Roles
Group Leader‘s age
Shankar
Sarpanch, lineage leader
45
Paaru
Ward member, lineage leader
38
Bharat
Vote broker, lineage leader
28
Veera
Ward member, lineage leader
46
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
Lineage leaders are the wealthiest in their lineage with perennial wells, motors
and diversified agriculture. Lineage leaders grow profitable crops like lentils and castor
and sell cash-vegetables, have an evenly distributed income-flow and can make a
temporary deposit on a member‘s behalf, are resident in the village and can host external
visitors from the bank. Table 20 outlines self-help group leaders‘ wealth compared
against that of their lineage. Asymmetries of wealth between lineage leaders and
members facilitate lineage leaders‘ ability to organize micro-credit groups.
Table 20 Group Leaders‘ Assets Compared to the Average for their Lineage
Group leader
Wells owned
Motor rights
Shankar
2 perennial (1 late-winter)
1 (0.31)
Paaru
1 perennial (1 mid-winter)
0.33 (0.42)
Bharat
3 perennial (1 late-winter)
2 (0.55)
Veera
1 perennial (1 late-winter)
1(0.55)
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007

Per capita livestock
1.77 (1.04)
1.12 (1.08)
2.67 (1.28)
1 (1.28)

Note: Figures in brackets are average values for the lineage a leader belongs to
Micro-credit‘s institutional rules transfer banking functions to groups and impose
the transaction costs of banking on self-help groups‘ presidents and secretaries who must
monitor members‘ deposits, write accounts and travel to the bank to deposit money.
Lineage leaders meet transaction costs which strengthens their property rights to loans.
Transaction costs include those internal to the group, those with intermediary institutions
and those with external actors.
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Transaction Costs within the Micro-Credit Group
Coordination costs. Lineage leaders meet the self-help group‘s coordination
costs such as deciding on the minimum monthly contribution, meeting venue and time.
Groups formed at early stages such as Shankar‘s began with a small monthly contribution
of 30 rupees, but newer groups realized that higher monthly contributions enabled
securing a bigger loan. Therefore both Veera and Bharat mandated a monthly
contribution of 50 rupees. Lineage leaders also decided on a meeting venue, and a lineage
leader‘s house is already a focal meeting point for the hamlet, therefore holding a
meeting at his house fits with customary norms of leadership.
Costs of gathering monthly deposits. Leaders emphasize that the internal costs
of managing their group are far greater than the costs incurred in bank transactions. To
make a bank deposit, leaders must secure all or most members‘ individual deposits.
Chanda and Champa, the de jure leaders of the Baria group, go from door to door telling
women to bring their deposit to either leader‘s house before a bank day so that they are
not delayed on the day of making a deposit itself. Veera pays his members an advance
‗reminder visit‘ so that members have their deposit ready the day he goes to the bank.
Bharat ensures that his group‘s members come to his house on a designated meeting day
to deposit the money. Making sure that all members contribute cash before the designated
bank day is more important for less wealthy leaders like the Barias than wealthier ones
like Geeta and Bharat who can fill in for a late-paying member with a temporary deposit.
Depositing money for late-paying members. Dryland households are cashstrapped and income has seasonal dimensions, with cash supplies being lowest in the
monsoon sowing season from June-August due to expenses on school textbooks, seeds
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and fertilizer coinciding then. However, bank deposits must be made every month. A
leader‘s ability to make a temporary deposit of cash on a member‘s behalf is particularly
relevant in this scenario. Lineage leaders with regular cash income from a government or
NGO job, contracting, cash-crop farming or shop-keeping can deposit cash on a
member‘s behalf and be reimbursed later.
Maintaining a written record. Micro-credit requires documentation of decisionmaking and monetary transactions, and eligibility for a loan is contingent on evidence of
regular deposits, periodic meetings and deliberation on group loans. Lineage-leaders who
are educated themselves or have educated kin appoint these individuals as formal group
leaders to meet micro-credit‘s documentary requirements and present a detailed record so
that bank officers approve a loan. Commercial micro-credit does not invest enough in
training leaders to perform banking functions. However, groups are still evaluated on the
basis of their documentation practices. Lineage leaders choose formal group leaders on
the basis of their ability to read and write. Consider how self-help group members‘
average literacy, described in Table 21, compares to their leaders‘ education. Mean
literacy among Baria self-help group members is 2.31 years, followed by Chauhan
members with 2.25 years, the Patels with 0.15 years and Nayaks who are illiterate. In
comparison to members, self-help groups‘ formal leaders are highly educated. Geeta has
a bachelor‘s degree, Babu, the disability group leader has studied till the 10th grade, and
Chanda and Champa, formal leaders of the Baria group have studied till the 9th and 10th
grades respectively.
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Table 21 Self-Help Group Members‘ Average Literacy According to Lineage
Lineage

Number of self-help
Literacy
group members
Chauhan
16
2.25
Baria
16
2.31
Patel
13
0.15
Nayak
2
0
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007

Standard deviation
5.09
3.62
0.55
0

Sanctions. Lack of timely payments is the single-most important cause for groups
being disqualified from loans at the end of 18 months of saving. Members do not
consider it their place to tell fellow-members to make contributions because members
may be in the same boat themselves at a later point, but the burden of filling in with a
cash deposit for a member falls on the leader and leaders feel justified in sanctioning
members. Lineage-leaders may withhold the use of shared assets in case a member
misses payments repeatedly, then stop taking deposits from a member altogether,
effectively eliminating that member from the group, make all remaining payments on a
member‘s behalf and purchase an asset in that member‘s name.
Transaction Costs with Intermediary Institutions
Negotiating loans with the sarpanch. Sarpanches are a part of micro-credit‘s
credit-delivery apparatus. The sarpanch‘s cooperation is critical for a group when a bank
officer comes to assess its viability because bank managers are from urban backgrounds
and lack understanding of dryland property systems, wherein land records reflect
undivided collective holdings and have several inheritors‘ names on a single title. The
sarpanch verifies the size of individual landholdings through knowledge of kin
relationships and helps bank officers verify each borrower‘s repayment capacity. The
sarpanch clarifies bank officers‘ doubts and gives them verbal assurance that a group will
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repay its loan. Monies are released through the signatures of both the bank officer and the
sarpanch, who is a super-guarantor of groups in his panchayat; therefore groups are
dependent on the sarpanch‘s cultural resources to secure loans.
Lineage leaders constrain the sarpanch to cooperate with them through their
control over votes, joint dispute-resolution and shared membership in the council of
elders. Lineage leaders are members of the council of elders which is more powerful than
the sarpanch in governing communal life. Since Panchayati Raj was enacted in 1994, the
sarpanch is designated the chief leader (agevaan) of the village, but often consults with
ex-patels and lineage leaders to sanction offenders because this reduces his own costs of
sanctioning. The sarpanch is subordinate to the dispute-mediation process and is subject
to lineage leaders‘ and the patel‘s authority if he commits a wrong. Consider the words of
Bhaga (BR), the Baria lineage-leader who co-founded the Baria self-help group:
DD: Are there times when the sarpanch doesn‘t heed the council of elders?
BR: No, the sarpanch won‘t do that.
DD: Is the sarpanch more powerful than the council of elders?
BR: No, he has to respect the council‘s verdict. These (lineage leaders) are people
from every hamlet, they have defined the law (kaaydo, kudrat), and they have laid
it down. He can‘t break the law.
Lineage leaders exercise countervailing power over the sarpanch through
knowledge of his judgments in disputes. Lineage leaders maintain secrecy about the
mode of resolution because leaders themselves may diverge in viewpoint but a single
judgment must be passed. Dispute mediation is a counterbalancing institution that
guarantees that the sarpanch delivers the bank loan, otherwise lineage leaders may refuse
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to support a particular judgment of the sarpanch, refuse to assist him in mediating a
serious dispute or call for fresh mediation in an old case stating that the sarpanch
misjudged it. This leads the sarpanch to do extra favors for lineage leaders, including
sharing information on questions that bank officers might ask on their visit and how to
secure a high ranking on the social development expert‘s evaluation of the group.
Additionally, lineage-leaders constrain the sarpanch via ward-membership. Veera
and Paaru, incumbent ward-members of Bordi and the main village respectively, recontested their seats and won in the 2006 village panchayat election, but Shankar, who
they partnered with as their sarpanch-candidate, lost. Veera and Paaru were now in the
awkward position of being ward-members in Shankar‘s rival Tersing‘s panchayat who
controlled their loan. However, as the sarpanch, Tersing required Veera and Paaru‘s
approval of his proposals to implement schemes. Both Paaru and Veera quickly forged a
cordial relationship with Tersing and started attending the new panchayat council‘s
monthly meetings, which opened channels of communication between them and the new
sarpanch for future action on micro-credit.
Simultaneously being members of Mahipura‘s council of elders, Veera and Paaru
were powerful enough to fend off Shankar‘s claims on old loyalties. When Paaru started
meeting Tersing in a personal capacity at Tersing‘s house from January 2007 onwards
and Shankar accused Paaru of turning over to Tersing, Paaru replied unfazed that Tersing
was the new sarpanch, therefore he had to petition to him for the Barias‘ needs.
Independent links with the panchayat. Micro-credit necessitates lineage leaders
forming links with the panchayat to be thoroughly familiar with loans‘ terms, particularly
because policy guidelines change constantly, new loans are introduced and old ones
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discontinued, and the subsidies on different loans may change. Ward members get
updated information at the monthly panchayat meeting and can legitimately ask the
panchayat secretary to read changes in guidelines and clarify their finer points.
The panchayat secretary demands bribes from people for small tasks like
notarizing documents. The secretary comes to the panchayat office just once a week and
is unresponsive to ordinary people‘s requests for information. Most people visit the
secretary only to pay annual taxes or record a birth or death. In reply to my question
about whether she visited the panchayat secretary for information on schemes, Kamla,
35, a Chauhan woman remarked, ‗Yes, we go to the panchayat secretary. But he tells us
on our face: ―Give me five-six thousand rupees. Whoever gives more money takes the
scheme.‖ If all he has to do is sign a document he says, ―I‘m sure you can spare 10-20
rupees.‖‘
The more fruitful meetings are between the secretary and the wealthiest cash crop
farmers who pay the secretary bribes to secure subsidized resources for low-income
families that they are not eligible for, as one of Mahipura‘s only two men who identified
themselves as cash-crop farmers did, securing monies for well-deepening and houseexpansion. While the panchayat secretary may oppress ordinary people, ward members
escape this privation because of their office and can secure information on development
from the secretary. This enables ward-member to lead micro-credit groups.
Transaction Costs with External Actors
Transaction costs with the bank. Self-help groups have to deposit funds in the
bank for 12 months, withdraw this ‗internal loan‘ and return this sum over the next six
months, all entailing periodic trips to the bank. The Bank of Bandibar is 15 kilometers
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from Mahipura and each round-trip costs 10 rupees by jeep, totaling 180 rupees over the
18-month period, the equivalent of one member‘s six months‘ deposit. Traveling to the
bank is a lesser financial burden on lineage-leaders who are among the wealthiest people
in their villages. Two leaders, Bharat and Shankar even own a motorcycle. Other leaders
walk or cycle to the bank to save on travel costs. The bank‘s hours are from 10 am-1 pm
and from 3 pm-4 pm, necessitating that leaders adjust daily time guided by sunrise and
sunset to the bank‘s clock-time. Landless households working as permanent field laborers
and migrant laborers cannot travel to the bank every month. This task is best performed
by those permanently resident in the village, such as wealthy lineage-leaders.
Groups also have to host bank officers when they come to assess a group‘s
capacity for repayment. Leaders identify their houses as the most suitable for meetings
with external actors. Through such artifacts as chairs for visitors, a table and the ability to
provide expensive refreshments like milk tea, lineage leaders can demonstrate that they
are connected to the broader world of economic advancement and are suitable candidates
for receiving loans for commodity production.
Transaction costs with state actors. The social development expert is assigned
high targets for forming self-help groups and does not visit newly formed groups after
their first two or three meetings. Because of poor investment in training leaders, groups
invariably attempt to persuade the social development expert to come to the village for
subsequent meetings to update records. Lineage leaders can afford to travel to Limkheda
to persuade the social development expert to come to the village.
While members grapple with meeting month-to-month deposits, leaders strategize
to make the group eligible for a loan by familiarizing themselves with the District Rural
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Development Agency and bank‘s criteria for judging a group‘s quality. The social
development expert ranks group on the basis of their book-keeping, record of meetings‘
minutes and clarity about how they plan to put their loan to a productive use. Lineage
leaders talk to the social development expert in an informed way and lay out a roadmap
of what commodity they will produce with their loan.
The social development expert‘s assessment of each self-help group involves
observing group meetings and savvy leaders demonstrate their groups‘ discipline at these
meetings. I realized the performative quality of meetings while attempting to interview
Masuri, Bharat‘s wife and the de jure leader of his group ‗Lakshmi‘. I rarely found
Masuri, 32, at home during my visits to her house because she worked in their
perennially irrigated fields every day; weeding, harvesting and watering food-crops,
fodder-crops and cash-crops. I kept trying to meet Masuri for several days and found her
at home one mid-morning. I began to ask her about her experience with micro-credit, the
group‘s internal relationships and her vision for her the loan. I had barely introduced the
topic when Masuri asked me preemptively, ‗Do you want to hold a meeting of the group?
I‘ll fetch the women.‘ Before I could protest, Masuri strode out of the house to inform her
sisters-in-law and aunts-in-law to assemble at her house.
Masuri assumed that I represented the Rural Self Employment Scheme, knew the
social development expert and District Rural Development Agency officers, and would
report to them on her group‘s performance. Micro-credit represented 18 months of labor
for Masuri. Masuri returned in less than 10 minutes and pulled new plastic chairs into the
verandah, typically commissioned for powerful external visitors like bank officers,
development specialists and Forest Department staff. Nine women arrived in another ten
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minutes, no mean feat for having to be fetched from grazing, working in the fields,
collecting firewood, fetching water, tending to cattle, cooking and taking care of infants.
NGOs and government officers often complain that they arrive for a village meeting at a
designated time only to find that none of the villagers had arrived. But by proving to an
unexpected visitor that she could command her group to gather for a meeting when a
development actor visited, Masuri demonstrated her group‘s discipline and commitment
to making monthly contributions. The meeting performed ‗work‘ or labor of showing
Masuri‘s authority over the group‘s members and presenting ideal development subjects
eager and willing to practice thrift-and-lending.
Unlike meetings in other villages that I had attended where self-help group
members came dressed in the formal attire of polyester saris, the women were dressed in
their ‗home‘ clothes- a cotton underskirt and half-sari and had obviously been interrupted
from work. Masuri appeared to have told them that this was a surprise evaluation visit.
Masuri strove to make up for this shortfall in performance by grabbing a heavy tarpaulin
sheet from the inner room of the house for the women to sit on.
The tarpaulin sheet is a characteristic artifact of participatory meetings conducted
by development agencies in an attempt to increase collaborative decision-making in
development projects. The heavy black sheet is used at public meetings at schools,
panchayats or under the shade of a tree to accommodate large numbers of people for
deliberative proceedings. The tarpaulin sheet is delivered through the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), the world‘s largest public works program, which
mandates that work sites have a comfortable resting place for workers to take breaks
during their eight-hour work shift. Every activity budget includes funds for a tarpaulin
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sheet for this purpose. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is implemented by
the panchayat and administered by the sarpanch.
Like other interventions, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is also a
source of patronage, and Shankar delivered funds to Bharat through the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act during his tenure as sarpanch to purchase cement, concrete,
tarpaulin and pay wages for a dam. Lineage-leaders, development agents, vote-brokers
and ward-members who organize activities retain the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act‘s materials which constitute higher-level patronage to them from the
sarpanch. Leaders often usurp the costly tarpaulin sheet (costing upward of 5,000 rupees),
as Bharat had done as well.
The tarpaulin sheet is a ubiquitous marker of both development brokerage and
participatory events. But even as Masuri unfolded the heavy sheet, the women instead
perched on fertilizer sacks and grain bags lining the verandah as they would have during
an informal visit to her house. Despite the flaw in the performance wherein members did
not sit on the ‗participatory‘ tarpaulin; Masuri had successfully assembled all members
for a meeting and demonstrated that hers was a disciplined group. Masuri did what is
well-documented in the anthropology of development- present her group members as
‗ideal‘ development subjects (Baviskar, 2007; Ferguson, 1990; Li, 2007) who will do
their part to make micro-credit a success and want what micro-credit has to offer.
Leaders do the work of ‗translating‘ (Mosse, 2004) programmatic guidelines into
practical actions so that tangible benefits can be secured, and in return, leaders feel
justified in controlling loans and shaping their distribution. Members accept lineage
leaders‘ control of leadership because lineage leaders have reciprocal ties with the
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sarpanch, are familiar with micro-credit‘s rules, and can sanction members. A group‘s
success in becoming eligible for loans is shaped by lineage leaders‘ resources to meet
both transaction costs within the group and external costs between the group and the
bank, the sarpanch and the social development expert.
Transaction Costs, Asymmetries and Property Rights
The Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana delivers both small loans for milk
livestock, irrigation motors, electric generators and threshers worth 15,000-20,000 rupees
and large loans worth 200,000-300,000 rupees for tractors, food processing units, organic
manure manufacturing units and spice-dehydration units. Small assets like livestock and
motors carry a 25 per cent subsidy while large assets like tractors and agro-manufacturing
units have a 50 per cent subsidy. As an incentive to self-help groups to continue saving
for 18 months, the District Rural Development Agency channels subsidized seed kits
when groups complete 12 months of saving.
While a transaction costs framework enables explaining why lineage leaders
organized micro-credit groups in Mahipura, interactions between members and leaders
are also political, and asymmetries of wealth, information and property rights between
leaders and members come to the fore when the group moves from the saving to the
internal lending and loan-taking stage.
The dynamics of loan-taking alter bargaining relations between self-help group
leaders and their members. The distribution of credit within groups is shaped by the
distribution of power between the leader and members. Intra-group power relations shape
whether a loan is taken for divisible capital like livestock or irrigation motors for each
member or indivisible capital like a tractor which only the lineage leader can afford. The
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wealthiest leaders- Shankar, Bharat and Veera wanted a single large loan for themselves
for a tractor or agricultural processing unit while the less wealthy Baria leaders could
afford only small loans for themselves, and decided on a buffalo-loan for each household.
Large-scale assets fit wealthy lineage leaders‘ resource endowments while less well-off
members prefer small capital. Tractors are scarce in Dahod and are used by the wealthiest
leaders to earn rental income by ploughing fields. Tractor rental charges are 400 rupees
per field and tractor owner-operators earn substantial incomes in the peak pre-sowing
weeks in June, July and November.
By 2008, two groups in Mahipura secured loans and both displayed asymmetries
in loan-taking between their leaders and members. Members could do no better than
accept these terms because of asymmetries of information and control over the group‘s
passbook and rights to make bank transactions. Banks list only the secretary and
chairperson‘s name in the group‘s passbook while members‘ names are listed in the
village-level register which is not granted the status of a legal document. Banks vest the
power of making deposits with leaders alone rather than allowing any member to deposit
cash on the group‘s behalf. The bank does not make entries of deposits in members‘
personal passbooks, instead delegating this to the leader. This buttresses leaders‘ property
rights over loans, attenuates members‘ claims to loans, and weakens members‘ ability to
ensure intra-group equity in loan-delivery.
Beyond formal rules, lineage leaders strengthened control over loans by meeting
intra-group transaction costs, banking costs and the costs of interacting with external
actors. To minimize lending costs, banks maintain their distance from borrowers and
interact only with leaders except during the single moment of disbursing a loan. Banks
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try to minimize costs by lending locally and lending to borrowers they know rather than
those they do not know (Banerjee, 2003). In the case of micro-credit, banks delegate
information costs to leaders who know borrowers‘ repayment capacity and who select
borrowers living close to themselves to form a group.
Moves and Countermoves in the Saraswati Micro-Credit Group
The loan-making stage was marked by conflict in the case of both Saraswati and
Gayatri, the first two groups that Shankar formed and which were the first to secure
loans. The loan is an external stimulus that altered the dynamic between the leader and
largely Chauhan members, wherein members felt entitled to a loan in exchange for saving
their money in the group‘s bank account, while Shankar attempted to secure the largest
loan for himself on the basis of meeting transaction costs, and because it was costless to
usurp a loan. Shankar secured loans by co-opting both Saraswati and Gayatri‘s de jure
leaders, sharing generous benefits with Geeta and Babu, Saraswati and Gayatri‘s leaders
respectively, in exchange for their cooperation.
Saraswati has all the qualities of a successful micro-credit group. It is led by the
sarpanch and its leader Geeta is the most educated woman in Mahipura. The group
comprises well-to-do Chauhan and Baria women inhabiting the powerful Chauhan
hamlet. Saraswati consists of an ‗inner-circle‘ of Chauhans close to Shankar who share
habitual interaction with Shankar‘s household. Sociality with the sarpanch‘s family is
‗infrastructure‘ for the inner-circle like the economic infrastructure of roads, bridges and
telecommunications (Elyachar, 2010) which provides an information flow on schemes.
The ‗outer-circle‘ comprises three Baria families and more dispersed Chauhans,
including my host Saroda.
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When Saraswati‘s members completed 12 months of saving, the inner-circle
members including Shankar‘s wife Charu, Geeta the group leader and their immediate
neighbors traveled to the Limkheda watershed development office to secure seed kits.
The commercial price of a seed kit is 600 rupees while self-help group members get
discounted kits for 300 rupees. Charu and Geeta also secured fertilizer loans, likely using
outer-circle members‘ loan quotas. The outer-circle members learnt about the innercircle‘s trip when they returned and felt cheated, being close kin and having always
assisted Shankar, their lineage leader in his annual rice transplantation, wedding feasts,
and voting for him.
This incident drove a wedge between the outer-circle and inner-circle. In the
meantime, members neither received their personal passbooks nor had group leaders
make entries in them. The outer-circle members demanded a written record of their
deposits in their personal passbooks. Geeta told Radha, 30, an outer-circle Baria who
deposited a total of 1,050 rupees that her saving amounted to only 700-800 rupees. Radha
recounted later, ‗My money hasn‘t grown, it has depleted in the self-help group. It would
have been better to keep it in a tin can in the kitchen without earning any interest.‘
Angered by what appeared to be a siphoning of their savings, Saroda, Radha, Saroda‘s
Chauhan neighbor Kamla and others demanded that their passbooks be returned to them.
A few days later Geeta told them that the passbooks were missing. This amounted to total
loss of control on members‘ part. In retaliation, at the end of 12 months of saving, when
the group withdrew its deposit after 12 months for internal lending and each member took
500 rupees, the outer-circle returned only 200-300 rupees to compensate for their losses.
Saroda, Kamla and Radha stopped depositing money in the group account from May
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2006 onwards, telling Geeta and Charu that they could not possibly contribute money
without obtaining a record of their deposit. This had the paradoxical effect of eliminating
these members‘ ability to make further claims on the group, and Shankar started
depositing monies on these three members‘ behalf, appropriating their share of loans.
Shankar had gathered information on loans and subsidies and decided on buffaloloans for the group for cash-milk production for the cooperative dairy. The group
consisted of 11 members and each was eligible for one loan-buffalo. Shankar decided that
group-members‘ husbands would travel to Mehsana district to select buffaloes from
markets in Mehsana famous for the high-yielding Mehsana breed. One week before the
Mehsana trip, Shankar told Saroda, Radha and Kamla that their purchase would require a
down-payment of 5,000 rupees for sundry travel expenses and fee to the buffalo-seller.
This figure amounts to one-fourth the price of a buffalo. The three women were taken
aback because the loan covered the full amount of cash required to purchase a buffalo.
The women said that they could not afford this sum. Shankar returned the next day
quoting a reduced figure, saying that it would take 3,000 rupees to process the buy, and
whittled the sum down to 1,000 rupees on the eve of the Mehsana trip. Inner-circle
Chauhans as well as Baria families close to the sarpanch were not asked to pay any fee
and this appears to have been a deliberate move by Shankar to discourage the outer-circle
members from purchasing a buffalo. Saroda and Radha opted out of the buffalo scheme.
Kamla paid 1,000 rupees to get her buffalo but stopped socializing with the inner-circle
after the men returned from Mehsana with buffaloes. Table 22 outlines the distribution of
loans within Saraswati.
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Table 22 Loan-Taking by Saraswati Self-Help Group Members, 2004-2005
Loan-taker‘s identity

Loan purpose

Sarpanch
Seeds, fertilizer, 4 buffaloes
Sarpanch‘s brother
Seeds, fertilizer, buffalo
Secretary, inner-circle Chauhan
Seeds, buffalo
Inner-circle Chauhan
Seeds, buffalo
Outer-circle Chauhan
Buffalo
Outer-circle Chauhan
Buffalo
Inner-circle Chauhan
Buffalo
Baria Neighbor
Buffalo
Baria Neighbor
Outer-circle Chauhan
Outer-circle Baria
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007

Amount
(with subsidy)
74,000
19,500
19,000
19,000
18,000
18,000
18,000
18,000
-

Shankar secured four buffaloes for himself using other members‘ quotas. Shankar
is illiterate and relied on Geeta to do the group‘s accounts, and secured the finest buffalo
for Geeta, account-keeper and a key agent in presenting the group‘s activities as
equitable. Access to resources was not shaped by kinship alone but qualitative differences
in sociality, and Kamla, Saroda, Radha and others in the Chauhan hamlet had felt this
keenly. Kamla said:
Every time we ask for our passbooks or information, the inner-circle members
say, ‗Come, let‘s have a meeting.‘ But there is no talk of who is poor (gareeb) and
who should get benefits. Why should we go to meetings just to hang out?
Kamla challenged inner-circle leaders‘ attempts to include them nominally
through formal ‗meetings‘ while in fact erasing distributional issues from the agenda of
these meetings and holding meetings only when outer-circle Chauhans challenged them.
Saroda, ever-vocal said, ‗Do they think that resources are only for them and not for the
poor?‘ Ramsing, another member‘s husband said, ‗Those who command information take
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resources and the poor don‘t get anything. They share benefits only with those who they
have social exchange with.‘ I was struck by the use of the term ‗poor‘ by these well-off
Chauhans who are better-off Kolis. Limkheda‘s predominantly Koli villagers, many of
who have lift irrigation and are cash crop farmers, are used to calling other groups in
Dahod poor. Calling them poor (gareeb) is a major way that Kolis assert dominance over
Adivasis and Dalits in Dahod. The term ‗poor‘ is pejorative, signifying not just material
hardship and powerlessness but lack of citizenship- lack of one‘s interests being regarded
in the public good and exclusion from norms of civility accorded to a fellow-being.
The least well-off families do not refer to themselves as ‗poor‘ because of its
association with subjection and because their indigence is evident in infertile plots,
homesteads devoid of cattle and huts without grain storage urns (kothis) because they
produce no grains to store. The least well-off households are instead preoccupied with
migration circuits, keeping their children in school and maintaining social standing in
their clan by contributing chaandlo to the few fund-raising feasts that they are invited to.
Kamla, Saroda and Ramsing are upwardly mobile Kolis. Kamla occasionally
leases in land from farmers in economic distress in exchange for cash and grows cashcrops on leased land. Ramsing runs a medium-sized provision store in the village and
earns a monthly income of 1,500 rupees. Saroda and her husband are saving up migration
wages to build a new stone house, a sign of upward mobility in Limkheda, in anticipation
of securing a bride from a well-off family for their son.
Deploying the term poor is a power move by well-off Chauhans to suggest lack of
entitlement, social exclusion and othering, and exhibited skilled use of the language of
deprivation by powerful actors to assert being unfairly excluded from development, even
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when the same exclusion is enacted towards Adivasi Nayaks and Taaviads is
derecognized. Identities are ‗mutable ongoing productions‘ (Massey, 2004) deployed to
secure resources. Kamla, Saroda and Ramsing, all relatively well-off Kolis, deployed the
term ‗poor‘ as a trope of powerlessness with respect to inner-circle members. Being poor
meant being discriminated against despite being kin or neighbors, lacking decisionmaking power and being kept in the dark about collective resources. By donning the
category of ‗the poor‘, outer-cluster Chauhans voiced different principles by which their
group‘s loans should have been distributed.
Saraswati‘s outer-circle members punished the sarpanch both within the
framework of micro-credit and in the multiple arenas in which members and the sarpanch
had relations. Kamla and Radha cast blank votes in the panchayat election in December
2006 instead of voting for Shankar as would be expected of them as his kin. Kamla and
Saroda withdrew their labor from Shankar‘s annual rice-transplantation in which all
Chauhan women participated as an act of loyalty to their agevaan. Radha, who lost 700
rupees in monthly deposits in the Saraswati self-help group, stopped interacting with
Shankar‘s family although as one of only three Baria households in the Chauhan hamlet,
living in proximity to the Chauhan leader was a matter of great pride to her.
Moves and Countermoves in the Gayatri Micro-Credit Group
In an attempt to make development policy more inclusive, the Rural Self
Employment Scheme emphasizes forming disability groups, marginalized castes‘ groups
and landless households‘ groups in addition to women‘s groups. Shankar formed a
second Chauhan group under the guise of creating a disability group. This group,
‗Gayatri‘ comprised two Barias, two Chauhans and two Patels with minor disabilities.
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Non-disabled members were subsequently added to the group. Babu, 40, Shankar‘s firstcousin was made the group‘s secretary, and Madhu, 26; Shankar‘s second-cousin‘s wife
was made the chairperson.
Babu has close ties with Shankar because he is the oldest of three brothers and
represents his two brothers in the village assembly, as is customary in Mahipura, where
only the oldest brother from each family attends the assembly. Many a younger brother
resents this informal rule which prevents him from accessing information on schemes and
subsidies from the sarpanch, and enables the oldest brother to appropriate patronage. In
his role as a panchayat assembly participant, Babu also contributes to legitimizing the
panchayat‘s decisions.
Shankar‘s house was my first abode in Mahipura and I was struck by the
gleaming red Mahindra tractor, Mahipura‘s first, standing conspicuously in his backyard.
Shankar said that he bought the tractor through a bank loan which had a subsidy so that
its cost was not the market price of 400,000 rupees but 200,000 rupees. Three months
later, through part-derisive and part-joking references by Gayatri‘s members, I learnt that
Shankar had purchased his tractor through Gayatri‘s loan.
The Chauhans refer to Gayatri as ‗Babu‘s group‘, tacitly disowning the group and
denying their membership in it. Gayatri‘s variegated story was pieced together from
conversations with its de jure Chauhan leaders, Shankar, the group‘s new members and
its former members. Gayatri initially consisted of 11 members; two Patels, five LabdaBarias and four Chauhans. Vikram, the Labda-Baria political broker had initially joined
this group and attended its first meeting- the Labda-Barias did not form their own group,
knowing well that Shankar would not cooperate with them in disbursing their loan.
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Vikram left the group after one month, considering it unviable because of Shankar‘s
control of the group, and Babu‘s acting at Shankar‘s behest. Once the most powerful
Labda-Baria leader left, the remaining Labda-Barias left the group as well.
Babu told me that old group ‗broke up‘ and Babu and Shankar crafted a new
group consisting entirely of Chauhans. However, Chauhan, Patel and Baria members
alike had a different story to tell. Members reported that Babu did not keep an account of
their deposits, did not make entries in their passbook and demanded more cash from
them, reportedly to bribe government officials. One member described his siphoning of
funds with the tongue-in-cheek comment ‗He told us that the government (sarkaar)
needed money to eat, so we gave him money for the government to fill its belly and for
him to fill his belly.‘ Chauhan members inhabiting the fringes of the village said that their
names were removed from the group‘s roster and new names were added.
Babu, a fluent penman wrote in the group‘s file that the Barias and Patels were
errant in depositing their money and were barred from membership due to non-payment.
This provided justification for forming a new group. Shankar and Babu used
documentary practices to materialize a particular reality of their group to expel nonChauhan members, after which Shankar added new Chauhan members. Many Chauhans
did not even know that their names had been added. In return for his cooperation,
Shankar turned a blind eye to Babu siphoning 450 rupees.
I met Babu late one afternoon while he was building a new house, using the final
weeks of summer to set up the roof. Babu produced Gayatri‘s register and showed a
meticulous record of its meetings. Minutes were noted for each meeting, points
deliberated upon and even ‗divergence‘ within the group transparently displayed. The
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group‘s other members insisted that the group in fact held no more than three meetings.
Babu told me frankly that he took the register to Shankar‘s place to write the minutes,
and records were collaborative texts between Babu and Shankar.
After liquidating the old group, Shankar singly deposited most of the collateral so
that the group did not become ineligible for want of deposits. Shankar secured a tractorloan worth 300,000 rupees through Gayatri. In return, Shankar helped Babu, Madhu the
president, and new members secure livestock-loans, securing his kin‘s support for his
tractor loan. Gayatri‘s loans are outlined in Table 23.
Table 23 Loan-taking by Gayatri Self-Help Group Members, 2004-2006
Loan-taker‘s identity
Loan purpose
Amount (including subsidy)
Sarpanch
Tractor
500,000
Group Secretary
Buffalo
18,000
Secretary‘s younger brother
Buffalo
18,000
Group President
Seed kit
18,600
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
Micro-Credit’s Impact on Credit Equity
Microfinance in the 2000s is constituted by financial institutions‘ imperatives of
expanding their returns by lending to the poor (e.g. Aitken, 2010; Elyachar, 2002; Young,
2010). Rural micro-credit is created through a neoliberal process of regulation that
privatizes credit-delivery while deepening borrowing cost, risk and uncertainty. Microcredit is an instrument of integrating the drylands with financial markets, and is centered
on forming self-help groups that are viable from commercial lenders‘ standpoint. While
micro-credit seeks to maximize credit coverage (Weber, 2004), it seeks it for all the nonpoor. Commercial microfinance‘s imperative is to maximize credit to those best able to
use it- those who own wells and already participate in cash crop production. Micro-credit
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deepens already existing inequalities, comprising a deliberately institutionally weak
channeling of monies to the wealthiest borrowers in the guise of financial empowerment.
Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana loans are tied to purchasing large capital
for commodity production such as tractors, organic manure production and livestock,
with the loan ranging from 18,000 rupees for a buffalo to 500,000 rupees for a tractor.
The poor cannot afford such large loans for purchasing capital that they cannot even use
productively. The credit needs of the poorest households in rainfed areas are for
consumption expenses, but micro credit expands credit to wealthier groups for
commodity production while allowing the least well off to fall into deeper debt traps.
Micro-credit in semi-arid communities is explicitly centered on commodity
production rather than meeting consumption needs, a finding corroborated by Bolivian
evidence on micro-credit (e.g. Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-vega, & Rodriguezmeza, 2000). While micro-credit can fill the gap between marginal cultivators‘ and
landless households‘ need for micro-loans to meet consumption expenses, the
Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana‘s loans are tied to purchasing capital for
commodity production, and constitute the upward distribution of state-delivered credit to
the wealthiest entrepreneurial households.
While 70 per cent of Dahod‘s population is Adivasi, only 50 per cent of the Bank
of Bandibar‘s micro-credit groups are Adivasi; and though only 30 per cent of the
population is Koli, 50 per cent of Bank of Bandibar‘s groups are Koli (DRDA, 2007).
Out of a total of 1,939 self-help groups formed in Dahod district during 2002-2007, 782
groups or 40 per cent did not qualify for a loan after completing their internal lending,
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656 self-help groups or 34 per cent qualified for only seeds and fertilizers, and only 501
or 26 per cent qualified for major loans (DRDA, 2007).
Micro-credit in the drylands is far from micro, particularly since the 2000s when
micro-credit has shifted to a commercial banking strategy implemented by private
microfinance banks, conventional banks with micro-credit subsidiaries, and nationalized
banks that have introduced a micro-credit component in their operations. The loans
delivered through the ‗new‘ micro-credit to the tune of 500,000 rupees for tractors,
dehydration units, food-processing machinery and power generators are not micro even
by well-off Kolis‘ standards.
Loan disbursement was highly skewed among a total of 1,939 self-help groups
formed by the District Rural Development Agency in Dahod during 2002-2007. 1,500
people received a total of 48,000,000 rupees or 32,000 rupees per borrower for livestockloans; 1,000 individual borrowers received 20,000,000 rupees or 20,000 rupees per
borrower for irrigation motors; 1,040 individual borrowers received a total of 40,430,000
rupees or 38,875 rupees each for an income-generation activity; and just 114 borrowers
received a total of 4,858,000 rupees or 42,614 rupees each for an industrial activity
(DRDA, 2007).
Far from being a strategy of making credit accessible to the poor, micro-credit
replicates a pattern of institutional lending well-document in the literature on credit,
namely that poor borrowers face higher costs for borrowing than wealthier borrowers
(Banerjee, 2003). Banks design micro-credit rules and financial institutions have
disproportionate power to define the terms of banking, including banks‘ own absence
from group-level governance. A range of scholarship suggests that microfinance
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institutions‘ devolution of monitoring costs from banks to leaders imposes financial
burdens on leaders and leads them to appropriate resources (e.g. Mahmud, 2003;
Mayoux, 2001; Rankin, 2002). Micro credit signifies ‗diffusion of self regulatory modes
of governance‘ (Sharma, 2006) beyond the bounds of the state, signifying state
divestment of governance and the ‗governmentalization‘ of private actors. The
‗responsibilizaiton‘ of entities such as self-help groups is aimed at governmentalizing
society with a parallel degovernmentalization of the state (Sharma, 2006).
Lineage leaders steer the group through a lending process which imposes more
conditionalities on poorer borrowers than wealthier ones (Field & Pande, 2008) including
a long gestation period, the imperative to form a group and calculate interest. Leaders are
able to appropriate loans because of deliberate erasure of oversight on banks‘ and the
market-based state‘s part, which are committed more to returns on investment and
commercial-input delivery for commodity production respectively than credit equity.
Creating rules that require group leaders to be accompanied by a different member for
each transaction with the bank, and requiring that monies be withdrawn and deposited
with more than one person‘s signature can increase ownership and prevent skewed
allocation of credit within groups. Giving members‘ personal passbooks legal backing is
critical in checking leaders‘ power and enabling ordinary borrowers with the poorest
access to fair credit access micro-credit.
At the same time, most households in Mahipura desired micro-credit by the time
watershed development‘s implementation was well under way, seeking smaller loans and
micro-credit‘s attendant rewards such as subsidized seed-kits. I suggest that this is
because micro-credit builds a new kind of citizenship instrumentalized through monetary
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transactions with the state. Micro-credit is a reversal of the state‘s attitude to the rural
poor- from regarding them as lacking industry; it now considers them as bankable
subjects. The citizenship bestowed by micro-credit needs to be seen in light of historical
and contemporary experiences of semi-arid communities in relation to the state. The state
is experienced in rainfed areas both by its absence during citizen distress and its
overwhelming presence in ways that signify violence and disenfranchisement. The state
is absent during robberies, cattle theft, murder and grain raids during the rainfed
cultivation season when impoverished subalterns whose food reserves have been
exhausted in summer venture forth to draw upon the wealth of well-owning cultivators.
The state is absent during communal violence against Muslims and Christians in rural
and tribal areas, a periodic occurrence in Gujarat since the mid 1990s where Hindu
nationalist organizations deploy Kolis and Adivasis as their foot soldiers in religious
violence (Lobo, 2002; Shah, 2002b).
However, the state is overwhelmingly present in other ways in rainfed areas. The
state is pervasive in sanctioning villagers for entering village forests for timber, fuelwood
and fodder; for demands of bribes for delivering development and human services; and in
the architecture of Indian development policy with terms of trade of between industrial
and agricultural commodities explicitly biased in favor of industry (Chakravarty, 1987),
which is discussed in greater detail in chapter 5.
In contrast with these everyday practices of the state, micro-credit deepens
economic citizenship, signaling the state expanding citizenship for dryland communities
hitherto excluded from circuits of institutional finance, as well as promising future
citizenship for people through capital ownership. As evidence from Mahipura shows,
175

some members condone leaders‘ loan usurpation because they hope to secure future
loans, because the new micro-credit promotes repeated lending. Despite being shot
through with conflict and even loss of monies for members, micro-credit is widely
desired because of the vast majority of dryland households hitherto being excluded from
institutional finance delivered by nationalized banks.
This chapter focused on the organization of new financial markets in the drylands
through the interaction of political society actors, commercial rural banks and the policy
implementation rules of a neoliberalizing state. The next chapter focuses on the social
and political organization of commodity markets, the extension of capital for commodity
production through loans which are effectively production contracts, the way contracts
alter commodity-producers‘ sovereignty, and the role of economies of scale and the
political process of price-setting in shaping commodity producers‘ returns from cash-crop
production and the distribution of gains across producer-categories.
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6. The Politics of Markets and of Value in High-Value Commodity Production
Linking the poor or ‗the bottom of the pyramid‘ (Prahalad, 2009) with markets to
improve their quality of life has emerged as a major development strategy among firms,
donor organizations and national governments in recent years. In the drylands, this has
taken the form of a policy thrust on agro-processing (GOI, 2008), dairying and marketing
of dairying products, horticulture and agroforestry (GOI, 2007a).
Semi-arid communities depend critically on the market for survival, including
both the labor market and agricultural market. A majority of households participate in
labor markets in the construction and infrastructure sectors. A significant proportion of
households sell produce for one to three months of the year, and cash-crop farmers all
year round. Dryland producers sell commodities in competitive markets at market-towns
called haat and the wholesale district market called mandi. Watershed development has
identified milk as an optimal high-value commodity for the drylands because of the
centrality of livestock in semi-arid areas, and 2007 was the year of the resurgence of the
‗white revolution‘ centered on milk production.
Gujarat is the flagship state of the cooperative dairy industry in India which was
established in 1965 with the formation of the National Dairy Development Board through
joint funding from international donors and the Indian government (George, 1990). The
National Dairy Development Board is a federation of regional dairies that procure milk
from village level milk societies; and process, package and sell milk and dairy products
to urban markets. The cooperative dairy sector comprises 177 regional dairies, operates in
346 districts and covers 133,349 village level societies (NDDB, 2010).
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The formation of village societies to collect milk from marginal producers in
remote areas and linking societies to dairies originated in Anand district in central
Gujarat in the 1960s. This model has been replicated all over the country and Gujarat is
the flagship state of the dairy cooperative sector. Gujarat has one of the highest levels of
milk production for the sector which is facilitated by the state‘s dense network of rural
roads. This enables rapidly ferrying perishable milk from remote villages to cooling
plants at district headquarters. Gujarat has 15,322 village milk societies, the fourth
highest in the country, and the fifth-highest milk production in India.
Watershed development identifies dairying as a ‗watershed plus‘ (GOI, 2006a)
activity to be implemented once physical interventions such as dams and farm ponds
have been built. The intervention links households in villages implementing watershed
development to the cooperative sector‘s local milk societies through livestock-loans
delivered to self-help groups. As discussed in chapter 4, the presence of a village milk
society has been a significant factor in village-selection for watershed development in
Dahod. Self-help group members repay their loans through milk-sale to the milk society.
This chapter builds upon existing research on the cooperative dairy sector in India
(Baviskar, 1988; George, 1995) and the vast body of research on contract farming (e.g.
Konefal, Mascarenhas, & Hatanaka, 2005; Little, 1994; Nevins & Peluso, 2008; Watts,
1994); but departs from these works‘ focus on macro structures by grounding a study of
commercial milk production in social actors‘ priorities of social reproduction,
consumption and accumulation; and everyday exchanges shaped by reciprocity, identity
and local politics.
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I identify the central role of transaction costs, politics and economies of scale in
shaping the governance of cash-milk production in the locality. This chapter describes the
way in which markets are inherently and simultaneously political and social entities
rather than solely economic artifacts that lie above society (Mitchell, 2002). The chapter
also focuses on the way in which the market structure of high-value commodities and the
political economy of development shape the terms of exchange between milk-producers
and the cooperative dairy sector, a government-owned commercial agro-enterprise of the
kind established by postcolonial governments in Southeast Asia, Latin America and
Africa as well.
The Cooperative Dairy Sector in India
India is one of the world‘s largest milk producers but most of its milk is
consumed in the domestic market. While private firms selling dairy products purchase
milk from individual large-scale peri-urban milk-producers close to their urban markets,
cooperative dairies procure milk from small-scale milk-sellers in rural hinterlands,
including from sellers selling as little as one liter of a milk a day. This leads the
cooperative dairy sector to boast that it alleviates poverty by providing income and
employment to millions of rural households.
The regional dairy plant minimizes transaction costs in gathering milk by
devolving milk collection to a village-level milk society. Milk-sellers bring milk to the
society‘s collection center twice a day, morning and evening, at a given collection time.
The dairy‘s tempo, a five-wheel open vehicle with a carrier collects milk from the center
and transports it to the chilling plant. The milk is pasteurized, processed, and used both to
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produce high-value products for local markets such as flavored milk, yogurt, buttermilk
and ghee (clarified butter) and transported in liquid form to cities through feeder dairies.
Dahod‘s milk-producers sell milk to the Panchmahal District Cooperative Milk
Producers‘ Union (henceforth Panchmahal dairy), one of 12 regional dairies in Gujarat,
located at Godhra town in Panchmahal district adjoining Dahod. With the implementation
of the white revolution, the Panchmahal dairy expanded its milk processing capacity from
200,000 to 400,000 liters per day in 2006 (PDCMPUL, 2007).
The Political Organization of Milk Production
The milk society is organized by the largest milk producers in a village who
supply the greatest proportion of milk to the dairy. The society is governed by a
committee comprising the society‘s biggest shareholders. The committee is led by a
secretary, a permanent employee of the dairy and a chairperson, who is selected by
rotation from the committee by its members. Milk production is shaped by local politics
including contestation among the milk society‘s committee‘s members to control loans
delivered to the society through chairmanship of the society, and households‘
representation on the milk society through a lineage leader‘s membership in the milk
society committee. Milk production is also shaped by household-level factors including
access to irrigation, labor availability and the presence of infants or small children for
whom milk is produced, with surplus being sold to the society.
The National Dairy Development Board‘s guidelines stipulate that any village or
cluster of villages that can generate a daily milk supply of 50 to 100 liters per day can
form a milk society. Forming a society entails collective action costs of organizing a
critical mass of milk-sellers to join the milk-society by paying a small membership fee.
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Limkheda block borders Panchmahal district on its western side and is less than 30
kilometers from the Panchmahal dairy‘s chilling plant at Godhra, therefore it has an
advantage in milk production. When Mahipura and Himmatpur‘s cash crop farmers
formed a milk society, several neighboring villages already had milk societies supplying
milk to the dairy. While Mahipura and Himmatpur‘s perennial well-owners could have
sold milk to these societies by paying a nominal (20-30 rupees) membership fee, the
leaders undertook the costly task of forming their own society. This requires explanation.
Milk societies are not only conduits for the upward movement of milk to the dairy
but also the downward movement of low-interest loans from the dairy to milk-producers
to purchase milk-livestock, deepen wells, and buy irrigation motors and fodder crops‘
seeds. The drylands are credit-scarce and access to low-interest loans from the dairy is a
major motive for wealthy village leaders to form a society. Leaders meet the costs of
collective action to form a society and assert rights over committee membership.
Committee membership gives leaders disproportionate control over the loans to the
society because the committee‘s chairperson‘s signatures are required on loan documents.
While supplying milk to a neighboring society would have given Mahipura and
Himmatpur‘s wealthy farmers income, it would not have given them access to loans.
While the wealthiest farmers provide a significant proportion of a village
society‘s total supply, their share alone is not sufficient to meet the minimum volume to
cover operation costs. Other sellers‘ participation is critical to sustain a society. While
large and small sellers are mutually dependent, the dependence is asymmetric- small
sellers are reliant on large sellers‘ more even supplies for the milk society‘s viability, and
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could not have formed a society in the first place. Table 24 lists the distribution of
average quantity sold per day according to the number of households.
Table 24 Milk Sale in Mahipura in 2006-2007
Average daily
Number of
Percent of total
milk sale in
households
milk suppliers
liters
1.5
1
8.33
2
4
33.33
2.5
2
16.67
3
3
25
3.5
1
8.33
20
1
8.33
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
Six wealthy farmers from Himmatpur and Mahipura including Shankar and
Veera, senior Patel leader formed the Himmatpur Milk Society in 1980. The founding
members belong to the same age-cohort which was in its twenties then. Founders include
Karam the secretary from Himmatpur who is the most educated of all members; Dheeru,
a contractor from Himmatpur, one-time sarpanch of the Mahipura panchayat and the
wealthiest founder; Shankar who was sarpanch from 2002 to 2006, and Veera, senior
Patel leader and panchayat ward-member. Other sellers from Mahipura joined the milk
society by paying a one-time membership fee of 20 rupees.
The milk society is governed by the Cooperative Societies Act of 1904. The
Cooperative Societies Act mandates the inclusion of Adivasis in committees in Adivasidominated districts. Mahipura‘s nine-member committee has three Adivasi members- the
Taaviad cash-crop farmer Sayba, his older son and a Nayak. The Adivasi members are
token representatives added by the Koli founders to meet guidelines‘ requirements and
are not informed about the committee‘s monthly meetings.
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The milk society committee is headed by a secretary and chairperson. The
secretary collects and measures milk and makes payments, and the secretary‘s position is
permanent and salaried. The secretary is considered the most powerful actor in the
society because he writes the accounts and handles monetary transactions (cooperatives
guidelines do not mandate women‘s representation on committees, and to the best of my
knowledge, secretaries are exclusively men). Cooperative dairies are economic bodies
governed by the priority of maximizing production and require societies to be run along
managerial principles. The Panchmahal dairy‘s managers emphasize that the chairperson
be chosen through ‗consensus‘ rather than election and the committee take decisions
through deliberation and not voting. Rules are geared towards authoritarian power of the
managerial kind and dairy managers are in fact alarmed at the prospect of democratic
decision-making in societies lest democratic politics disrupt the critical task of
maximizing milk production. As I will show, milk societies are inherently political
because they distribute resources, and whether the politics is democratic or not, societies
and milk production is shaped by politics.
Along with the secretary, the chairman is the most powerful member of the
committee because guidelines vest decision-making power with the chairman and
secretary. Contestation among committee members is entirely for the chairman‘s position
and becoming chairman signifies control over the society. The chairperson‘s term lasts
four years. Chairmanship gives a committee member control over loans because the
chairperson and secretary jointly operate the society‘s bank account and disburse loans.
The committee meets at the milk collection center every month to process applications
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for loans, take stock of monthly milk collection and process insurance claims in case of
livestock death or injury.
The Himmatpur milk society‘s secretary is Karam, a cash-crop farmer from
Himmatpur who is the most educated of all committee members and is in charge of milk
collection, preparation of samples for testing fat content, and recording quantity supplied.
Karam arrives at the roadside collection center every morning at 6 am and every evening
at 4:30 pm. Milk collection timing is 6:30-7:30 am and 5-6 pm. Karam and his assistant
bring empty aluminum canisters out of the collection shed and set up the fatmeasurement tray. Milk-sellers arrive with their steel cans and Karam‘s assistant uses a
liter-sized measure to measure the quantity supplied, pouring milk into the aluminum
canister. A thimble-full of each seller‘s milk is drawn and placed in the fat-measurement
tray. The tray is sent to the dairy to measure fat content with the ‗milkotester‘ (a fat
measurement instrument). Milk-payments are made according to quantity and fat content.
Karam sits by the canister with his register which contains sellers‘ milk accounts.
Karam notes the quantity supplied in the row against each seller‘s account. As each
canister is filled, it is closed and lined up by the road. The dairy‘s tempo collects canisters
and the fat-sample tray and returns empty canisters and fat readings from the previous
trip. Karam calculates each seller‘s payment in the register on the basis of quantity and
fat content. Payment to milk-sellers varies between a bi-weekly and monthly basis.
Transactions between Milk-Sellers and the Secretary
The milk society is one of the most powerful local organizations because it
obtains low-interest loans and handles large amounts of milk payments on a daily basis
and is a source of extra cash for many households. The secretary is considered the most
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powerful actor in the society because he measures fat content which shapes the prices
milk producers receive and writes the accounts, and can skim a proportion of milkproducers‘ payments by noting lower fat content than that reported by the dairy.
Reciprocity between the secretary and milk-seller is critical for fair payment because the
dairy conducts only an annual audit and not random checks of milk-collection. This is
because the dairy relies on secretaries and chairmen- among the largest milk producers in
the drylands- for milk procurement in lean summer months.
In Mahipura, the decision to sell milk is shaped by wealth and political capital.
Milk-sellers are more likely to be large sellers on whom the society depends for its
survival, committee members who can check the secretary‘s power by examining the
accounts at monthly meetings, or committee members‘ closest kin. The Himmatpur milk
society is particularly opaque, with meetings and financial dealings being carried out at
committee members‘ house rather than the milk collection center, and different sellers
being paid at different frequencies. Milk sellers lacking political capital take extra
precautions to ensure that they receive full payment. The cash-crop Adivasi farmer Sayba
is a nominal committee member and medium milk-seller. Unlike the Chauhans and Patels
who delegate milk delivery to their children or wives, Sayba does not delegate milk
delivery to his wife, sons or daughters-in-law but delivers milk himself. Sayba is one of
only two men in Mahipura who identify themselves as cash-crop farmers. As one of the
leading Adivasis in Mahipura, Sayba is also a member of the panchayat‘s education
committee which oversees the functioning of Mahipura‘s schools. Despite this, Sayba
shares little trust with the milk society‘s secretary, chairman and powerful committee
members.
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Sayba is an Adivasi in a Koli village marked by Koli exclusion of Adivasis from
social citizenship and adherence to ritualistic rules wherein Kolis do not eat food cooked
or served by Adivasis and do not drink water in an Adivasi home. Sayba‘s painstaking
milk delivery routine involves intense preparation of the body. Sayba delivers milk after
bathing and dons a washed shirt, dhoti and Nehru cap, as if mindful of Koli norms of
pollution and purity. Sayba‘s attire to the center is like others‘ attire for a trip to the
market, as if for him, the external world begins beyond the boundary of his house. Sayba
walks with a brisk step to the collection center and back, steel can in hand, sometimes
with an umbrella to protect from sun or rain, rarely stopping to converse with people he
meets en route.
Koli discursive practices are centered on the Adivasi body and its actions, and
Kolis cast Adivasis as thieving, fond of drink and lazy (also Skaria, 1999; Sundar, 1997).
Sayba‘s demeanor, disciplined body and attire present the image of the ideal Adivasi
subject. Performing industry, assiduousness, ‗hygiene‘ and impeccability are indelible
parts of Sayba laying a claim to citizenship and securing fair treatment in the milk
society. Sayba‘s performance is also an everyday counter-narrative to Koli discourses. As
if challenging Kolis‘ accounts of Adivasis, Sayba told me pointedly one day, ‗We had to
work hard to get a good winter harvest this year. That‘s why we have been able to last so
far on our field‘s grains. We are not the drinking type. We tend to our land, our house,
our cattle and keep to ourselves.‘ Both Kolis and Adivasis have historically practiced
cultivation but Kolis assert discursive dominance by constructing themselves as
cultivators and referring to Adivasis as jungli (wild), forest dwellers, uncivilized,
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unclean, violent and indolent. Sayba simultaneously challenged all these constructions by
asserting an identity as a cultivator par excellence, assiduous laborer and model citizen.
Fair milk payments are shaped by identity, and Adivasis in Koli-dominated
villages may be defrauded of milk payment. But being Chauhan is no guarantee of fair
payments either. Lineages are internally differentiated and kin lacking mutuality with a
leader may not be protected by him. Fair milk payments are shaped not only by identity
but mutuality and reciprocity within the same lineage. The case of Chandra, Babu the
Gayatri disability group‘s record-keeper‘s sister-in-law is illustrative of this. Chandra was
added to Gayatri after the initial group was dissolved, secured a buffalo loan from
Shankar and started selling milk. Each milk-seller receives a passbook with a record of
outstanding loan, monthly interest incurred on the loan, and the milk-seller‘s repayment
to the dairy through milk-sale. While the secretary recorded all other sellers‘ payment in
their passbook, he retained Chandra‘s passbook and refused to update her payments on
some pretext or the other for over a year.
It may be that Shankar and the secretary were skimming Chandra‘s payments
because Shankar had not demanded cash for her buffalo-loan but felt that she should have
given him a commission. Perhaps the beneficiary of the skimmed funds was Babu,
Chandra‘s brother-in-law to whom Shankar was channeling Chandra‘s payments by way
of rewarding Babu for allowing Shankar‘s tractor-purchase with Gayatri‘s loan. Chandra
may have been vulnerable to being cheated because she is illiterate, her husband is a
migrant laborer away from the village for long spells, and the couple does not belong to
the Chauhan inner-circle. However, in retaliation, Chandra has stopped selling milk to the
society and now retains it for household consumption.
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Markets as Social and Political Entities
A major function of the panchayat is to facilitate economic activity and the
panchayat can allocate resources to create a village milk society, which shows how the
bureaucratic state and capitalist expansion are intertwined. When Shankar won his first
panchayat election in 1994, he allotted land and funds for building a milk collection
center, which enabled him to secure chairmanship of the milk society. Milk society
chairmanship is a high-stakes reward involving contestation among the most powerful
founding members of Himmatpur and Mahipura, including those with access to liftirrigation, contracting income and membership in larger credit cooperatives such as the
Bandibar Agricultural Credit Society. Committee members who can leverage resources
for the milk society from other bodies such as the panchayat, a credit society or a liftirrigation scheme are at an advantage in becoming the chairman.
In 2004, Veera, senior Patel leader, panchayat ward-member and Tree Growers‘
Cooperative chairman lobbied for the milk society‘s chairmanship. Shankar and Veera
had agreed that Shankar would support Veera‘s candidature for chairmanship in
exchange for Veera delivering him Patel votes in the 2002 panchayat election. Veera
delivered his section‘s votes and Shankar won the election. In 2003, Mahipura was
selected as a watershed development site, and with the intervention‘s resources at his
disposal, Shankar lobbied for milk society chairmanship in exchange for channeling
watershed development‘s monies and materials to Himmatpur and Mahipura‘s committee
members, even allotting a self-help group to Karam the milk society‘s secretary. The
committee switched its support from Veera to Shankar. Veera retaliated by shifting his
membership to neighboring village Pania‘s milk society and selling milk there. Other
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Patels followed suit to protest against their leader not being made chairman. In 2007, nine
Patels had lactating livestock but sold milk either to the Pania society, retained it for
consumption or shifted from cash-milk to cash-vegetable production. This made an even
bigger dent on the milk society because the Patels with abundant irrigation were bigger
milk suppliers than the Chauhans. Policy organizations‘ rhetoric of ‗linking producers
with markets‘ suggests an unmediated relationship between producers and markets. But
milk-supply is as much a political transaction as an economic one, and the act of
supplying milk is also an act of patronage to a particular society.
Shankar and Karam expected to meet the milk society‘s shortfall with buffaloloans for self-help group members. Livestock-loan beneficiaries comprised those who
had face-to-face contact and reciprocity with Shankar. Twelve households in Mahipura
sold milk in 2006-2007 and 10 of them sold loan-livestock‘s milk. Loan beneficiaries
include two Barias and 10 Chauhans including Shankar and his brother, and Babu and his
two brothers. Eleven of 12 milk-sellers in Mahipura share kin relations or hamlet-based
reciprocity with Shankar. Production and exchange for markets are implicated in
regulation which is a political process, and in the absence of regulation, reciprocity based
in the locality serves as a guarantee of fair milk payments.
Consider milk-livestock ownership among Chauhans, Barias and Patels, who have
the highest irrigation endowments and capacity for milk-production, delineated in Table
25. Sixty-nine per cent Chauhans, 57 per cent Patels and 57 per cent Barias own milk
livestock. However, loan-livestock were the first bovines for 6 out of 10 Chauhans, and if
these were excluded, Chauhan livestock ownership falls to 43 per cent, lower than the
Patels and Barias. Livestock-loans delivered by their sarpanch played a critical role in
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expanding Chauhan ownership, demonstrating how political capital continued to facilitate
the expansion of economic capital for the most powerful lineage in Mahipura.
Table 25 Owners and Non-owners of Milk-Livestock in the Largest Lineages
Lineage

Lineage

Milk-livestock
Milk livestock
Milk-livestock owners as
owners
non-owners
a proportion of the lineage
Patel
16
7
57%
Baria
28
13
57%
Chauhan
16
2
69%
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
The Chauhans, Barias and Patels have the largest proportion of surplus farmers
with adequate crop residue and abundant fodder to raise milk-livestock. Table 26
delineates the proportion of surplus producers according to lineage. Thirty five per cent
Chauhans and 61 per cent Patels are surplus-foodgrain producers. Seventeen per cent
Chauhans and 18 per cent Patels even sold maize in 2006-2007, and 13 per cent and 32
per cent respectively sold rice. Maize and rice are indigenous crops that generate more
leaves and longer stalks which are a rich source of fodder.
Table 26 Distribution of Surplus Foodgrain Producers According to Lineage
Lineage
Number of surplus producers
Proportion in the lineage
Chauhan
8
35%
Baria
12
24%
Patel
17
61%
Taaviad
2
14%
Labda
0
0%
Nayak
0
0%
Bhabhor
0
0%
Total
39
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
While surplus foodgrain production provides crop residue, cash-crop production
generates income for purchasing fodder from the market during a drought. Thirty-nine
per cent Chauhans sold either surplus foodgrains or cash-crops including wheat, lentils,
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castor, mustard, yellow gram, flat gram, white gram, bitter gourd, flat beans, onions,
seedlings and sunflowers in 2006-2007, as did 36 per cent Patels.
Despite the Patels‘ higher perennial-well ownership than the Chauhans, higher
foodgrain surplus and similar agricultural-market participation, none of the Patels sell
milk to the Himmatpur milk society. This is despite the Patels owning the highest
proportion of calves in Mahipura (61 per cent households) and a high proportion of
lactating livestock (35 per cent households). Table 27 outlines the distribution of calves
across lineages.
Table 27 Distribution of Calves According to Lineage
Lineage

Number of calves

Households owning calves

Chauhan
25
14
Baria
35
24
Patel
29
17
Taaviad
10
5
Labda
3
3
Nayak
1
1
Bhabhor
0
0
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007

Calf-owners as a
proportion of lineage
61%
49%
61%
36%
75%
33%
0%

Patel discontinuation of milk supply coincides with Veera boycotting the society,
and constitutes both a form of exit to sanction the society‘s committee and because the
Patels believe that their interests will no longer be protected because of their inability to
monitor the secretary. The Patels switched from cash-milk to cash-vegetable production.
Thirty-nine per cent of Patels sold cash-vegetables in 2006-2007 to the Wednesday
vegetable market at Morwa. Cash-vegetable production across lineages, delineated in
Table 28 reveals a reversal of Chauhan and Patel market strategies- the Patels were the
largest cash-vegetable producers while the Chauhans were the smallest.
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Table 28 Distribution of Cash-Vegetable Producers According to Lineage
Lineage
Number of cash-vegetable producers
Proportion in the lineage
Chauhan
2
9%
Baria
12
24%
Patel
11
39%
Taaviad
2
14%
Labda
0
0%
Nayak
0
0%
Bhabhor
0
0%
Total
27
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
My attempt through this account is to show that (commodity) markets are political
phenomena as much as economic ones and are structured through politics. Commodity
milk production is mediated by issues of local regulation which is influenced by those
who govern the milk society and panchayat. Control over milk societies and panchayats
is shaped by economic wealth, caste-tribe status, lineage identity and political networks.
Milk-sellers from Mahipura are either Chauhans or Barias proximate to Shankar whose
interests he protects, or medium- and large milk-sellers who brandish economic power
over the society and are not only guaranteed fair payments but also a bonus for elevated
milk-sale. Cash vegetable production by the Patels is an equally political response to the
closing of avenues for milk-production, and both cash-milk and cash-vegetable
production are constituted by place-based politics. Both participation in and withdrawal
from exchange are political acts. While markets are considered to be organized between
impersonal buyers and sellers, all markets are in fact shaped by social and political
relationships.

192

The Bureaucratic State, High-Value Commodity Production and Markets
Livestock-loans enable dairies to incorporate marginal households into cash-milk
production. The state links dairies to rural households who have the land, water and
commons to raise livestock. But the state‘s role in commoditization is not new and
represents a continuation of the state‘s attempt to extract surpluses from the drylands by
extending credit for irrigation, livestock, fertilizer, seeds and motors through agricultural
credit societies (Ebrahim, 2000) and cooperative dairies (George, 1990, 1995). In 1962,
the Government of Gujarat‘s Cooperative Department boasted 14,596 cooperative
societies with a membership of 2.2 million farmers and a working capital of 1.75 billion
rupees (GOG, 1965). Agricultural societies numbering 7,728 were considered the most
important kind of society and formed 51.67 per cent of all societies (GOG, 1965).
Commodity milk-production through watershed development represents
continuity of the state‘s attempt to extract agrarian surplus and consumption goods for
urban constituencies through watershed development. What is new is the extension of the
economic frontier from perennial well-owners to marginal producers, representing the
movement of capital into frontier credit categories.
Table 29 illustrates the distribution of advantageous characteristics for cash-milk
sale among milk-sellers in Mahipura. All milk-sellers have winter or perennial wells
which generates crop residue. Seven out of 12 households have sufficient household
labor to care for livestock. 11 out of 12 households have a perennial supply of fodder
which contributes to high milk volumes and ensures that these families do not have to
purchase fodder from the market. Seventy five per cent milk-sellers share the same
lineage as the milk society‘s chairman (Chauhan), 91 per cent live in proximity with him,
193

all have access to irrigation, 75 per cent have small children and 91 per cent have access
to fodder.
Table 29 Characteristics of Milk-Selling Households
Chauhan Proximity to Irrigation Presence of small Availability of
lineage
sarpanch
access
children in family family labor
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
*
X
X
X*
X
X
X
X
Note: * Indicate milk sellers who sold self-owned livestock‘s milk
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007

Fodder
availability
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Inputs of Milk Production
Milk production requires fodder, feed, water, labor, veterinary services and
insemination. Large and small milk-sellers‘ cost of milk production diverges, a
phenomenon well-documented in scholarship on smallholder milk-production worldwide,
and their rewards from participation in milk production are asymmetric. Consider the
differences in expenses on inputs.
Fodder. Fodder includes green fodder comprising grass from fields and field
boundaries, grazing lands and forests; dry fodder comprising crop residue (stalks and
husk) and nutrients such as cottonseed and oilseeds cakes, which are cakes made by
pressing the residue from oil extraction from seeds. Perennial well-owners own better
land, cultivate in all the plots of land that they own rather than being forced to restrict

194

sowing to one or two plots due to lack of water, produce surplus foodgrains and have the
greatest reserves of crop residue. Perennial well-owners can even grow a summer fodder
crop of bajra (barley) when crop-residue is exhausted and may not need to graze
livestock. The ownership of milk-livestock is strongly associated with access to
irrigation, as Table 30 illustrates. While only 33.3 per cent of non-well owners have milkbovines, 57.2 percent of summer-well owners, 74.1 per cent of winter-well owners, and
80.8 per cent of perennial well-owners have milk-bovines.
Table 30 Ownership of Milk-Bovines According to Well-Categories
Well category

No milkbovines

One milkbovine

Two or more
milk-bovines

No wells
6
3
0
Summer wells
3
4
0
Winter-wells
7
8
12
Perennial wells
15
31
32
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007

Milk bovine owners
as a per cent of their
well-category
33.3
57.2
74.1
80.8

Winter-well-owners supplement crop residue with fodder from the fields and
expend more labor than perennial well-owners in squatting in fields and cutting fodder
with a sickle. Dryland cultivators sow subsistence crops‘ seeds densely in chaumaso and
shiyaalo and periodically ‗weed‘ surplus shoots and feed them as green fodder. This
increases water, nutrient and sunlight for the remaining stalks and provides green fodder
for livestock. Field fodder can provide up to two months of fodder.
While winter-well-owners expend more labor than perennial well-owners to
harvest this source of fodder, summer-well-owners and non-well-owners who cultivate
only in monsoon do not harvest stalks for fodder and instead conserve them for
foodgrains, and obtain fodder solely from the commons. Summer well-owners and non
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well-owners expend more energy on fodder collection than winter well-owners. Grazing
entails three to six hours of labor every day, and much of grazed livestock‘s energy is
dissipated in the grazing process itself.
Feed. Medium and large farmers in irrigated districts supplement fodder with
oilseed cakes which are a by-product of their large agricultural operations, but dryland
farmers typically do not supply this food. The dairy manufactures and sells urea-molasses
crystals which increase the metabolism rate, and wealthier milk-sellers in Mahipura
purchase urea-molasses and feed it to lactating livestock. Urea-molasses increases milk‘s
fat-content and wealthier milk sellers typically earn 1-3 rupees more per liter of milk than
those who do not feed supplements. Shankar and Kamla are the only milk-sellers to
receive 12-13 rupees per liter for milk because both feed their buffaloes urea-molasses.
Table 31 indicates the range and distribution of the price received by milk-sellers.
Table 31 Distribution of Per-Liter Price to Milk-Sellers
Price per liter

Number of
Percent of total
households
milk-sellers
10
4
40
11
4
40
12
1
10
13
1
10
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
Labor. Bovine livestock‘s care involves milking, cleaning sheds every morning,
watering and grazing livestock, gathering fodder by squatting for hours and cutting grass
with a sickle, milking livestock and taking milk to the collection center in the morning
and evening. Livestock management involves four to seven hours of labor each day and
is predominantly women‘s work.
Water. Livestock also have to be watered each day. The cost of watering is lower
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for perennial well owners who can draw water from a homestead well and higher for
those who have to fetch water from a handpump and carry pots on their head to empty
water into troughs. Perennial well-owners also cool off their livestock in summer by
splashing water from a homestead well or handpump.
Insemination. Insemination is provided both by the dairy and private bull owners
and ranges from 250-300 rupees, and involves paying for the service of a breeding bull,
its transportation and the handler‘s fee. Households prioritize the ownership of oxen for
plowing, and those who purchase milk-cows from the market can inseminate their cow
with their plowing bull. However, the dairy delivers buffaloes which must be serviced by
a water-buffalo, and a milk-seller must pay an insemination fee.
Returns from Milk Production
The returns from milk production include cash-income, milk for consumption
including colostrum and raw milk for children, and milk for tea and yogurt; the
acquisition of a female bovine and calf for herd expansion, and manure. Per-seller milksale in Mahipura ranges from 1.5 to 20 liters as illustrated in Table 24, and the mean
daily sale per household is 2.07 liters. Shankar has five lactating buffaloes and supplies
20 liters of milk per day, constituting 67 per cent of Mahipura‘s supply. The dairy
rewards larger suppliers with an annual bonus because they keep the dairy viable during
summer. The price paid to milk sellers ranges from 10 to 13 rupees per liter depending on
fodder quantity and supplemental feed. Table 31 illustrates that most milk-sellers earn
10-11 rupees because they rely only on dry fodder and occasional green fodder.
For all new sellers in 2006-2007, a motivating factor for taking a livestock-loan
was the desire for milk for children. Seventy per cent of new milk producers have small
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children ranging from three months to 11 years in age, and livestock are purchased at the
lactation stage, providing milk as soon as a livestock is brought home. In the food-scarce
drylands, milk is a significant dietary supplement which prevents infant and child
malnutrition. One by-product of milk-production is a calf which creates livestock
endowments for meeting future expenses on education, setting up a trade, or giving a
wedding gift. Livestock enable household- and social-reproduction. For 33 per cent of
households supplying milk in 2006-2007, the loan buffalo was their first milk livestock,
enabling herd expansion.
Consumption, social reproduction and accumulation are major motives for
households to take livestock loans. Livestock-loans enable meeting immediate desires
and future aspirations. This suggests the limitations of considering commodity producers
simply as producer-subjects and considering them as consumers as well, moving beyond
conceptions of identities as uncomplicated and singular (Ramamurthy, 2003).
Technologies for Securing Continuous Milk Supply
Eighteen families in Mahipura produced milk in 2006-2007 but only 12 sold milk.
There are no intra-village milk sales but people gift surplus milk to kin with infants. Five
of six households with lactating livestock who do not to sell milk emphasize that their
livestock are not loan-livestock; therefore they are under no compulsion to sell milk. The
binding nature of the contract leads people to see selling milk through loan-livestock as a
compulsion, and people stop selling milk once their loan is paid.
Livestock loans enable the dairy to guarantee continuous milk supply in the face
of milk-producers‘ competing uses for milk; competing sources of income (from
migration and cash-vegetable production); and the competing uses of household labor
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between milk-production and other activities. Large-scale mechanized plants like the
Panchmahal dairy which has a processing capacity of 400,000 liters require high
procurement levels to cover operation costs. To guarantee milk supply, the dairy extends
livestock-loans to households with a 25 per cent subsidy to Kolis and 30 per cent subsidy
to Adivasis. Borrowers repay their loan through milk-sale, and the loan is in fact the
production contract between the dairy and milk-seller.
The average price of a buffalo which is sold with its calf is 18,600 rupees and a 25
per cent subsidy for Kolis reduces the cost to approximately 14,000 rupees. A buffalo has
a 12-month lactation period which is followed by an inter-calving (‗dry‘ or non-lactating)
period of 15 months when interest accrues on the loan because no milk can be sold then.
A buffalo‘s life-cycle is 10-11 years. Buffaloes reach reproductive age at 2.5 years and
their reproductive life is 7-8 years or five to six calvings. The Panchmahal dairy‘s loan‘s
interest rate is 2 per cent per month compounded monthly.
Producers with just one milk-livestock represent 80 per cent of Mahipura‘s
producers. These sellers produce four liters of milk a day and sell two liters per day to the
dairy. Assuming that the dairy pays 12 rupees per liter for a fat proportion of 5.9 per cent,
these milk-sellers earn a total of 2*12*30=720 rupees each month. During the first
lactation cycle of 12 months, a milk-seller repays 5,990 rupees and owes the dairy 8,190
rupees. The buffalo then runs dry, interest accrues for 15 and the outstanding loan
increases from 8,190 rupees to 11,119 rupees, as delineated in Appendix F. Assuming
that a household gets the buffalo inseminated gratis, the loan-taker starts earning net
income only from month 64 onwards, five years after the buffalo was purchased, and
close to the end of the buffalo‘s reproductive life (see Appendix F). Calvings produce
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buffalo-calves which themselves reach reproductive age in 2-3 years and can produce
milk, but this is fraught with uncertainty because it is contingent on the birth of a female
calf. The compulsion to repay the loan induces frequent pregnancies that milk sellers may
not carry out otherwise due to fodder shortage.
The dairy‘s loan is a financial technology that alters milk producers‘ behaviors
towards livestock. To repay a loan, a single-buffalo owner must have three calvings and
space them just 1.25 years apart. While poorer milk-sellers might gift calves to kin and
even earn income through a calf sale, poorer milk-sellers face poor prices as single sellers
in local markets. Table 32 illustrates the average duration for which each milk seller sold
milk, which shapes total earnings and time taken to repay the loan. Most milk-sellers sell
milk for only eight months of the year.
Table 32 Distribution of Milk Sale Duration in Months
Number of months for which Number of
Percent of total
milk was sold in the year
households
households in Mahipura
6
2
1.64
7
1
0.82
8
7
5.74
12
2
1.64
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
Buffalo sellers are milk-sellers themselves and sell buffaloes after one, two and
even three calvings, and a buffalo‘s age is not always possible to detect during purchase
(BankofIndia, n.d.). In case a buffalo has had three calvings, the buffalo may become
permanently dry by the time a borrower repays her loan. The case of the Baria couple
Samjhu and Mohan is illustrative of this. Samjhu and Mohan‘s buffalo delivered a little
over two liters of milk a day rather than the average of four, leaving less than half a liter
for household consumption, suggesting that they were sold a buffalo which had had
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multiple calvings. Mohan and Samjhu are in their early forties and have 1.27 hectares of
land, a plowing bull, diesel motor and winter well. Mohan discontinued wage migration
in 2004 because chances of accidents in construction work increase with age. Since his
income stream from migration has exhausted, Mohan seeks cash income from
agriculture. Mohan and Samjhu cultivated cash-vegetables in winter in 2007 but were
short on funds to deepen their winter-well. As spring progressed without well-deepening,
the plants and the couple‘s hope of cash income withered. The couple now desperately
sought milk-income, but was worried about whether the buffalo would yield milk for
even two more calvings to repay the loan.
Contract milk production signifies double commodification of both milk-livestock
and milk. The loan is a legal-financial instrument that treats a buffalo as an input
commodity to be spent and dissipated. The loan embodies commodification and
alienability- the capacity of the buffalo to be legally separated from the farmer wherein
the farmer has no control over impregnation, longevity and the decision to withdraw from
milk sale. The loan, interest rate and price of milk together induce milk production
through strenuous, continuous pregnancies. For dryland households, livestock have
practical, cultural and aesthetic value as security, collateral, prestige, social standing,
endowment and gift, and not solely as inputs for milk production.
The commodity status of buffaloes is ‗not intrinsic but assigned‘ (Castree, 2003).
The loan also shapes milk-sellers‘ actions towards milk-livestock by inducing the feeding
of urea-molasses which farmers do not feed self-owned livestock. The dairy
manufactures and sells urea molasses‘ granules which comprise urea, molasses, proteins,
minerals and gelling agents. The feed‘s main ingredient is urea which speeds up
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fermentation in the buffalo‘s digestive tract, resulting in efficient utilization of fodder and
rapid calf-maturity. Urea-molasses reduce the inter-calving period and produce mature
calves, desirable traits for dairies.
However, these physical traits signify extensive alteration of livestock‘s bodies.
Farmers consider the heat of the urea to generate the same heat that farmers say fertilizer
generates in land. I used to borrow a pint of milk for tea occasionally from Kamla, who
had been a member of the Saraswati micro-credit group and had paid Shankar a 1,000
rupee bribe for her buffalo. I was surprised one morning to find Kamla‘s buffalo licking
mineral granules from a metal pan in the cowshed, with Kamla watching dismayed. The
buffalo was licking the dairy-manufactured urea molasses mineral granules, the cost of
which is deducted from milk payments. Kamla was visibly upset about feeding her
buffalo urea-molasses in which the heat of the urea generates the same heat that farmers
say fertilizer generates in land.
According to Ramabhai Chauhan, fertilizer makes the land ‗taught‘ like iron and
‗strains‘ it like a fevered body, transposing the human qualities of body heat, rigidity, illhealth and strain onto land, constructing land as a live entity. Ramabhai revealed that soft
and yielding land is critical for a good harvest so that roots can breathe, but while
fertilizer generates heat that speeds up biochemical processes to increase plant growth, it
has an adverse physical impact on land, altering its texture and reducing its suppleness.
Cultivators transpose the effects of urea on land to cattle because they know what
fertilizer does to the human body. Cultivators handle fertilizer and it is hot and corrosive
to the touch. Cultivators resist fertilizer because it damages soil and enters their bodies
through the food chain. Despite the trace amounts of fertilizer applied to rainfed maize,
202

people wait for rain to wash the fertilizer off maize saplings before feeding them even to
livestock as green fodder. Land on which subsistence food is grown is fed only trace
amounts of fertilizer to preserve soil quality and minimize fertilizer ingestion.
Peasants in Dahod take pride in the small amounts of fertilizer they use relative to
farmers in agrarian districts, and some assert that they do not eat fertilizer-grown food
because it makes them ill. Cash-crop farmers who grow vegetables for both home
consumption and market production grow both types in separate plots, fertilizing the
commercial plot and leaving the subsistence plot uncontaminated.
Milk producers articulate the same heating and damaging qualities of fertilizer in
urea-molasses which contain urea, a fertilizer ingredient. Urea-molasses transform the
bodily rhythm of cattle and seasonal time of calving into the daily time of the dairy‘s
plant. While the milk-producer is supposed to be detached from the buffalo and not feel
the heat, discomfort and biological alteration induced by urea-molasses, detachment is a
fiction of economics that is no really achieved in real-world production (Holm, 2007).
Artificial inputs that generate body states in bovines produce emotions of discomfort,
repugnance and loss of control in humans (see Jalais, 2010; Mullin, 1999; Noske, 1997
for nuanced accounts of human-animal relationships). Milk sellers do not experience
complete ownership of their livestock until their loan is repaid; they discontinue feeding
urea-molasses, and impregnate their cattle beyond purposes of loan repayment. Though
subsidized livestock-loans enable less well-off households to build their livestock
portfolios, the terms of loans are shaped by asymmetries in the ability to design loan
contracts between the dairy and milk-sellers.
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Milk-Sale Pattern in Mahipura
Income from milk sale in Mahipura ranges from 4,800 to 28,800 rupees, as
described in Table 33, and reflects higher returns for wealthier sellers for higher fat-value
and higher quantity of milk. In a region of depressed wages and lack of employment,
income from milk sale provides a significant proportion of income to milk sellers. The
field-labor wage in Dahod is 30 rupees a day, 60 per cent less than the official minimum
wage of 77 rupees per day. A minimal milk-income of 20 rupees per day at the rate of 2
liters per day sold at 10 rupees per liter produces 66 per cent of the daily income from
agricultural labor. But unlike field-labor employment which is available for no more than
nine days of the year on average in Mahipura, milk production provided guaranteed
income over six months or more. Milk income ranges from 12.5 to 93 per cent of total
income of milk-sellers, with its average contribution being 26 per cent. The next section
explores how milk income is shaped by the political economy of pricing.
Table 33 Distribution of Annual Earnings from Milk Sale
Rupees

Number of
Percent of total
households
milk-sellers
4,800
2
20
5,280
1
10
5,400
2
20
6,000
1
10
7,200
1
10
7,920
1
10
8,085
1
10
9,360
1
10
11,880
1
10
28,800
1
10
Source: Household surveys conducted by the author in 2007
Market Structure and the Determination of Value
Dairies are monopsonistic milk-buyers. As a monopoly buyer of perishable raw
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milk from remote communities, the dairy has disproportionate power in shaping the price
paid to milk-sellers. The cooperative dairy industry sets milk prices and shapes milksellers‘ returns from milk-sale. Dairies set the milk price to be paid to farmers by
estimating the cost of milk production (Shah, 1987a). The National Dairy Development
Board sets milk price for the cooperative dairy sector. The Board‘s website proclaims that
it was founded ‗to replace exploitation with empowerment, tradition with modernity,
stagnation with growth, and transforming dairying into an instrument for the development
of India's rural people‘. Likewise, the Panchmahal dairy‘s annual report states that it
provides ‗rural employment‘ (PDCMPUL, 2007); both articulating lofty goals of
economic and social uplift.
However, the prices set by the cooperative dairy sector are shaped by relations of
class and geography, and crafted through metropolitan assumptions about rural labor and
the value of inputs such as fodder and water. Researchers on the dairy industry in Gujarat
declare that small farmers ‗have neither the knowledge nor the appreciation of the
concept of cost of production‘, (Bardhan & Huria, 1987), therefore ‗whatever price the
producer gets for the milk is an addition to… income‘ (Bardhan & Huria, 1987). This
claim denies that small farmers have keen appreciation for production costs because they
are integrated in labor, input, land, education, livestock, capital, house-building and
foodgrain markets.
Postcolonial development policy is marked by unequal terms of trade between
agriculture and industry such that one unit of an agricultural commodity secures less than
one unit of a commodity produced outside the agricultural sector. This is a fundamental
strategy of development planning to finance industrialization, with antecedents in
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Rostow‘s (1960) model of economic development. This model equates development with
industrialization and emphasizes economic development through initial investment in the
industrial sector by drawing resources from agriculture. Skewed terms of trade between
agriculture and industry mean that while the price farmers received for maize was 9
rupees a kilo in June 2007 in Dahod, the price they paid for a liter of diesel was 26
rupees, three times the price of a unit of maize. A 25 kilo bag of DAP fertilizer costs 490
rupees, entailing the sale of 54 kilos of maize, i.e. a price ratio of 2:1 per unit of fertilizer
and maize. A kilogram of tea that rural households purchase from the market costs 240
rupees and denotes a price ratio of 27:1 between tea and maize. ‗We do the business of
selling grains cheaper than we buy them,‘ sums up cultivators‘ dilemma of receiving
depressed prices as agricultural sellers and steep prices as commodity buyers. As grain
sellers in perfect competition markets, small-scale producers receive low prices, but as
food consumers, they have to buy the same grains- unprocessed- from shopkeepers at 2575 per cent higher prices.
As a result of the industrial bias of development policy, the prices of industrial
commodities rise faster than the prices of agricultural commodities. The inputs of milk
production including feed and diesel for irrigating fodder crops rise faster than milk. In
its study of livestock-loans for poor milk-sellers in the 1980s, the Bank of India found
that while the price of commercial feed rose from 56 rupees per bag in 1978 to 72 rupees
per bag in 1980, an increase of 28 per cent; the average price of milk rose from 1.75
rupees to 2 rupees, a rise of only16 per cent, leading to a 12 per cent erosion in the
income from milk (BankofIndia, n.d.).
Dairy technocrats systematically discount the costs of labor, fodder and water in
206

estimating the cost of milk production. Dairy researchers label crop residue ‗waste‘ and
assign it zero price (e.g. Shah, 1987b) though it has opportunity cost for mulching and
manure. For most milk producers, crop residue is available for only a few months after
which fodder must be cut from fields and grazing lands. Technocrats, policymakers and
government officials assume fodder to be ‗freely‘ available while fodder has to be
harvested through manual labor by squatting in fields or grazing lands for two-three
hours each day.
Researchers in Gujarat as well as international donors such as the World Bank
which funded the dairy sector in the 1970s describe rural labor as ‗flexible‘,
‗unemployed‘, ‗highly underemployed‘ (see Shah, 1987b) and ‗at home all day‘ (Candler
& Kumar, 1998), ignoring that people recorded as ‗unemployed‘ in censuses because of
lack of opportunities for formal employment in fact migrate to cities to earn a living
wage, and those who stay behind who are largely women, bear disproportionately large
burdens of tending to fields, livestock, subsistence, children, families and social
relationships and are neither ‗flexible‘ in terms of time-allocation nor ‗unemployed‘
(Agarwal, 1985, 1989), except that their work is not accounted for by policymakers and
national accounting systems (Waring, 1988). Researchers construe village labor as ‗low
cost labor‘ (Candler & Kumar, 1998), discounting policy-led disparities in urban and
rural wages to sustain industrialization through cheap supply of agricultural raw materials
based on depressed rural wages (Chakravarty, 1987; Frankel, 1978; Kohli, 1994;
Varshney, 1995).
The cooperative dairy sector defines which objects involved in milk production
should be considered ‗inputs‘- manufactured feed and insemination services which
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dairies themselves sell; and which should be considered ‗free gifts‘- fodder, water and
labor. Constructing fodder as a ‗free‘ resource is a discursive cut that erases women‘s
labor in gathering fodder (e.g. Gururani, 2002; Sarin, 2001). What counts as an input is a
matter of ontological invention (Castree, 2003). Milk production is nested in the social
practice of grazing and fodder-gathering and domestic acts of cow-shed cleaning and
watering, without which livestock will fall sick and die. The economy relies on labor
considered to lie outside the economic sphere but which is crucial for the maintenance of
the economy (Polanyi, 1957).
Milk pricing relies on discounting the value of labor. Technocrats have little
comprehension of the daily strain of livestock care, grazing and gathering fodder. Where
there is some knowledge that livestock management is largely women‘s work,
technocrats discount women‘s labor. Fetching water is exclusively girls‘ and women‘s
task and men perform it only when norms of pollution dictate that women not touch
water utensils during menstruation. Women also perform the time-consuming, tedious
and strenuous task of cleaning cow sheds by squatting on the ground every morning and
scooping manure by hand out of pits made in the ground by hooves throughout the shed.
Men milk cattle occasionally and take livestock grazing but never clean the shed or
harvest fodder.
Dairies‘ price-setting policies are shaped by gender, geography and class. Dairies
systematically discount the cost of both labor and fodder in milk-production and can
impose this because they are monopsonistic buyers in remote villages. Private milk
traders lack the infrastructure to gather milk from remote producers and operate only in
villages in cities‘ and towns‘ vicinity where they pay milk-sellers much higher prices
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ranging from 13 to 16 rupees per liter.
Accounts of the contract in institutional economics propose that contracts are
struck between symmetrical parties that command equal power in designing a contract
(Cheung, 1970; Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1967). But in conditions of asymmetrical
bargaining power between monopsonies such as state-owned dairies that purchase raw
milk and remote milk-producers, contracts are better understood as embodying the
‗relative bargaining power‘ (Knight, 1992) of the actors entering into a contract.
With the market-centrism of rural development policy, the relationship between
markets and development is of a particular oligopolistic form of the market as the
pathway to development rather than development enabling participation in markets. The
demands of agricultural markets driven by large-scale firms‘ priorities of value creation
vest disproportionate power in shaping market structure, input prices and output prices
within oligopolistic firms that are not subjected to the same equalizing forces as
competitive markets.
Attempts to integrate the poor with capital in the drylands for high-value
commodity production, such as through the extension of livestock loans through microcredit are premised on the assumption that the poor can be mobilized in entrepreneurial
undertakings if they receive credit. But commodity production requires combining loans
with other kinds of capital. Following critique that watershed development ignores the
needs of landless households and the poor because its interventions are private-landbased (Kerr, 2002; Kerr, Milne, Chhotray, Baumann, & James, 2007), the introduction of
large-scale dairying offers an ideological counter-argument by virtue of its supposed
land-neutrality. Dairy policymakers argue that milk production can be performed by the
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poor and rich alike because it requires only water and fodder and not land, and water and
fodder are communal resources. However, milk production is cheaper for perennial well
owners who cultivate in three agricultural seasons and produce abundant crop residue
which provides fodder. In the absence of irrigation, loan-livestock do not generate an
income-stream.
Consider Manju‘s case, who is one of the least well-off in Mahipura. Manju and
her husband Sabur carefully built patron-client relations with Shankar and Bordi‘s older
Patel leader Veera to access government schemes for those in absolute poverty. Both
Manju and her daughter-in-law joined Veera, the senior Patel leader‘s self-help group.
But Manju‘s daughter-in-law withdrew her money because she could not afford to make
the monthly payments. Manju is still a part of the group and makes monthly deposits,
faintly confused by why the powerful Indian state needs her to give it money to be able to
give her a loan, but tickled by this reversal between the benefactor and receiver in her
relationship with the state, and carefully making monthly payments.
I met Manju in her courtyard one morning, aesthetically bordered with a neckhigh wall of thatched grass and bamboo. Manju‘s single-room shelter‘s roof had caved in
during the rains and she was preoccupied with getting emergency government assistance
to rebuild it. Manju has an infertile upland plot, no well, subsists below the poverty line
and is forced to buy foodgrains from the market because government rations for the poor
have been periodically whittled down since the adoption of liberalization policies in 1990
and no longer meet household needs of the poor (Cheriyan, 2006; Patnaik, 2004). The
poor now either purchase foodgrains from increasingly volatile markets or starve. During
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the last week of each month, Manju buys maize or rice, whichever is cheaper from
Himmatpur‘s shopkeeper, sometimes by borrowing money.
The one symbol of sustenance in her house that morning was chicks running
around the courtyard, which I assumed she raised to eat. Manju mentioned earning 400
rupees from selling chicken in Diwali; the equivalent of two weeks‘ field-labor wages. I
queried why she did not eat chicken herself because she obviously faced a food shortage.
Manju said, ‗How can we eat them when we raised them?‘ It struck me as odd that Manju
said that livestock one raised could not be eaten despite having considerable need for
food. After all, all of the family‘s assets could be taken in with one glance and the only
other enumerable asset was a buffalo calf.
I noted the calf and the absence of its mother, and asked if Manju had any
lactating buffaloes. Manju replied with restraint, ‗We don‘t have a buffalo because we
can‘t feed it. It‘s a moral crime to get a buffalo if you can‘t feed it (paap laage).‘ Manju
told me weeks later that she had got a buffalo through a livestock-loan from the milk
society. Recall that her husband Sabur is a nominal member of the milk-society
committee. But the buffalo died. It was implicit that the buffalo had died of starvation.
Manju‘s denial of eating chicken one had raised and injunctions against getting a buffalo
if you could not feed it appeared to append atonement for the death of her animal.
Manju‘s refusal to get another buffalo because of the inability to feed it has a
parallel in other households‘ attitude to watershed development‘s subsidized commercial
seed kits. Commercial seeds require timely applications of water two to four times in a
crop-cycle, which non-well owners and summer-well owners cannot afford because each
water turn costs 100-150 rupees. Despite a 50 per cent saving on a seed kit worth 500
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rupees, households lacking winter- and perennial wells refused to purchase subsidized
commercial seed kits because their seeds would not bear grain. High-value commodity
production, including milk-production is irrigation-intensive and can only be undertaken
by the wealthiest households who have access to capital and irrigation.
Advocates of contract production cast it in the language of entrepreneurialism
(Braun & Kennedy, 1994) which suggests that high-value commodity producers can
command advantageous prices for their produce. This is not the case because
monopsonistic firms- both state-owned and private- dictate price and commodity
producers are price-takers. Commodity production as a development strategy is a technofix that takes political questions such as land distribution, irrigation, food policy, state
investment in human capabilities, market structures and the terms of trade between
agriculture and industry out of scrutiny.
In a period of neoliberalizing development policy, dryland households are
expected to engage with high-value commodity markets, change their ‗mindset‘
(mantavya) (GOG, 2007), and be risk-taking and responsive to signals from particular
forms of the market that generate monetary value. Commodity production is not only an
economic process but also political and social, and markets cannot be disembedded from
the social contexts in which they are embedded. What value is generated, and what
inputs, erasures, and acts of de-valuing go into making one type of commodity
complicate high-value commodity production as a development strategy. Commodity
production is a political process shaped by relations of power between wealthier and less
well-off households in the drylands because of firms‘ reliance on local institutions to
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procure produce, between the drylands and metropolises and between enterprises and
producers.
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7. Conclusion: The Mangle of Market-Driven Development and Democratic Politics
This dissertation explored the implementation of market-driven development in
the form of watershed development in the drylands through elected local bodies. In the
wake of almost two decades of democratic decentralization, the study explored the way in
which political brokerage, collective action, and spillover effects of struggles over natural
resources influence the cartography of market-driven development. Watershed
development is a form of institutional change to bring into being productive subjects and
high-value commodity production in rainfed areas. On the basis of ethnography in Dahod
district, dryland western India, I explored how social and economic change unfolds in the
context of market expansion and the entrenchment of democratic decentralization in an
era of ‗late‘ capitalism.
Insights on the Neoliberalization of the State
Development policy implementation is inherently political because it reorders
social relations, economic production and control over natural resources. In-built
distributional rules in a neoliberalizing development policy for the drylands around the
world interact with inequalities inscribed in local institutions to create a deeply uneven
distribution of watershed development. Watershed development embodies ‗the
intertwined nature of capitalism, industrialization and the bureaucratic nation-state‘
(Friedland & Boden, 1994). Market-led development is implemented through a process
of state regulation and deeper rather than lesser involvement of the state in the drylands.
The state itself is the site and actor of neoliberal development, as the neoliberalization of
state-owned enterprises and banks demonstrates (e.g. Rudnyckyj, 2008). While private
banks and commodity firms operate in urban geographies in which they secure an
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adequate rate of return, state-owned banks and commodity enterprises operate in
marginal geographies, earning a lower rate of return but advantaged by a web of support
agencies in remote regions to achieve the same goals of economic growth and revenue
maximization. The state has built synergies between government agencies in semi-arid
areas and the cooperative dairy sector and nationalized banks to expand state-owned
enterprises‘ operations. Neoliberal development involves the mutation of boundaries
between the state‘s functions of governance and profit maximization, with the District
Rural Development Agency playing a pivotal in linking households to both state-owned
commodity firms and nationalized banks. Watershed development is also emblematic of
the state‘s role as the handmaiden of an oligopolistic form of the market since
neoliberalization, distinct from policy emphasis on competition in the liberalization era of
the 1990s.
The Relationship of Democratic Politics to Neoliberal Policy
The dissertation‘s findings testify that market-driven development in the drylands
is a state-regulated process and relies on political society for implementation. Markets
and democracy are intertwined, and democratic institutions are critical instruments of
fashioning and legitimizing market-driven development because they secure procedural
justice and are conduits of patronage politics. During a period of growing inequality,
development is thoroughly implicated in democratic politics given the state‘s and
political parties‘ imperative to establish legitimacy, largely through the delivery of
privatized and expensive capital to leaders.
With the entrenchment of grassroots democratization including the creation of
new levels of political representation at the district, block and locality; village panchayat215

, block panchayat- and district panchayat-leaders are new loci for political parties to
channel patronage. The lowest level elected local bodies are sites of intense political
competition in the drylands, and political competition in the locality intersects with
political competition among national parties to channel development patronage to
panchayat leaders, the lowest-level political society actors in India.
Elected leaders governed by the priorities of broad-based development in
resource-poor communities implement an intervention that threatens to deepen inequality
by distributing development differentially. Sarpanches deliver just as much development
to a particular voter as the voter‘s reserve price for delivering her vote. Sarpanches may
deliver no resources to groups in a permanent minority, token benefits to those most
dependent on them, and the largest benefits to groups that are both numerically power
and economically wealthy, and least dependent on the outcomes of bargaining outcomes
with elected leaders.
Democratic decentralization is considered an instrument of pro-poor development
by most scholarship in the field, the argument being that electoral politics lead to elected
leaders undertaking broad-based development. Nonetheless, Mahipura‘s case shows that
democracy broadens development in limited ways. Electoral democracy builds but one
kind of political capacity, that of suffrage, but may not bring about any significant
distributional shift in favor of subordinate groups if these groups lack resources for
collective action and if they are subjected to social discrimination. Democratic
decentralization may in fact have little impact on distributional equity.
While panchayats are thought of as republics comprising citizens and their elected
representatives bound by a contract, the boundary between the state and society is porous
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and panchayat leaders and voters bear social identities, which shapes their relations. This
calls for rethinking the practice of democratic decentralization and understanding
panchayats not as neutral entities but as bodies that are constituted by caste, tribe, gender
and capital.
Neoliberalism and its Legitimation
Deepening inequality through neoliberal interventions such as watershed
development in the drylands which are inhabited by the vast majority of India‘s
predominant voters who are poor may be sustained by the simultaneous expansion of
rural welfare programs and social services, which are deliberate ‗exceptions to
neoliberalism‘ (Ong, 2006). Partha Chatterjee‘s (2008) claim that the rise in state welfare
programs after liberalization in India is a result of liberalization immiserating the vast
majority of people is suggestive in this regard, and true for many other parts of the world.
Examples of the expansion of welfare programs include the radical four-fold
increase in disability pensions in rural Andhra Pradesh in the 2000s and the National
Rural Employment Guarantee Act. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is
emblematic of a deep commitment on the state‘s part to guarantee wage employment to
rural households in the wake of an agricultural crisis precipitated by the withdrawal of
state investment in agriculture, the squeezing of agricultural credit throughout the 1990s,
the withdrawal of state investment in irrigation; and exposing medium, small and
marginal farmers to volatile markets. The phenomenal growth of the urban, professional,
service and financial sectors of the economy and ever-greater commoditization,
privatization and resource extraction contribute to a remarkable growth rate in the 2000s
and generate the resources to channel welfare to rural populations.
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The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act itself reveals how neoliberal
forces in the state, academe and think-tanks have successfully diluted the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act from providing extensive employment to providing only 100
days‘ work in a year, from providing employment to every adult to providing
employment only to each household, and from employing labor- intensive technologies to
allowing up to 40 per cent of expenditures in the intervention to be spent on capital.
To Chatterjee‘s notion of the state balancing neoliberalism with welfare I add the
idea that the inequalities caused by neoliberalism in one arena might be balanced by the
equalizing tendencies of neoliberalism in another area. Women‘s empowerment
exemplifies this. The Indian state has recently strengthened women‘s rights to land,
removed labor market barriers against women‘s participation in night-time work and
expanded women‘s employment in the government. While women form the logical site
of action for the patriarchal state to craft disciplined, regulated and useful bodies
necessary for the new market economy; women‘s economic empowerment may also
increase their economic agency.
The enactment of entrepreneurial agriculture in resource-poor communities by
elected leaders generates fresh insights into the relationship between capitalism and
democracy. Capitalism and democracy are regarded as theoretically antithetical- while
capitalism is considered to be tolerant of inequality, democracy is considered to be
predicated on each person‘s equal ability to influence the institutions affecting her.
However, the relationship between pro-market development policy and democratic
politics is far more complicated. Neoliberal development and democratic politics
mutually constitute each other- market-driven development generates economic resources
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to channel development patronage to local leaders, and political society actors in turn
appropriate the material technologies of neoliberal development to enhance their political
dominance.
Development subjects accept these distributional outcomes partly because they
can do no better than accept these outcomes and partly because capital does not come
from some external place to reorder society but interacts with people‘s aspirations and
desires. Like the state and the market, capital in fact has a long genus in eastern Gujarat
and is testimony to historical patterns of statemaking, market-integration and
accumulation. Capital achieves ends of accumulation, social reproduction and
consumption for development subjects, and development subjects‘ relationship with
capital is not necessarily simply antagonistic. Furthermore, people are not just producers
but also consumers and have other identities beyond the production-consumption binary.
All commodities including the inputs of high-value commodity production have ‗other
lives and other meanings‘ (Appadurai, 1986).
The Nature of Institutional Change in Rainfed Areas
The dissertation‘s findings show that market-based development does not unfold
through an internal logic but is produced contingently in contexts shaped by democracy,
electoral politics, spatial relations of power, history and the agency of social actors. In
Gujarat, the poster-state of the ‗success‘ of both Hindu nationalism and market reforms in
India, market-driven development is shaped by the historical context of communal
violence in eastern Gujarat, and India‘s largest political parties‘ attempts to stake a claim
to justice, material advancement, and what constitutes good governance in the state that is
the global beacon of the market. Watershed development in Dahod is shaped by the BJP219

led government‘s attempt to reestablish legitimacy in the district and struggle between the
BJP and Congress to stake a claim to delivering pro-poor development in Gujarat.
Market-driven development is produced by actors in the state, political society,
market and community, and shaped by the ends of social reproduction, economic
advancement and political control. Nationalized banks and enterprises craft markets in
credit and commodities and form critical alliances with political society actors including
sarpanches, ward members and lineage leaders to integrate semi-arid households into
commodity-circuits. Watershed development is shaped by the relative distribution of
authority, resources and power between dairies and milk sellers, banks and borrowers,
lineage leaders and members, sarpanches and vote brokers, Kolis and Adivasis, disputemediators and those governed by them, and well-owners and non-well-owners.
Development policy shapes the bargaining advantage of all actors not only substantive
terms with respect to material technologies, but also in procedural terms or with respect
to control over decision-making.
Implications and Recommendations for Development Policy
In the first decade of the 21st century, transnational donors such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, global policy organizations such as the
International Food Policy Research Institute and the Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research, and national governments have emphasized market-based agrarian
growth in regions and communities that were bypassed in the green revolution, including
the uplands, semi-arid areas, rainfed tracts, unirrigated regions, subsistence communities,
pastoral communities, small-scale communities in coastal and mountainous areas, and
forest-dependent communities (Deaton, 1999; Key & Runsten, 1999; Peters, 2004; Ponte,
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2002). Market-based development conjures markets as neutral entities, but markets are
simultaneously political and social, and are shaped by relative bargaining advantage
between commodity producers and firms. Market-based development also conjures
producers as hitherto being subsistence oriented, but as Dahod‘s case shows, those with
capital have always participated in cash-crop production. In the guise of the notion of
laissez-faire and the invisible hand, market-based development is in fact a moniker for a
particular oligopolistic form of the market dominated by large-scale capital and
attenuated capacities for commodity producers to shape crop choices, production
processes and prices.
In not only South Asia, Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia, but also North
America, East Asia and Europe, the liberalization of agricultural policy throughout the
1990s and its neoliberalization in the 2000s has emphasized high-value commodity
production in high-risk environments. High-value commodity production has adverse
implications for biodiversity conservation, natural resource conservation and entitlement
to common pool resources for the poorest households. In an era of climate change with
the greatest impending adverse effects anticipated for South Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa, and the brunt of detrimental effects falling on subsistence and natural resourcedependent communities, high-value commodity production appears to be a regressive
policy prescription from the standpoint of both food security and environmental
sustainability.
High-value commodity production is a contributor to the global food crisis
currently underway shaped by speculative trading in food-commodity markets (which
were deliberately kept out of stock market trade in many countries until recently,
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precisely to prevent price-shocks due to speculative trade), conversion of food-crop land
to biofuel and high-value commodity production, shift from low-input to input-intensive
and water-intensive agriculture, and the decline in smallholders‘ participation in
agriculture worldwide which as contributed to a decline in food-crop production. The
poor in developing countries are the worst affected by price-shocks which deepen
malnourishment and hunger, already endemic with states‘ withdrawal in the provision of
food security for the poor. High-value commodity production in the locality has adverse
implications for the global poor, in both the developing and developed worlds, because of
its spillover effect on global foodgrains prices.
Development policy is a specific type of institution that articulates goals, channels
resources and creates delivery mechanisms for economic improvement. Watershed
development policy constitutes rules which allocate resources for irrigation rather than
for drinking water and communal needs, for cash-crop production rather than food
security, and for increasing the capacities of those best able to participate in the ‗new‘
commodity production by subsidizing capital. Watershed development allocates decisionmaking powers to contractual staff, sarpanches and self-help groups‘ leaders, and
provides for no countervailing institutions above the panchayat and self-help groups
which members can take recourse to. Institutions matter in policy design because
institutions embody power relations and shape distributional outcomes (Knight, 1992).
Development policy has distributional dimensions because it shapes access to shared
resources on which private economic activity depends, including control over
groundwater, surface water, grasslands and forests. While recent scholarship in the social
sciences has emphasized ‗getting the institutions right‘ (North, 1990), a more fruitful line
222

of enquiry entails recognizing institutions as embodying the distribution of power among
stakeholders, and the policy incentives required for development that is more just,
sustainable and equitable in the present and the future.
Development policy both embodies power relations and configures them;
therefore policymakers need to consider the implications of capital-intensive and
irrigation-intensive technologies for household well-being and ecological security. The
drylands have the highest concentration of poverty in the world (Irz, Lin, Thirtle, &
Wiggins, 2001). The drylands are differentiated and while capital-intensification propels
better-off households‘ economic advancement; it undertakes an upward distribution of
communal natural resources in favor of wealthier households. The dominant policy turn
towards high-value commodity production in rainfed areas may adversely affect the
production of less energy-intensive and local foodgrains- maize, millets, barley and
dryland varieties of rice are examples from western India, increase local foodgrain prices
and hurt food security among marginal farmers and landless households.
Future Research
In closing, I return to recent changes in Mahipura, where Shankar in the main
village and Bharat in Bordi have each dug bore wells for commodity production,
choosing to tap into aquifers rather than deepen dug wells from which irrigation has to be
halted from time to time to wait for the well to be recharged. Other Chauhan families are
contemplating digging bore wells. Bore well-deepening is likely to lead to dug-well
owners‘ wells drying up. Shankar and Bharat‘s well-deepening spree has already
precluded the possibility for summer-well-owners and non-well-owners to dig
conventional wells and hit water. Incentives created by policy have long-term effects not
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only on those at whom they are directly aimed but also in terms of their externalities
which affect other social actors. Further research is needed to explore how energyintensive commodity production interacts with the political ecology of irrigation in semiarid areas, the impact of cash crop production on local food availability, and changes in
food consumption patterns, and impact on social relations in the drylands.

224

Appendix A: Household Questionnaire
Household number: ______ Date: ______________Hamlet: ___________________
Lineage: ______________Tribe/Caste: _______________ Village: _______________
I am going to ask you questions on your wealth, participation in the recent Hariyali
watershed development program, in village affairs and the panchayat. Please answer
these questions to the best of your knowledge. If there is any question you do not wish to
answer, please feel free to refrain.
1. Tell me about the composition of your household. Enumerate all the people that eat
from the same kitchen.
Name (First and last)

Gender

Age

Total household calorie requirement: _____________

Educational attainment

per day.

2. MEASURE OF INCOME:
*Period columns: days, weeks, months, year
Total income from wage work alone: ______________
Measure of total market integration: (wage/trade/rental/sale of home production):
________________
Measure of local market integration: (trade/rental/sale of home production):
_________________
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Income Source
(Describe in Detail)
Wage Labor (Casual
or Prof)
Trade (Not of own
goods—only profit
from purchase and resale)
Rental Income
Sale of Home
Production (Specify
Crop, Stock, Milk,
Meat, etc.)
Cash Remittances
(Specify Source)
In Kind Remittances
(Type&Source)
Other (Specify in
Detail)

Amount
(Corresponding
to
Period in the
Next Column)

Period
(Check
One)*
W
E
E
K
L
Y

M
O
N
T
H
L
Y

S
E
A
S
O
N
A
L
L
Y

A
N
N
U
A
L
L
Y

Code for
Source
of Income
(1) Wage
Labor
(2) Trade
Profit
(3) Rental
Income
(4) Sale
Home
Production
(5) Cash
Remittances
(6) In Kind
Remittances
(7) Other

Calculate
Annual
Income
from this
Source

Total
3. MEASURE OF WEALTH:
Wealth Source (All
Income Producing
Assets)
Farm Acreage –
Dry

Number (Acreage,
Livestock, etc.)

Code for Wealth
Source & Value of
one unit

(1) Dry Acreage
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Calculate total value
(for income earning
assets calculate
annual income
times life of asset)

Farm Acreage –
Wet

(2) Wet Acreage

Livestock

(3)

Farm Equipment
(Tractor, Plow,
Mill, Generator,
Thresher)
Rental Property
Wells (Bore/Dug,
Number, and Share
in each)
Other Capital
Equipment
(Sewing Machine,
Pipes, threshers
etc.)
Commercial
Vehicle (Truck,
Cart, Bicycle,
Tractor,
Motorcycle)
Shop
Other (Specify in
Detail)
Total

(4)

(5)
(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)
(10)

4. Please tell me how much food you got out of your land and livestock in the monsoon
season. Tell me about each plot of land, and how much you harvested. Was it a typical
harvest?
Crop

Harvest amount

Kilo amount
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Total Calories

5. Please tell me how much food you got out of your land and livestock in the winter
season. Was it a typical harvest?
Crop

Harvest amount

Kilo amount

Total Calories

6. Please tell me how much food you got out of your land (and livestock) in the summer
season. Was it a typical harvest?

Crop

Harvest amount

Kilo amount

Total Calories

Grand total of calories produced: __________
7. Are you a Below Poverty Line household? (Y/N)
What is your ration allotment of foodgrains, oil and sugar?
Total calories: _______________
Total calories available for consumption (home production plus ration allotment):
______________
8. Where do you fetch water for domestic use from? How far is your drinking water
source?
9. Are you a member of the local milk dairy?
10. Your village has undertaken watershed development. Is anyone in your household a
member of a Hariyali Self Help Group? (Y/N) (Code: 1/2)
11. If yes:

Name

Self-help
group

Group taking
bank loan?
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If yes, loan
amount

Asset
purchased

12. Has anyone in your household done wage labor on Hariyali since its inception, such
as check wall construction, nursery labor, demonstration plot labor, vermicompost or
pond-digging? Please tell in detail. (Code 1/2 for Y/N)
13. If yes:
Name

Gender

Age

Type of work

No. of days Wages

14. Has any of your land benefited directly or indirectly from any watershed development
activity such as well recharging, check wall construction, gully plugging, field bunding,
nala plugging, tank building/deepening or vermicomposting? Please describe in detail:
Type of
activity

Land area

Wages

Material
benefits

Impact on
agricultural
productivity

15. Is anyone in your household or your immediate extended family a member of the
panchayat? Please specify.
16. Is anyone in your household or your immediate extended family a member of the
dairy cooperative committee? Please specify.
17. Are you a member of the forest cooperative?
18. Do you or your spouse attend village assembly meetings? (Y/N) (Code 1/2)
19. Do you visit your ward member (sabhya) for development related questions, or have
you in the past two years?
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20. Do you visit the sarpanch for development related questions, or have you in the past
two years?
21. Do you visit the panchayat secretary (talati) for development related questions, or
have you in the past two years?
22. Do you visit the block level office for information on government development
schemes?
23. Please tell me the names of three people with whom you discuss village-level issues.
Name

Gender

Age

Tribe/Caste

Thank you for your time and for participating in the survey. I appreciate the information
and knowledge you shared.
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Appendix B: Lineage Leaders’ Interview Schedule
‗During household surveys in Mahipura I asked respondents who they would call upon to
mediate a dispute on land, wells or interpersonal disagreements. Many respondents stated
they would call upon you to resolve a conflict. I will ask you questions regarding your
role in dispute mediation.‘
Q.1. How do lineage-leaders resolve disputes?
Q. 2. Do disputing parties adhere to the council of elder‘s verdict or do wrongdoers often
repeat an offence? What do you and other agevaans do when an offence is repeated?
Q.3. Everyone in the village is not an agevaan. How did you develop an understanding of
what is wrong and right?
Q. 4. Lineage leaders may not see eye to eye in case of certain intractable conflicts. How
do dispute-mediators resolve disagreements among themselves?
Q. 5. When did you first resolve a dispute?
Q. 6. You resolve disputes in your lineage and hamlet. Do you also resolve disputes in
the rest of the village?
Q. 7. Household disputes, hamlet-level disputes, and village-wide disputes- what are the
different rules that apply to each one of them?
Q. 8. If the sarpanch commits wrongdoing, do lineage leaders sanction the sarpanch? If
the sarpanch is at fault, what do people do then?
Q. 9. Have you ever contested the panchayat election as a sarpanch-candidate or ward
member candidate?
Q. 10. As a lineage leader, do you lobby for development for your hamlet or lineage from
the sarpanch?
Q. 11. (To those who were ex-patels) Who in your opinion wields more power- the patel
or the sarpanch? How so?
Thank you for participating in the interview.
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Appendix C: Micro-Credit Group Leaders’ Interview Schedule
1. How did you learn about micro-credit being initiated in Mahipura? How did you join a
group?
2. How did you become the leader of your group?
3. Do you hold a meeting every month? How do you organize your group‘s monthly
meetings? Where are they held?
4. Do members contribute regularly? How do you try to ensure that members contribute
on time?
5. How do you deposit monies in the bank?
6. How long has the group been carrying our saving? Have members started internal
lending?
7. Have you thought of what kind of a loan you plan to secure once the group completes
internal lending?
8. Who writes meetings‘ minutes? How has the experience of writing technical minutes
for the group in an official register been? How do you deal with difficulties you
encounter in writing minutes?
9. Does the social development expert visit your group to explain hard-to-understand
procedures, norms of writing and rules of accounting? Do you have the social
development expert‘s contact information?
10. Have you ever called the social development expert to the village to assist you with
book-keeping and group-building? Do you intend to do so in future, or have you thought
about doing so?
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Appendix D: Micro-Credit Group Members’ Interview Schedule
1. How did you learn about micro-credit being initiated in Mahipura? How did you join a
group?
2. Why did you choose to join a micro-credit group? What kinds of benefits do you
envisage from it?
3. How was the leader of your group chosen?
4. Does your group have a meeting every month? Where is it held? How do you stay
informed about them?
5. How long has the group been carrying our saving? Have you started internal lending?
6. Has the group been allotted passbooks? Is a record of your monies entered in your
passbook?
7. (If the member has a personal passbook) Do you have your personal passbook with
you? If not, where is it kept?
8. Have you thought of what kind of a loan you plan to secure once your group completes
internal lending?
9. Does the social development expert visit your group to explain hard-to-understand
procedures, norms of writing and rules of accounting? Do you have the social
development expert‘s contact information?
10. Have you ever called the social development expert to the village to assist you with
book-keeping and group-building? Do you intend to do so in future, or have you thought
about doing so?
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Appendix E: Archival Documents

Documents Analyzed at the National Archives of India
Government of India, Home Department, Census Branch, June 1900, Part A, Reference
No. 46, No. 58, letter from H.H. Risley, Census Commissioner of India to all
Superintendents of Census Operations, dated 26th May 1900.
Government of India, Home Department, Census Branch, August 1900, Part A, Numbers
6-8, Sub: ‗Proposal of the British Association regarding ethnography, etc in connection
with the census of 1901‘.
Government of India, Home Department, Census Branch, November 1900, AProceedings, No. 1, Subject: ‗Question of undertaking ethnographical investigations at
the census of 1901‘ from the Finance and Commerce Department to Lord George Francis
Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, dated 1st November 1900.
Government of India, Home Department, Judicial Proceedings, March 1901, No. 271272, Sub: Proposal to amend paragraph 3 of Section 5 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists‘
Relief Act, 1879.
Government of India, Home Department, Public Branch, 1901, Part B. Proceedings for
October 1901, Nos. 3/5-3/7, Sub: ‗Cattle raid committed by Bhils of Mewar in the
Ahmedabad district‘, letter from officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana,
No. 3754-G, dated 22nd July 1901.
Government of India, Indian Irrigation Commission: Minutes of evidence of the Indian
Irrigation Commission for the Native States, 1902.
Government of India, Home Department, Public Branch, 1924, File No. 932/24, Sub:
‗Degree of control to be exercised by the Secretary of State and the Government of India
over irrigation works in the major provinces‘.
Government of India, Home Department, Public Branch, 1939, File No. 45/21/39, Sub:
‗Request from the Gujarat Research Society for fuller investigation of certain races of the
area known as Gujarat (including Kathiawar and Cutch)‘.
Government of India, Home Department, Public Branch, 1941, File No. 45/13/41, Sub:
‗Tabulation of caste within the areas under the jurisdiction of the Bombay Government‘.
Government of India, Home Department, Judicial Branch, 1930, File No. 546/30, Sub:
‗The Bombay Irrigation (Amendment) Act, 1931, Bill No. III of 1931.
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Government of India, Home Department, Public Branch, 1930, File No. 141/30, Sub:
‗Proposal to prepare a map of India showing the distribution of tribes and castes‘.
B. Documents of the Princely States
Bhopal Political Agency, File No. 1196/169 of1886, Sub: ‗Returns of forecast of cotton
crop‘, 1890, Revenue and Agriculture Department, Agriculture Resolution No. 358-369
C, dated the 13th March 1890, Calcutta.
Bhopal Political Agency, Foreign Department Branch, File No. 67. Letter No. 2128 from
Captain E. Barnes, Political Agent in Bhopawar to First Assistant to the Agent to the
Governor-General in Central India, dated 16/17 May, 1901, Jhabua.
Bhopal Political Agency, Foreign Department Branch, File No. 67. Letter No. 3362 from
Captain E. Barnes, Political Agent in Bhopawar to the First Assistant to the Agent to the
Governor-General in Central India, Dhar, dated 25th July, 1901.
Bhopal Political Agency, Foreign Branch, File No. 104 of 1902, Sub: ‗Board of Scientific
Advice‘, Resolution by Government of India, Department of Revenue and Agriculture,
Despatch from His Majesty‘s Secretary of State for India, No. 10-Rev, dated 17th January
1902.
Bhopal Political Agency General Branch (1830-1904) Part 1, Volume 1, No. 1-1272. File
No. 35-A, 1903. Administrative Report of Rajgarh State (1902-03): Memo on concession
granted to induce people to take up land for cultivation.
Bhopal Political Agency General Branch (1830-1904) Part 1, Volume 1, No. 1-1272. File
No. 35-A, 1903. Administrative Report of Rajgarh State (1902-03), Ref. No. 43, Subject:
Rajgarh Affairs: Survey and settlement operations.
Bhopal Political Agency General Branch (1830-1904) Part 1, Volume 1, S. No. 1-1272.
File No. 115, 1902. ‗Report on natural vegetable foods gathered and used by poor people
in years of scarcity or famines‘.
Bhopal Political Agency Foreign Department Branch, File No. 115. 1902. Circular No.
C/306, 1902. Subject: Natural vegetable foods.
Bhopal Political Agency Foreign Department Branch, File No. 4232/26, 1879: ‗Nonintervention of the government in the operations of private trade in times of famine‘.
Bhopal Political Agency, File No. 142/38 of 1899, letter titled ‗Famine or distress:
Weekly reports on conditions of crops‘ on weekly foodgrain prices from the
Superintendent of Pathari State to the Political Agent at Bhopal, Pathari State, dated 7 th
October 1899.
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Bhopal Political Agency, File No. 57A of 1897, Extract from the Proceedings of the
Government of India in the Department of Revenue and Agriculture, No. 35-245-26, Sub:
‗Resolution on the appointment of a Commission to formulate the experiences of famine
and the result of their deliberation‘ by Denzil Ibbetson, Secretary to the Government of
India, dated the 23rd December 1897.
Bhopal Political Agency, File No. 57A of 1897. Extract from the Proceedings of the
Government of India in the Department of Revenue and Agriculture, No. 36-240-5, Sub:
‗Resolution on the appointment of a Commission to formulate the experiences of famine
and the result of their deliberation‘ by Denzil Ibbetson, Secretary to the Government of
India, dated the 30th December 1897.
Bhopal Political Agency, Foreign Department Branch, File No. 67 of 1901. ‗Famine in
the Bhopawar Agency‘: excerpts from the travel diary of Lieutenant H. Stewart, Famine
Assistant, Bhopawar Agency.
Bhopal Political Agency 1902 No. 36 (Part 2), Administrative Report Narsingarh State:
1901-02.
Bhopal Political Agency 1902 No. 36 (Part 2), Administrative Report Narsingarh State:
1901-02: Administrative Report, Pathari State: 1901-02. Letter from the Superintendent,
Pathari to the Political Agent in Bhopal, dated 30th March 1902.
Bhopal Political Agency File No. 4463/102 of 1898. Letter No. 19 C titled ‗Gujars in
Dholpur State: Operations for Bringing under Control‘, from the Political Agent Eastern
States Rajputana to the First Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General Rajputana,
dated 1st April 1898.
Bhopal Political Agency File No.169 of 1899 No. 942, letter titled ‗Using forests as water
catchments to raise resources and revenues for agriculture‘, from the Superintendent,
Narsingarh State to the Political Agent in Bhopal, dated the 29th December 1899.
Gujarat States Agency File No. F 920/46, 1946, tour note of A.P.F. Hamilton, Director
General of Forests on the Bombay Deccan, to the Government of India in August 1945.
Bhopal Political Agency File No. 1196/169 of 1886, Agriculture Resolution No. 358-359,
Revenue and Agricultural Department, Calcutta, dated the 13 th March 1890.
Bhopal Political Agency, Finance Branch, File No. 90-742, Resolutions adopted on
‗Detailed programs of work for the ‗Grow More Food Campaign‘‘ by Mr. N.R. Sarkar,
member-in-charge of Education, Health and Lands Department, at the Food Production
Conference, New Delhi, 6th April, 1942.
Bhopal Political Agency, 1906, File No. 37, Sub: ‗Famine Protective Works: Irrigation‘,
extracts from Mr. Impey‘s Settlement Report of the Jhansi district for 1893.
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Documents Analyzed at the Nehru Memorial Library Archives
All India Congress Committee Papers Microfilm Roll No. 8639 File G-13, Part 1, 3, 4;
Resolutions of the meeting of the All India Depressed Classes League held at 9 Fort
Road, Allahabad on 22nd October 1939, forwarded by Ram Prasad Jaiswar, Secretary of
the All India Depressed Classes League, to Jawaharlal Nehru.
All India Congress Committee Papers Microfilm Roll No. 8607, File No. G-13, T.L. No.
869-R, 1936-37, Congress Socialist Supplement All-India Kisan Bulletin, Kisan Sabha‘s
Program for Peasant Welfare.
All India Congress Committee Papers Microfilm Roll No. 8681 ‗Kisan Organization‘
File, File No. ED-7/1947-48 (Part I).
All India Congress Committee Papers Microfilm Roll No. 8681, File G-13, Reference
No. A 923/36, letter titled ‗Re: The Agrarian Program‘ from R.R. Diwakar, Honorary
Secretary of the Indian National Congress to the President, Indian National Congress,
Karnataka Provincial Congress Committee, Dharwar, dated 15 th May 1936.
All India Congress Committee Papers Microfilm Roll No. 8634, File No. P 20 (Part2),
letter from R.S. Pandit, General Secretary of the United Provinces Provincial Congress
Committee, Lucknow to All District, City and Town Congress Committees, dated 27 th
July 1938.
All India Congress Committee Papers Microfilm Roll No. 8607, File No. G-13, T.L. No.
869-R, All-India Kisan Bulletin1936-37, Congress Socialist Supplement, Kisan Sabha
Newsletter (2), ‗Utkal Congress Committee lead on Kisan Question‘, Bombay, June 29
1937.
All India Congress Committee Papers Microfilm Roll No. 8607, File No. G-13, T.L. No.
869-R, All-India Kisan Bulletin1936-37, Congress Socialist Supplement, Kisan Sabha
Newsletter (2), Utkal Provincial Congress Committee (eastern India)‘s resolution adopted
on June 14.
All India Congress Committee Papers Microfilm Roll No. 8607, File No. G-13, T.L. No.
869-R, 1936-37, Kisan Bulletin, Bombay, 14 May, 1937, Agrarian File, Kisan Sabha
Bulletin entitled ‗Police search Bengal Kisan Office‘.
All India Congress Committee Papers Microfilm Roll No. 8635, File No. P.L. 13/1938
(Part II) through File No. 6/1938, letter regarding peasant rally in Allahabad from the
Collector, Allahabad, United Provinces to Jawaharlal Nehru, All India Congress
Committee Office, Allahabad.
All India Congress Committee Papers Microfilm Roll No. 8648, Congress disseminated a
questionnaire on national planning to ‗Provincial Governments, Indian states,
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Organizations of Trade, Industries, Commerce, Labor and agricultural Interests, firms and
corporations‘ asking in File G-23/1940 (KW-2)
All India Congress Committee Papers Microfilm Roll No. 8681Congress rhetoric on its
objectives addressed to members of the NPC, File No. ED-7/1947-48 (Part I),
All India Congress Committee Papers Microfilm Roll No. 8639 Note on the function of
the Irrigation Branch, Public Works Division, United Provinces, and its potential
contribution to national economic planning‖, File G-14/1939 Part III. National Planning,
1939-40, the Congress stated
All India Congress Committee Papers Microfilm Roll No. 8648, File G-23/1940 (KW 2),
Proceedings of the Economic Planning Committee Meeting chaired by Jawaharlal Nehru
on 11the December 1947 at Council House, New Delhi.
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Appendix F: Buffalo-loan Repayment at Two Percent Interest Compounded
Monthly

Month

Principal

2 per cent
interest
compounded
monthly

Principal
due at the
end of the
month

Milk
payment
deducte
d per
month

First calving
One
Two
Three
Four
Five
Six
Seven
Eight
Nine
Ten
Eleven
Twelve
First calving
interval= 15
months
Thirteen
(Dry)
Fourteen
Fifteen
Sixteen
Seventeen
Eighteen
Nineteen
Twenty
Twenty-one
Twenty-two
Twenty-three
Twenty-four
Twenty five
Twenty-six
Twentyseven
Second

14,000
13,568
13,127
12,677
12,218
11,750
11272
10784
10286
9778
9259
8730

1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825

14,288
13,847
13,397
12,938
12470
11992
11504
11006
10498
9979
9450
8910

720
720
720
720
720
720
720
720
720
720
720
720

8190

1.020591825

8359

0

8359
8531
8706
8886
9069
9255
9446
9641
9839
10042
10248
10459
10674
10894

1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825

8531
8706
8886
9069
9255
9446
9641
9839
10042
10248
10459
10674
10894
11119

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Principal at
month‘s
end

Principal
reduces
13,568
13,127
12,677
12,218
11,750
11272
10784
10286
9778
9259
8730
8190
Principal
increases

Principal
239

calving
Twenty-eight
Twenty-nine
Thirty
Thirty-one
Thirty-two
Thirty-three
Thirty-four
Thirty-five
Thirty-six
Thirty-seven
Thirty-eight
Thirty-nine
Second intercalving
period
Forty (Dry)
Forty-one
Forty-two
Forty-three
Forty-four
Forty-five
Forty-six
Forty-seven
Forty-eight
Forty-nine
Fifty
Fifty-one
Fifty-two
Fifty-three
Fifty-four
Third calving
Fifty five
Fifty six
Fifty seven
Fifty eight
Fifty nine
Sixty
Sixty one
Sixty two
Sixty three
Sixty four

11119
10627
10126
9615
9093
8560
8016
7461
6895
6317
5727
5125

1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825

11347
10846
10335
9813
9280
8736
8181
7615
7037
6447
5845
5231

720
720
720
720
720
720
720
720
720
720
720
720

4511
4604
4699
4795
4894
4995
5098
5203
5310
5419
5531
5645
5761
5880
6001

1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825

4604
4699
4795
4894
4995
5098
5203
5310
5419
5531
5645
5761
5880
6001
6124

nil
nil
Nil
Nil
nil
nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil

6124
5530
4924
4305
3674
3030
2372
1701
1016
317

1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825
1.020591825

6250
5644
5025
4394
3750
3092
2421
1736
1037
324
240

720
720
720
720
720
720
720
720
720
720

reduces
10627
10126
9615
9093
8560
8016
7461
6895
6317
5727
5125
4511
Principal
increases

Principal
reduces
5530
4924
4305
3674
3030
2372
1701
1016
317
Earn 396
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